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Perebutan minyak dan keganasan yang tercetus di rantau Delta Niger, Nigeria telah 
menarik perhatian para ilmuwan dan pembuat dasar dengan fokus kajian tertumpu pada 
faktor-faktor penyebabnya. Walau bagaimanapun, peranan golongan elit yang 
mencetuskan konflik ini kurang mendapat perhatian. Oleh itu, kajian ini bertujuan untuk 
mengisi kekosongan ini dengan mengkaji peranan yang dimainkan oleh golongan elit ini 
di dalam keganasan politik dan pilihan raya dan menganalisa tuntutan mereka terhadap 
pengawalan sumber dan penstrukturan semula politik Nigeria. Kajian ini menilai 
keberkesanan atau sebaliknya Program Pengampunan Presiden dan mengkaji ketelusan 
dan kepertanggungjawaban golongan elit di dalam pengurusan sumber.  Pendekatan 
dalam menyelesaikan  konflik ini turut dicadangkan di dalam kajian ini.  Kaedah kualitatif 
telah digunakan di dalam kajian ini bagi mendapatkan maklumat yang mendalam 
mengenai peranan golongan elit di dalam konflik Delta Niger. Bagi tujuan mengumpulan 
data, seramai dua belas orang telah ditemubual  di dalam kajian ini dengan menggunakan 
teknik temubual separa berstruktur. Temubual telah dijalankan  di empat buah negeri 
dengan menggunakan “purposive sampling” dan teknik snowballing dalam merekrut 
peserta. Temubual direkodkan dan kandungannya telah ditranskripsikan secara verbatim. 
Analisis tematik telah digunakan di dalam menganalisa data.  Dapatan kajian 
menunjukkan bahawa golongan elit telah menyumbangkan  kepada konflik tersebut bukan 
sahaja melalui salah urusan sumber di rantau ini, tetapi juga pembiayaan, pergaulan dan 
menyerapan  kumpulan militia ke dalam kerajaan. Mereka juga telah menerajui 
pengkajian semula formula pengagihan pendapatan dan mengesyorkan pengampunan 
untuk militan Delta Niger. Dapatan kajian juga menunjukkan bahawa syarikat minyak 
multinasional dan Kerajaan Persekutuan Nigeria  juga telah bertanggungjawab dalam 
mencetuskan keganasan di rantau ini.  Kedua-dua teori elit  - teori kawalan sumber dan 
teori frustrasi-pencerobohan, bersama-sama dengan model teoretis yang dibangunkan 
oleh penyelidik, dapat meningkatkan pemahaman tentang konflik ini. Kajian ini 
mencadangkan, antara lain, penggunaan sumber secara berhemat, penyediaan kemudahan 
sosial, pemantauan aktiviti-aktiviti syarikat minyak, dan menghukum  ahli-ahli  politik 
yang didapati bersalah kerana menyalahgunakan golongan belia untuk menimbulkan 
kekacauan.  Untuk mencapai keamanan di rantau ini, kajian ini memutuskan bahawa 
pelbagai pihak berkepentingan, terutama golongan elit, perlu memiliki kesungguhan 
politik dan menunjukkan komitmen terhadap pembangunan di rantau ini melalui tindakan 
dan bukannya  hanya dengan memberi ucapan retorik. 
 
 
Kata Kunci:  Politik Minyak, Keganasan Politik, Pilihanraya, Niger Delta, Nigeria, 












The scrambling for oil and the outbreak of violence in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria 
have    attracted the attentions of scholars and policymakers, with most of the research 
focus on their driving factors. Nonetheless, less attention has been given on the roles 
played by the elites in generating this conflict. Hence, this study is intended to fill this 
vacuum by examining the roles of these elites in political and electoral violence and 
analyzing their demands for resource control and political restructuring of Nigeria. It also 
assesses the effectiveness or otherwise of the Presidential Amnesty Programme and 
examines the transparency and accountability of the elites in the management of resources. 
This study recommends several measures to resolve this conflict. Qualitative method is 
used in this study to elicit in-depth information on the elites’ role in the Niger Delta 
conflict. Twelve interviewees took part in the study, and semi-structured interview 
technique was used for data gathering.  Interviews were conducted in four states, with 
purposive sampling and snowballing techniques were employed in recruiting the 
participants. The recorded interviews were transcribed verbatim. Thematic analysis 
technique was used to analyze the data. The findings show that the elites have contributed 
to the conflict through mismanagement of the region’s resources, and by financing, 
fraternising and co-opting militia groups into the government. They also spearheaded the 
upward review of the revenue allocation formula and recommended amnesty for Niger 
Delta militants. The research findings also demonstrate that multinational oil companies 
and the Nigerian Federal Government were also responsible for trigering terrorism in the 
region. Both elite theories - resource control and frustration-aggression theories, together 
with the theoretical model developed by the researcher, could enhance understanding of 
this conflict. This study recommends, among others, prudent use of resources, provision 
of social amenities, monitoring of activities of oil companies and sanctioning of politicians 
who are found guilty of misusing the youths to incite trouble. The study concludes that 
for peace to reign in the region, various stakeholders, especially the elites, should muster 
their political will and show commitment towards regional development through actions 
rather than just giving rhetorical speech.  
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 1.1 Introduction 
 
Oil and political violence in the oil belt region of Nigeria called the Niger Delta and 
the part played by the elite of the Niger Delta in the conflict are the focus of this study.  
The chapter gives an overview of the whole study and sets the stage for the subsequent 
chapters that follow. The chapter incorporates the background to the study, a statement 
of the problem, research questions, and the objectives, the significance of the study, 
the scope of the study, research method, definition of key terms, reliability and validity 
as well as organisation or structure of the study. 
 
 1.2 Background to the Study 
Oil is the most sought after natural resources in the globe by both developing and 
developed nations.  It is strategic because is the lifeblood of modern economies and 
the force behind the military machine (Renner as cited in Ejibunu, 2007). Several 
violent conflicts experienced today in different parts of the world are traceable to this 
non-renewable natural resource.  Ross (2004) and Humphreys (2005) considered oil 
to be prone to violence. For instance, Tombalbaye, former president of Chad was 
toppled in 1975 because of oil. Similarly, Humphreys (2005) avers that the control of 
oil wealth cannot be ignored in Chad’s politics.  It has brought and removed leaders 
from office and influenced the political agenda of the country.  In a like manner, 





the Turkana and Pokot communities in Northwestern Kenya were over land that 
contained about 600 million barrels of oil.  Meanwhile, oil was the reason for the Iraqi 
invasion of Kuwait and its subsequent annexation as one of the provinces of Iraq in 
1991 (Le Billion, 2005).  
 
Indeed, one distinct characteristic of resource abundance and dependent nations of the 
third world is a resource-based conflicts (MCNeish, 2011). Several studies have been 
conducted on the effect of abundant natural resources of developing countries on their 
development, conflict, and democracy. Prior to the late 1980s, there was a positive 
relationship between natural resources abundance and development, but since then, 
studies have shown that resource abundant nations are prone to unrest, poor 
governance and low economic performance (Collier & Hoeffler, 1998, 2000, Ross, 
2004; Humphreys, 2005; Collier, 2007; Kaldor, Karl, & Said, 2007). 
 
Nigeria, Africa’s leading oil producing nation and thirteenth in the world (African 
vault, n.d) is a good example of resource curse nation. Like other natural resource-
endowed countries like Algeria, Gabon, Congo DR, Angola, Iraq, Nigeria is 
confronted with numerous  problems among which are slower economic growth rate, 
pervasive corruptions, and political violence. These problems are features associated 
with the resource endowed nations.  For Ross (2012), non-oil states are getting 
wealthier, democratic and peaceful whereas the oil abundant and dependent nations in 







The significance of oil and its consequences cannot be overemphasized. Oil 
contributes substantially to Nigeria’s federally collected revenue. For example, from 
its initial N0.1 million contributions to government revenue in 1958, the share of oil 
contributions to government revenue rose to N3830.05 trillion in 2015 (Table 3.4, p. 
125). But the 2015 figure is low when compared to previous years and the reasons for 
these are low production due to the ongoing damage to oil infrastructure and the fall 
in the price of crude oil in the international market.    
 
Oil is instrumental to the growth and development of Nigeria. According to Murtala 
(cited in Martins, 2014) oil has promoted Nigeria’s image as a leading oil producing 
nation in Africa and also improved the nation’s economic advancement, infrastructural 
development, and welfare of the people. However, oil is also a source of conflict in 
resource endowed states. This ‘black gold’ has been the cause of violence in the Niger 
Delta of Nigeria. The resource curse thesis stipulates that natural resource-endowed 
countries are disposed to corruption, social crises, civil war and are also unable to use 
their wealth for economic growth (Pederson & Bazilian, 2014).   The map below shows 








Figure.1. 1 Map of Nigeria 
Source: Maps of the World (2014). 
 
The Niger Delta is the economic powerhouse of Nigeria due to its oil and gas (Adeola, 
2009) and this has made the region “economic jewel in the Nigerian crown” 
(Imobighe, 2004, p. 101).  Oil from the Niger Delta region accounts for 90% total 
export and 80% government revenue (Madugba, Ekwe & Okezie, 2016; Sayne & 
Hruby, 2016). 
 
The region derived its name from River Niger and is one of the trouble spots in the 
globe (Ogundiya, 2011).  It has a landmass of 70,000 square kilometres, representing 
7.5 % of Nigeria's total land area and a population of over 31million (Obi & Rustad, 





It comprises about forty different nationalities speaking about two hundred and fifty 
(250) languages and dialects (Kashi & Watts, 2008; Campbell, 2011). Some of these 
ethnic groups are Ogonis, Etches, Ikwerees, Ogbas, Ekpeyes, Engennes, Kalabaris, 
Ndoni, Efiks, Urhobos, Itsekiris, Oron, Igbos, Ika-Igbos, Ibeno, Bini, Bekwarras, 
Anag, Ijaw, Yorubas, etc. Their traditional professions are farming, fishing, and 
hunting, trading, collecting, and processing palm fruits (NDDC, 2004). 
  
Oil from the region has generated about $600 billion to the coffers of the Nigerian 
government since 1958 (Obi, 2010).  Despite the region’s contributions, it lacks social 
amenities.  For instance, it has 2% of federal roads, less than 30-40% of the settlements 
have electricity; educational facilities are inadequate (Olusola, 2013). According to 
Adeola (2009) “the region remains the most impoverished oil-bearing communities in 
the world.” (p.135). 
 
 
The Niger Delta incorporates nine states and this study focuses on four states in the 
area, namely: Akwa- Ibom, Bayelsa, Delta, and Rivers. They are the epic centres of 
the violence or militancy.  The map below shows the states that make up the region. 
The Niger Delta incorporates nine states and this study focuses on four states in the 
area, namely: Akwa- Ibom, Bayelsa, Delta, and Rivers. They are the epic centres of 







Figure.1. 2 Map of Niger Delta 
Source: NDDC (2004) p. 51  
 
 
Since the 1990s, the Niger Delta has been the hub of violence and revolt with a 
rekindled call for self-determination and resource control. It is vital at this stage to 
examine how the conflict started. In the early 1990s, the Niger Delta conflict took a 
new dimension with the formation of the Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People 
(MOSOP). The movement led by Ken Saro-Wiwa threatened to disturb the free flow 
of oil if the government did not meet their demands.  
 
The Ogoni activism was met with stiff state repression, which resulted in violence and 
the militarisation of the region (Okoli, 2013).  Since then, the region has been a scene 
of violent activities characterised by the bombing of oil installations, kidnapping and 






The conflict in the Niger Delta has been attributed to several factors. Some scholars 
have ascribed the problems to the centralised federal structure and the inequity in the 
distribution of proceeds from oil rent (Ikporukpo, 1996; Okoko & Nna, 1997; Ibaba, 
2005; Orobator, Ifowodo, & Edosa, 2005; Omotosho, 2010; Ebegbulem, 2011; 
Aworawo, 2013; Esikot, & Akpan, 2013; Ikunga, & Wilson, 2013). While others have 
credited it to ecological debasement and human rights infringements (Okonta & 
Oronto, 2001;   Aaron, 2006; Nwozor, 2010; Okumagba, 2012b; Oshwofasa, Anuta & 
Aiyedogbon, 2012; Ebegbulem, Ekpe, & Adejumo, 2013; Raji, Grundlingh, & 
Abejide, 2013; Akpan, 2014; Osah, & Alao, 2014; Nnorom, & Odigbo, 2015).  Yet, 
other scholars such as Inokoba and Imbua (2010), Ojo (2012),   Amadi and Abdullah 
(2012), Ako (2012), Ndu and Agbonifoh (2014), Enuoh and Iyang (2014) and 
Nwankwo (2015) have adduced poor corporate social obligation as a factor responsible 
for the conflict. Isumonah (2005), has ascribed the problem to hegemonic politics. 
Scholars like Ibaba (2005), Müller (2010) and Madubuko (2014) have attributed the 
cause to obnoxious laws that ruled the oil industry.  For Suberu (1996), Frynas (2000), 
Obeanu, (2002), Okonta and Oronto (2003) and Ekpolomo (2015), the conflict is 
attributable to ethnicity.   
 
 As can be seen the causes of the Niger Delta conflict have elicited different positions. 
There is no consensus, the above accounts, no doubt, can enhance our knowledge of 
the conflict as there are different perspectives in which the conflict was explained. 
However, because each of the different explanations focuses on one apparent factor as 
the core factor accounting for the conflict, it might not offer a satisfactory account of 
the real cause of the conflict. In other words, a single factor cannot explain fully the 





Interestingly, previous studies on Niger Delta paid little attention to the role the 
regional elites played in the conflict.  The period under review witnessed the increasing 
roles played by the elite in fuelling the conflict. The return to civil rule in 1999 
witnessed an increase in the derivation principle from 3 percent to 13 percent.  This 
means more money or cash for the zone compared to other regions of the country.  
However, the increase does not have any impact on the lives of the people instead it 
resulted in the struggle for power among the elite of the region.  Consequently, politics 
in the area became zero-sum in nature and the governing and non-governing elite alike 
employ unconventional means to retain and get into position. The 2003, 2007, 2011 
and 2015 elections in the region were soiled by violence. Notable politicians or 
political heavyweights such as James Ibori, DSP Alamieyeseigha and many others 
from the region were found wanting in terms of embezzlement of public funds 
 
Accordingly, the conflicts in the Niger Delta have led to the withdrawal of major 
petroleum companies from the region; increased the level of criminal activities such 
as kidnapping, oil bunkering, reduction in oil production and loss of revenue by the 
government (Oghoghoweh, & Ironkwe, 2012).   It is against this backdrop that this 
study examines oil and political-related violence in the Niger Delta of Nigeria with a 
focus on the role played by the regional elite in the conflict. 
 
1.3 Statement of Problem  
 
This study examines the role of regional elites in the Niger Delta conflict. Several 
explanations have been advanced and different theories have been used to explain the 
conflict. A number of studies (Enweremadu, 2008; Otite, 2009; Watts, 2009; Ibaba, & 





Suleiman, 2013; Babalola 2014) have shown that the elite contributed to the violence 
in the region through corruption which has negative effects on the development of the 
region. However, many of these studies are descriptive in nature and focus their 
attention on national elite and political office-holders only. More so, these studies have 
been overtaken by events in the country. 
 
Ordinarily, the discovery of oil in a community or state ought to be a thing of joy 
among the inhabitants because it brings about economic development by providing a 
development of infrastructure and industries for the communities where such resources 
are located. Unfortunately, oil has been a source of misery to the people of the Niger 
Delta region. The ‘black gold’ has destroyed their means of livelihood, environment, 
and created poverty. To the oil-bearing communities, oil is a curse rather than a 
blessing to them. 
 
The region has been engulfed in violence perpetrated by militants demanding a fair 
share of oil wealth, development of the region and welfare package for the indigent 
people of the area.  The insurgents financed and encouraged by some of the elite from 
the region kidnapped both nationals and foreigners for ransom (Etebu, Buseni, & 
Amamieyenimighan, 2011; Nte, 2011). For instance, the 2008 report on human rights 
practices in Nigeria by the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labour (2008) 
showed that 400 people were kidnapped in 2007.  According to Nte (2011, p. 64), the 
regional elite, notably retired generals, traditional rulers, top civil servants, politicians 






Consequently, the conflict has caused a decline in oil production. For instance, in 2005, 
the total oil production was 2.52 million bpd, it dropped to 2.11 million bpd in 2008, 
increased again to 2.45 bpd in 2010 and fell to 2.37pd in 2011 (Schultze-Kraft, 2013, 
p.25). The Technical Committee on Niger Delta (TCND, 2008, p. 9) report showed 
that Nigeria lost $27.2 billion to militancy in 2006; $18.8 billion in 2007 and $ 20.7 
billion in January- September 2008.  Similarly, Idowu (2012), noted that Nigeria lost 
150,000bpd to oil theft by the militants. This amounts to $1,500, 000 US dollars.  
 
The resumption of militancy in 2016 resulted in the destruction of critical oil 
infrastructure by the Niger Delta Avengers. Hence, Nigeria lost N1.3 billion daily to 
oil pipeline bombing and this affected the implementation of the 2016 budget.  
According to Babachir, Lawal, Secretary to the Government of Federation of Nigeria, 
the government’s revenue dropped by 80% to 60% due to the militancy in the region 
(cited in Adeosun, Ismail & Zengeni, 2016).    
 
Some studies have identified corruption among the elite as a reason for violence in the 
zone. Enweremadu (2008), posits that the misuse of oil rent by the political leaders of 
the region accounted for violence in the region. In a like manner, Omotosho (2011) 
argues that corruption and greediness of the elite triggered violence in the region. 
Similarly, Suleiman (2013) avers that corruption among the elite has worsened the 
conflict in the region.  By the same token, Babalola (2014) argues that corruption 







The central question posed by this thesis is: To what extent does the elite of Niger 
Delta extraction fuel and sustain the conflict in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria? 
Hence, this thesis examines the role of the national and provincial elites in the 
encouragement and sustenance of the Niger Delta conflict.  But the study will focus 
more on the provincial or regional elite of the Niger Delta and in answering the above 
central question, this study addresses the following specific questions: 
 
1.4 Research Questions 
 
1. How do the elites of the Niger Delta contribute to the political violence engulfing 
the region?  
2. Why are the elite of the Niger Delta demanding control of natural resources of the 
region  and political reorganisation of the country?  
3. How transparent and accountable are the elites of the Niger Delta in the management 
of the oil proceeds of the region? 
4. Has the amnesty programme advocated by the elite of the region tackled the Niger 












1.5 Research Objectives 
 
1. To examine the Niger Delta elites’ contribution to the political violence engulfing 
the region 
2. To analyse the reasons Niger Delta elites are demanding for resource control and 
political reorganisation of Nigeria  
3. To examine the transparency and accountability of the Niger Delta elites in the 
management of the oil proceeds of the region. 
4. To assess whether the amnesty programme championed by the elite of the Niger 
Delta has addressed the conflict. 
 
1.6 Significance of the Study 
 
The conflict in the Niger Delta has always been viewed from the lens of the 
institutional and national elite deprivation of the region resources for development. 
The national elites castigate the regional elites as the architect of the region’s problem. 
Former Nigerian leader Olusegun Obasanjo accused the elites of Niger Delta 
extraction of encouraging the agitation in the region (Obasanjo, 2007). Thus, the state 
of anomie of the region in which militia groups have continued their violent activities 
unabated; the flow of resources to the region without commensurate development and 
the intense struggle among them for the control of these resources have made it 








Hence, the study contributes to the growing body of literature on Niger Delta crisis. 
Specifically, it fills the lacuna in the extant literature.  Previous studies (Ebegbulem, 
2011; Aworawo, 2013; Esikot, & Akpan, 2013; Ikunga, & Wilson, 2013)  have  
focused on institutions (Federal Government and Multinational Oil Companies) and 
little attention has been paid to the role of the elite of  the Niger Delta extraction in the 
Niger Delta conflict. Thus, this study contributes to the understanding of conflict 
dynamics of the region through the new perspective it offers to the ongoing conflict in 
the region.  
 
The study would be of utmost importance to the academia, security agencies, civil 
society organizations and non-governmental organizations.  For the academia, the 
findings of the study would serve as resource materials that can be used in further 
research; the security agencies would equally found the study useful in their attempt 
to address the security challenges facing the region and the country at large; for the 
civil society organisations and non-governmental organisations, the study’s findings 
would be of help to the groups who are engaging in advocacy and rendering assistance 
towards the development of the region but have little knowledge with regard to the 
region. Hence, this study will be of valuable assistance to them. 
 
Several studies (Abegunde, 2013; Aminu, 2013; Olusola, 2013; Oluwaleye, 2013; 
Abang, 2014; Ojo, 2015; Akinbobola & Aderoba, 2016)  have used frustration-
aggression theory and others (Enweremadu, 2008; Watts, 2010; Jegede, et.al, 2012; 
Abegunde, 2014;  Osaghae, 2015) have employed the resource curse theory to analyse 
the Niger Delta debacle.  Also, elite theory has been used to analyse Niger Delta 





This study combined elite, resource curse theory and frustration-aggression theories. 
The advantage of this is that it makes up for the inadequacies or weaknesses of the 
others. 
 
1.7 Scope of Research 
 
The research work covers the period from 2005- 2016. The logic behind the choice of 
this period is that 2005 marks a turning point in the Niger Delta struggle. It marked the 
commencement of insurgency in the region (Watts, 2007). The Movement for the 
Emancipation of Niger Delta (MEND) was formed in 2005 and it executed violent 
activities in the region such as kidnapping, killing, extortion and destruction of oil 
pipelines. During this period, armed groups received financial boost from some elite 
in the region (Watts, 2009; Ibaba & Ikelegbe, 2010). Indeed, the conflict in the region 
was at its zenith during this period.  Moreover, some of the political office holders of 
the region were convicted during this period.  In 2016, a new militant group called the 
Niger Delta Avengers (NDA) came on board and its activities led to devastating effects 
not only on the environment of the Niger Delta but also on the nation’s economy, 
generation and distribution of electricity (Adeosun, et al, 2016).  
 
During the period under review, there was also the change of baton from an indigene 
of the Niger Delta to a Hausa-Fulani man from the North. In other words, the nation 
witnessed for the first time an opposition candidate unseating an incumbent president.  
This change of guard also affected how Niger Delta conflict was handled.  The policy 






The president had revoked the juicy contracts of pipeline surveillance awarded by the 
previous administration to some of the ex-militant leaders (International Crisis Group, 
2015). Also, the administration has signified its plan to discontinue the amnesty 
programme in 2017.  
 
Akwa-Ibom, Bayelsa, Delta and Rivers States are the focus of this study and the four 
states put together produced eighty percent of crude oil production in Nigeria (Oil-
Revenue, 2013), they are the epic centres of the violence.  Moreover, the allocation to 
these states from the centre are more than others in the federation (Osaghae, 2015).  
The analysis will not foreclose other states of the region, but these four states are the 
focus of this study.    
 
1.8 Definition of Terms 
 
It is vital that in a study of this nature, there is a need to clarify concepts or terms that 
are used. Thus, this segment of the study clarifies the four concepts that are germane 
to this discourse and they are: oil politics, violence, Niger Delta and regional elite. 
 
Oil Politics: It entails the various manoeuvring and actions by the key actors in the 
Niger Delta conflict regarding issue pertaining to oil such as its ownership, 
management, allocation of its proceeds and participation.  
 
Violence: It means maiming, killing, kidnapping, bombing of oil installations, 






Regional Elite: It consists of elected and non-elected public servants in the region and 
also those representing the region at the centre. In addition, the traditional and 
economic elite from the region are also included.  For instance, elected officials, civil 
servants, political appointees, members of the armed forces, heads of parastatals, extra-
ministerial or departments and traditional rulers.  Therefore, the regional elite are the 
ruling elite of the region as well as those representing the region at the centre 
(ministers, governors, senators, members of the HOR, Member State House Assembly, 
Civil Servant, Traditional Ruler and Chairman of local Council). 
 
Niger Delta:  It comprises Abia, Akwa Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross River, Delta, Edo, Imo, 
Ondo, and Rivers. Thus, these four states namely Akwa Ibom, Bayelsa, Delta and 
Rivers states are the focus of this study.  
 
1.9 Research Method 
 
This segment of the study discusses issues relating to how the study was conducted. 
But before examining the nuts and bolts of how the study was conducted. It is vital to 
define the term method.  According to Cohen and Manion (1980, p.26), method refers 
to “a range of approaches used in research to collect data which are used as the basis 
for inference and interpretation, for explanation and prediction”. This study adopted 
qualitative method and the rationale for this was to have an in-depth comprehension 
of the conflict in the Niger Delta. This type of research (qualitative) is flexible and the 







Moreover, it enables the researcher to explore issues from multiple sources of 
information, including interviews, observations and published documents, etc. 
(Dawson 2002).  Hence, the researcher obtained documents from the websites of the 
Federal Ministries of Finance and Budget and National Planning. The documents 
centred on monthly revenue allocation to the federation. In other words, the approach 
allows the researcher to find out people’s views about the conflict and the part played 
by the elite in fuelling and sustaining it.  It is vital to define what qualitative research 
is.  
 
A Qualitative research is one “that uses data that do not indicate an ordinal value” 
(Nkwi, Nyamongo, & Ryan, 2001, p.1). It is a research that involves collecting and 
working with text, sound or images.  Similarly, Creswell (2005) defined Qualitative 
research as: 
a type of educational research in which the researcher relies on the 
view of participants, asks broad, general questions, collects data 
consisting largely of words (or texts) from participants, describes 
and analyses these words for themes and conducts the inquiry in a 
subjective, biased manner (p.39). 
 
 
1.9.1 Research Philosophy 
 
It is important to examine the epistemological and ontological perspectives of research 
philosophy. In research, epistemological issues are concerned with how knowledge is 
known (Creswell, 2013). According to Creswell (2013), it is incumbent on the 
researcher to conduct studies in the field where participants live and work. In the words 
of Mathews and Ross (2010), “epistemology is the theory of knowledge and how we 





Ontology is concerned with the nature of reality and its characteristics (Creswell, 
2013).  Similarly, Bryman (2012) describes it as the nature of what we know. For 
Mathews and Ross (2010) ontology refers to “the science of what is, of the kinds and 
structures of objects, properties, events, processes and relations in every area of 
reality” (p.17). 
 
The philosophical foundation of this work is Interpretivism. It covers varied 
philosophical approaches such as constructivism, symbolic interactionism, and 
ethnomethodology. It centred on understanding social phenomena from the 
perspectives of those involved. This approach rejects the application of scientific 
method to the study of social behaviour because human nature or behaviour are very 
difficult to understand and advocate for an approach that takes cognizance of the 
different social dynamism of a study (Bryman, 2012).  
 
The import of the philosophical basis of this research is, it influences the formulation 
of the problem, research question and the method of data collection (Hull, 2009). The 
kernel of Interpretivism is well captured by Walsham (1993) in his explanation of the 
term.  He notes that:  
Interpretive methods of research start from the position that our 
knowledge of reality, including the domain of human action, is a 
social construction by human actors and that this applies equally to 
researchers. Thus, there is no objective reality which can be 
discovered by researchers and replicated by others, in contrast to the 








1.9.2 Case Study 
 
It is imperative at this juncture to examine the case study design. There is no agreement 
among scholars as to the meaning of case study. Scholars like Punch (2005); Bryman 
(2013) and Creswell (2013) see case study as a research design. For others Cohen, 
Manion, and Morrison, (2007), it is a style of research while Stake (1995) sees it as an 
object of research. In the light of this, Tight (2010) submits that case study can be “a 
method, approach, style, strategy or design.” (p.331). 
 
Yin (2003) defines case study “as an empirical inquiry that investigates a 
contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context; when the boundaries between 
phenomenon and context are not clearly evident; and in which multiple sources of 
evidence are used” (p.23).  
 
For Stake (1995), case study research refers to a study and analysis of a single or 
collective case, intended to capture the complexity of the object of study.  According 
to Stake (1998) a case study is “both the process of learning about the case and the 
product of our learning” (p.87). Hyett, Kenny, and Dickson-Swift (2014) identify two 
popular case study approaches.  
 
The first is associated with Stake (1995) and Merriam (2009) and is situated in social 
constructivist paradigm while the second approaches associated with scholars such as 
Esienhardt (1989), Yin (2012) and Flybjerg (cited in Hyett, et al, 2014) is from the 






This research is situated within the social constructivism paradigm. The researcher 
looked at the issue from the standpoint of the participants and had personal interaction 
with the case. The case was developed in conjunction with the participants and the 
finding was based on the views expressed by the participants and the interpretation of 
these views by the researcher (Stake, 1995; Merriam, 2009).  
 
Several writers such as Stake (1995), Merriam (2009) and Creswell (2013) have 
discussed how to select a case and one of the factors identified in the selection of a 
case to study, is the uniqueness of a case. Niger Delta is unique; it is the oil belt of 
Nigeria. The region is the goose that laid the golden egg but is the least developed part 
of Nigeria. Since the 1990s, it has been the hub of a limited war between the militant 
and the Nigerian State with no solution in sight.  
 
The conflict is ongoing and the government needs a right diagnosis of the problem to 
be able to resolve it. Therefore, employing this design will enrich our understanding 
of the problem and thereby proffering a solution to the conflict. 
 
1.9.3 Data Collection 
 
The primary data for this study was collected through interview. Interviews are useful 
data collection for allowing interviewees give in-depth answers about a complex issue 
(Bowling, 2002). Semi-Structured Interview format was adopted and it involves a 
process whereby the researcher offers topic and questions carefully designed to the 
interviewee to elicit his or her view on the topic of interest or phenomenon being 
researched. In this type of interview, the interviewee has a latitude in how he responds 





Besides, questions that are not part of the interview guide may be asked (Bryman, 
2012). The secondary data sources include published interviews, journal articles, 
books, periodicals, newspaper articles, internet materials, etc. 
 
1.9.3.1 Sampling Strategy 
 
The study employed a non-probability sampling strategy as the researcher is only 
interested in analysing social process or phenomenon, not in achieving statistical 
representativeness (May & Pope, 1995). A purposive sampling technique was used 
and it involves a non- random way of selecting participants for research, which allow 
individuals to be selected because they have knowledge relevant to the study (Bowling, 
2002).  In accordance with that, twelve participants that cut across academic, military 
or para- military, civil society groups and youth were interviewed. This was augmented 
with interviews of prominent leaders of thought and politicians in the print and 
electronic media.  
 
There is no accord among scholars about the appropriate number of those to be 
interviewed in the qualitative study. Bertaux (1981) contends that fifteen is the 
minimum acceptable sample size while Morse (1994) recommends six participants.   
According to Bernard (2000), most ethnographic studies are based on thirty-sixty 
interviews whereas Guest, Bunce, and Johnson (2006) suggest twelve interviews and 
Creswell (2007) suggests ten participants.  
 
A total number of twelve participants took part in the study and this is within the range 
suggested by Morse (1994), Guest Bunce and Johnson (2006) and Creswell (2007). 





1.9.3.2 Preparing For Interview 
 
As part of the preparation for the interview, the researcher acquainted himself with the 
extant literature to be current about the conflict in the region and to be able to ask vital 
questions during the interview proper. The researcher availed himself with necessary 
interview skills and materials that were to be used during the interview and ensured 
that they were all in good working conditions.  The researcher called friends who were 
residing in the various states where the interview would be conducted for logistics 
support.  During this period, the potential participants for the study were contacted to 
seek their consent and appointment. 
 
1.9.3.3 Conduct of the Interview 
 
The interview was conducted between May and July 2016.  A total number of twelve 
interviewees took part in the study and out of which three of the interviewees did not 
allow the researcher to audio- tape them. The interview session was conducted in 
English Language and it took place in Warri, Delta State, Port-Harcourt, Rivers State 
and Yenagoa in Bayelsa. State. The last interview took place in Kano because the 
interviewee was in the state at the time of the interview and on an average, the duration 
of the interview was thirty- minutes.  
 
Before the commencement of the interview, a written consent form was given to the 
interviewees to go through and sign.  The interview centred on finding out their 
perceptions of the conflict in the oil-rich region of Nigeria and the part played by the 
elite in four major areas, political-cum electoral violence, resource control and political 





During the interview, techniques like probing for further information, asking for 
examples, seeking clarifications were employed, each of which is considered a core 
skill of interviewing (Gillham, 2005).  The Table 1.1 shows the list of the interviewees. 
 
Table 1.1 
Coded list of Interviewees   
S/No Date Code Place/Location Position 
1 1/05/16 001 Taylor Creek, Yenagoa, 
Bayelsa State 
Traditional ruler 
2 3/05/16 002 Yenagoa, Bayelsa Youth 
3 3/05/16 003 Yenagoa, Bayelsa State Youth 
4 4/05/16 004 Secretariat,Yenagoa, Bayelsa 
State 
Civil Servant/ CLO 
5 30/5/16 005 Warri, Delta state Lawyer/Politician 
6 1/6/16 006 Warri, Delta state Retired-Military 
officer 
7 1/6/16 007 Diobu, Port-Harcourt, Rivers 
State 
Youth leader 




9 2/6/16 009 Tombia, Port-Harcourt, 
Rivers State 
Chief/ CSO 
10 2/6/16 010 Tombia, Port-Harcourt, 
Rivers State 
Academic 
11 3/6/16 011 Tombia, Port-Harcourt, 
Rivers State 
Academic 
12 16/7/16 012 Mariri, Taurani, Kano state Academic 
 







1.9.4 Data Analysis 
 
The interviews have been transcribed verbatim. This increases the strength of the 
research findings as it enables the researcher a valid account of what he heard during 
the interview (Robson, 2002).  The interview transcripts were analysed thematically. 
Before describing how the analysis was conducted, it is essential to first discuss what 
thematic analysis is and its phases or procedure. According to Clarke and Braun 
(2014), thematic analysis refers to a method for identifying and analysing patterns of 
meaning (themes) in qualitative data.   
 
The term was credited to Gerald Holton, who introduced it in 1970 and since then 
different versions have been introduced within psychology and social sciences to 
analyse qualitative data (cited in Clarke & Braun, 2014).  It can be used to address 
most types of research questions; it analyses major types of qualitative data ranging 
from secondary to textual and interactive data; it analyses large or small data and can 
be used within different theoretical frameworks (Clarke & Braun, 2014).  
 
 Scholars have argued that there is no one generally acceptable way of conducting 
thematic analysis (Braun & Clark, 2006). However, Braun and Clarke (2006) 











The Table 1.2 contains the various steps involved in thematic data analysis 
Table 1. 2  
Phases of Thematic Analysis 
Phase Description of the process 
1. Familiarising yourself 
with your data: 
Transcribing data (if necessary), reading and re-
reading the data, noting down initial ideas. 
2. Generating initial codes: Coding interesting features of the data in a systematic 
fashion across the entire data set, collating data 
relevant to each code. 
3. Searching for themes: Collating codes into potential themes, gathering all 
data relevant to each potential theme. 
4. Reviewing themes: Checking in the themes work in relation to the coded 
extracts (Level 1) and the entire data set (Level 2), 
generating a thematic ‘map’ of the analysis. 
5. Defining and naming 
themes: 
Ongoing analysis to refine the specifics of each theme, 
and the overall story the analysis tells; generating clear 
definitions and names for each theme. 
6. Producing the report: The final opportunity for analysis. Selection of vivid, 
compelling extract examples, the final analysis of 
selected extracts, relating back of the analysis to the 
research question and literature, producing a scholarly 
report of the analysis. 
 
Source:  Braun and Clarke (2006) pp. 77-101. 
  
After transcribing the data verbatim, the data management and analysis were done 
manually. As already indicated or stated above, the researcher employed the use of 
thematic analysis of data. The researcher read and re-read the data to be familiar with 
the contents, making a preliminary observation about the data. Then went ahead to 






 The researcher combined prepared themes (based on the research questions) and 
emergent themes from the data to sort out the responses of the interviewees into 
different categories. As the iterative process continued, some adjustments were made 
along the line and the interviewee's responses were grouped together based on the 
themes and the relevant quotes or statements of the interviewees were used to buttress 
the issues discussed and these were supported by relevant works in the literature and 
published interviews. 
 
1.9.5 Reliability and Validity 
 
Scholars have queried the appropriateness of the use of these terms in qualitative 
research (Guba, 1981; Lincoln & Guba, 1985, 1986; Healy & Perry, 2000; Steinke, 
2004) because these terms are synonymous with quantitative research and the 
worldview of this approach is different from that of qualitative research. Therefore, 
qualitative research should be judged by its own paradigm’s term (Healy & Perry, 
2000).   However, Patton (2002) argues that reliability and validity should be applied 
to measure the quality of a qualitative study.  
 
Following Lincoln and Guba (1985), trustworthiness and authenticity are the term used 
in qualitative research and trustworthiness is further divided into four aspects namely: 
credibility, transferability, dependability and conformability. Therefore,  this  study 
employs Lincoln and Guba (1985)  trustworthiness  concept which has  four aspects 
and one of which is  the credibility which deals with the truth of the findings and it has 





engagement and peer debriefing (Guba, 1981; Lincoln & Guba, 1985; Creswell & 
Miller, 2000).    
 
The researcher employed two of these strategies to establish the credibility of the 
research and these are member-checking and triangulation. Member checking involves 
a process whereby the researcher takes data and interpretations back to the participants 
in the study so that they can confirm the credibility of the information and narrative 
accounts (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). During the fieldwork, the researcher employed the 
member-checking among the interviewees to give their verdict on the interview 
transcripts whether it captured their views.  
 
Triangulation involves the use of different sources of data collection methods and a 
wide range of interviewees (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). The use of interviews, 
observation (verbal and non-verbal) and documents as well as the different 
interviewees that took part in the study ensure the credibility of the study by cross 
verifying the same information. For instance, the data obtained through the interviews 
and observation were verified through secondary source like the literature and 
documents. Also, the use of a wide range of interviewees such as political, traditional 
ruler, academician, youth leader, military personnel enabled the researcher to verify 
the data obtained from A by also going through B, C, to check the veracity of the 
information elicited from them. Thus, contributing to the trustworthiness of the 
research.   
 
The transferability of the study is ensured through rich description of the method used 





context.  The dependability of this work has been established by two anonymous 
reviewers who examined the method of inquiry.  
 
Lastly, confirmability which can be likened to the quantitative concept of objectivity 
has also been established through confirmability audit and this shows that data exist in 
support of every interpretation and that the interpretations have been made in ways 
consistent with the available data (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). The interpretations made 
are not only supported by available data obtained from the field, but also the researcher 
ensures that they are a true reflection of what transpired in the fieldwork and free of 
researcher biases.  
 
1.10 Organization of Study 
 
The study is partitioned into eight chapters. The first chapter is the general introduction 
and provides an overview of the work. It incorporates the background of the study, a 
statement of the problem, research questions, research objectives, significance of the 
study, scope of the study, research method, the definition of terms, and organisation or 
structure of the study.  
 
The second chapter is the literature review and theoretical framework. The chapter 
examines the related works on the Niger Delta conflict, dissect and synthesis them and 
also analyses the underlying theories employ for the study while Chapter three 
discusses the evolution of the Nigerian state and Niger Delta conflict. It examines, 
among others, history of Nigeria, Niger Delta agitation and the contribution of oil to 






Chapter Four titled the roles of elite in Niger Delta conflict examines the political 
contribution of the elite to the Niger Delta conflict. Issues such as emergence and 
composition of elite and political-cum electoral violence are examined. 
 
Chapter Five is a follow-up to the preceding chapter and is titled Resource Control and 
Political Restructuring. It analyses among others, the meaning of resource control and 
its rationale, federalism and its other components such as fiscal federalism and revenue 
allocation. 
 
Chapter Six titled Elite and Management of Resources deals with the management of 
resource of the Niger Delta.  The chapter focuses on the mismanagement of oil wealth. 
It discusses how elite at the federal and region have managed the resources of the state.  
Besides, it discusses how the elite have ignored the social sector in budgetary 
allocation and focus more on those sectors that are beneficial to them.  The impacts of 
mismanagement of resources which are identified as corruption, underdevelopment, 
poverty and debt accumulated by the region were thoroughly discussed. 
 
Chapter Seven titled Elite and The Presidential Amnesty Programme. As the title 
suggests, the chapter examines the amnesty programme, its strengths, and weaknesses. 
The chapter also discusses previous attempts to address the conflict. While chapter 
eight is the summary and conclusion.  The chapter gives an overview of the study, 










This chapter introduces the study and stating the fundamental problems and objectives 
of the study. A brief background of the study has been discussed and details will be 
analysed in the chapter that follows this one. This chapter also examines among others, 
the significance of study, scope, and the definition of terms.  This chapter has given a 
general overview of the study and the next chapter examines the conceptual review of 
literature germane to the study, a review of existing studies and the review of theories 




















This segment of the study is divided into conceptual review of the literature, empirical 
and theoretical review of the literature. The conceptual review of the literature 
discusses the three concepts that are germane to this study and these concepts are 
politics, violence, and elite.   An idea expressed in a short phrase or word is known as 
concept (Heywood, 2001, p. 1). 
 
2.1.1 Politics, Violence and Elite: An Explanation 
 
i. Politics 
Any attempt to define politics must first and foremost, free it or disentangle it from 
popular misconceptions. Politics is seen as deceit, manipulation, disruption, violence 
and lies.  Henry Adams described it as 'the systematic organization of hatreds” (cited 
in Heywood, 2002, p.4). It is important at this juncture to define politics.  The concept 
politics belongs to what Gallie (cited in Heywood, 2000, 2002) calls “essentially 






Politics in its widest sense means activity involving law enactment, preservation and 
reformation of laws under which people live. There are four angles from which politics 
can be viewed. Firstly, it is an art of government and essentially state activity.     
 
Secondly, it entails management of community’s affairs. Thirdly, it involves resolution 
of conflict by compromise, conciliation, and negotiation rather than using physical 
force. Lastly, politics entails production, distribution, and use of resources. This 
implies that power is central to politics.  Power may be defined as the ability to achieve 
an outcome via whatever means (Heywood, 2000).  
 
In line with these different viewpoints, scholars have defined politics in diverse ways. 
For examples, Easton (1979, 1981), sees politics as the 'authoritative allocation of 
values'.  This implies that politics includes the different methods via which government 
reacts to demands from the people by a way of rewards or punishments.   
 
Authoritative values are commonly accepted in the society and are believed to be 
binding on the people. For Lasswell (cited in Hanley, 2010), politics refers to who gets 
what, when and how. Ryan (2012) defines politics as the practice and theory of 
influencing people at an individual or civic level for directing them toward the desired 
destiny. Leftwich (2015) describes politics as actions concerning making and 
implementing collective decisions.  For Hay (2010), politics involves compromising, 
building consensus and forming coalitions. Hanley (2010) defines politics as all 
behaviour applied to determine who gets what, when and how in a situation where 
there are two or more people.  Politics has also been defined as the art and power of 





From the foregoing, there is no consensus among scholars as to the meaning of politics 
and this points to the fact that politics means different thing to different people. Harold 
Lasswell conceptualization of politics as “who gets what, when and how” is 
appropriate to this study as it enables us to understand the intrigues and manoeuvring 
concerning how the proceeds from the oil wealth are distributed and the conflict that 
arises from such distribution as well as its resolution.  
 
Therefore, oil politics may be described as the machinations concerning government 
policies over issues relating to oil resources ownership, participation and the 
distribution of proceeds from oil resources (Abraham, 2009). Similarly, Eghweree, 
(2015, p. 239), defines oil politics as the “intrigue that accompanies the exploration of 
oil mineral resources in oil-rich and dependent states.” Thus, oil politics is the 
manoeuvres and power play surrounding the ownership of oil and the distribution of 
proceeds from its sale among the component units of the Nigerian federation. 
  
ii. Violence  
Violence, like other social sciences concepts such as authority justice and rights, 
belongs to a class of concept known as contested. This stems from the fact that there 
is no unanimous agreement among scholars as to its meaning. Pontara (1978), contends 
that defining violence has been the major preoccupation of political philosophers, 
political scientist and peace researchers over the years. Similarly, Imbusch (cited in de 
Haan, 2008) describes the concept violence as “one of the most elusive and difficult 
concepts in the social sciences” (p.37). This is because there is no generally accepted 





Ikelegbe (2011) describes violence as “the use of force, intimidation and psychosocial 
and physical injury in the context of personal or social relations, or in the pursuit of 
set goals” (p.125). World Health Organisation (2002) defines violence as  
the intentional use of physical force or power, threatened or actual, against oneself, 
another person, or against a group of communities, that either result in or has a high 
likelihood of resulting in injury, death, psychological harm, mal-development or 
deprivation (p.5). 
 
This study will use Ojakorotu and Gilbert’s (2010) definition of violence as its working 
definition. For them, violence means: 
the deliberate deployment of instruments of physical force by the 
various stakeholders in the oil industry in Nigeria, for the 
achievement of their respective objectives and goals with regards to 
the exploration, exploitation, and appropriation of crude oil and its 
accruable benefits in the Niger Delta region (p.1) 
 
iii. Elite 
Elite is a widely-used concept in everyday discourse and academia. There is no 
agreement among scholars as to who introduced the concept into the social science 
lexicon- cum political science. Korom (2015) credited Vilfredo Pareto to have 
introduced the term while Zuckerman (1977) credited Mosca as the originator of the 
concept. According to Lasswell (1952, p. 6), “elites are the power holders of a body 
politic; they are the holders of high positions in a given society”. By the same token, 
Soanes, Hawker, and Elliott (cited in Ibietan, & Ajayi, 2015, p. 15) define the elite as 






In the same vein, Yamokoski and Dubrow, (cited in Lopez, 2013) define elite as actors 
controlling resources, occupying key positions and relating through power networks. 
Equally, Menges (cited in Azeez & Ibukunoluwa, 2015, p. 152) define the elite as, “a 
descriptive term designating those who hold high positions in a society”.  
 
For Azeez and Ibukunola (2015, p. 152) “elite is a group of persons exercising the 
major share of authority or influence within a larger group or society. That is, they are 
sets of people with the highest indices in their areas of endeavour”.  Putnam (cited in 
Ibodje & Allen, 2009, p. 166), defines elite as those with more power than others.   
 
According to Ibodje and Allen power in this sense is the ability to influence directly 
or indirectly politics and state activity. Higley (2010, p.163) defines elite as “persons 
who by virtue of their strategic locations in large or otherwise pivotal organisation and 
movements are able to affect political outcomes regularly and substantially”.  For him, 
elites are people with the capacity to cause political trouble without being suppressed. 
He describes the elite as including not only the established and prestigious ones such 
as top businessmen, politicians, senior military officers, civil servants but also less 
known leaders in their own rights. For this study, Higley’s conception of elite shall be 
our guide. 
 
The foregoing definitions clearly show that there is no common agreement among 
scholars as to its meaning and this can be seen in the different phrases ‘holders of high 
or key positions’ the ‘best’, ‘major share of authority’. The problem of some of these 
definitions is that there are some elites that are not holding high or key positions and 





The notion that elite constitute the best in a society has its own limitation. Sometimes, 
a group of elite occupying a key position may not necessarily be the best or the society 
first-eleven. Moreover, the above definitions are too broad and we need to narrow 
down to specific and therefore for the purpose of this study, elite refers to the political 
or ruling elite that comprise of both elected and non-elected officials, economic elite 
and traditional rulers who exercise influence on policy making and execution.  
 
2.1.2 Nigeria’s Niger Delta Conflict: A General Overview of Existing Studies 
 
This section of the study analyses related works on Niger Delta conflict. It examines 
among others, the role of elite in the conflict in other climes, Nigeria as well as Niger 
Delta. 
 
Several studies have shown that elite played a critical role in conflict (Migdal, 1988; 
Reno, 1998a; 1998b; De Juan, 2008; Gore, 2008; Sebudubudu & Botlhomilwe, 2011; 
Day & Enough Project Team, 2016; Melendez, 2016). For example, Migdal (1988) 
argues that the politics of survival played by the elite accounted for conflict. Similarly, 
the political and religious elites played prominent role in the 1990s Bosnia conflict.  
For instance, Slobodan Milosevic needed the support of Orthodox Church leader to 
legitimise his rule and also his expansion agenda. The Cleric supported him in order 
to pave way for their influence in the Bosnian Society (De Juan, 2008). Hence, elites 








Nigeria is bedevilled with numerous conflicts ranging from communal, ethnic and 
religious conflicts.  There are several studies on the conflict in Nigeria (Jacob & Saad, 
2011; Haliru, 2012; Onapajo, 2012; Saheed, 2012; Joshua, 2013; kalejaiye & Aliyu, 
2013; Suleiman, 2013, Ebeh & Nkemnole, 2016). These studies examine the issue of 
violent conflicts in Nigeria from different angles. For example, Jacob and Saad (2013) 
argue that the manipulation of the Constitution by the political and religious leaders in 
the country who are not able to meet the needs of their people in their respective states 
accounted for violent conflict in the country.     
 
Haliru (2012) focuses on ethnicity and how the elite have employed it to cause 
disaffection among the people to achieve their selfish ends. Onapajo (2012) work 
centres on religion and political violence while Saheed (2012) focuses on an economic 
dimension of the social conflict in Nigeria.  On their part, Obeidi (2012) and Suleiman 
(2013b) examine corruption within the governing elite in Nigeria and argue that it has 
led to the re-routing of public funds into private pockets and contributed to socio-
economic maladies confronting the country. These works examine corruption from the 
national perspective and how the various elite across the country have been involved 
in these social vices. However, no attempt was made to focus on a detailed study of a 
particular region or state.  It is important to note that these studies provided background 
to the examination of specific cases.  
 
Omilusi (2015) work centres on the nature and character of Nigeria’s political elite 
and how it has affected the structure of Nigerian federalism. He argues that the elite 
used state machinery to amass power and distribute resources based on loyalty (which 





Similarly, Adeyeri (2013) examines the factors militating against political stability and 
development in Nigeria and avers that the way elite sustain themselves in power 
accounted for instability in the country.  He maintains that elite hold on to power 
because of patronage and this they do through the creation and control of a large chunk 
of the wealth which they distribute to those that support them and denied those that do 
not and this has resulted in violence because those who were denied also wanted to 
have access to such resources.  These are insightful analyses of the use of patronage to 
garner support by those who are at the helms of affairs in the country and it is also a 
source of discord among groups in the nation, who may have been neglected due to 
their uncompromising stand against the power that is or their relative position in the 
scheme of things in the country.   
 
Kuka (2012) blames the elite for the numerous socio-economic and political problems 
confronting the nation. Similarly, Abdullahi Ganduje, the governor of Kano State, 
maintains that the elite in the country had contributed to the promotion of violence and 
conflict in the country and warned that it would no longer be tolerated (Today, April 
12, 2015). 
 
Mbah and Edeh (2017) argue that the struggle for state power between Northern and 
Southern elites has intensified national conflict and insurgencies in Nigeria. Though 
this work focuses on Boko Haram, its arguments are relevant to the Niger Delta 
conflict because the southern elites, especially those from the Niger Delta has 
attributed their predicament to the domination of the political leadership of Nigeria by 






Folami (2017) argues that the imbalance in the distribution of oil wealth generated 
conflict in the region. Although the study centered on ethnic conflict, these conflicts 
have an economic undertone. That is the struggle for the control of oil wealth.  
 
While numerous studies have been conducted on Niger Delta conflict, there have been 
few studies that focus on the role of the elite in the Niger Delta imbroglio. Besides, 
many of these studies are descriptive in nature and have been overtaken by events.  For 
instance, Ogungbemi (2010) argues that elite made up of political office holders are 
the “unseen hands” supporting the militants in the region. Others such as Omotosho 
(2011), Ayokhai (2013), Suleiman (2013a), Babalola (2014) and Bakare (2015) 
maintain that the elite have added to the aggravation of the Niger Delta crisis through 
corruption and recommend that resources should be well managed for the benefit of 
the oil producing communities in particular and the nation at large. Most of these 
studies are descriptive and relied on secondary sources of data while the present study 
uses both primary and secondary sources of data and is also based on a combined 
theories of elite, resource curse and frustration- aggression.   
 
A majority number of studies (Akpabio & Akpan 2010; Omotosho 2010; Ebegbulem, 
2011; Aworawo, 2012; Mahler 2012; Egbe, 2013; Esikot & Akpan, 2013; Ikunga and 
Wilson 2013; Raji, Grundlingh & Abejide, 2013; Abegunde 2013; Aaron, 2015) have 
pointed to the defective federal system and absence of equity in the disbursement of 
revenue among the federating units as the cause of conflict in the Niger Delta.  The 
people of the Niger Delta are dissatisfied with how rents accrue from oil proceeds are 





This is one of the major grievances of the people and is responsible for the armed 
conflict against the Nigerian state.  As Cederman, Wimmer, and Min (2010) and 
Cederman, Weidmann, and Gleditsch (2011) contend that countries that exclude and 
discriminate against minorities ethnic group are prone to internal armed conflict. 
 
In contrast, Osaghae (2015) questions the view that the defective federal structure and 
injustice in the revenue allocation formula as reasons for the conflict. He argues that 
there is no exact proof, especially with regards to public expenditure to strengthen the 
statement and further goes to argue that state governments are not answerable to the 
central government for the way domestic and foreign loans are used. 
 
On the impacts of oil on the environment in Niger Delta, studies have shown that it 
has negative effects. It affects the people means of livelihood; creates poverty and 
unemployment and causes health related problems. Studies and report (Aaron, 2006; 
Akhakpe, 2012; Akpan, 2014; Amnesty International, 2009; Environmental Rights 
Action/Friends of the Earth Nigeria and Oil Watch Africa, 2012; Oshwofasa, Anuta, 
& Aiyedogbon, 2012; Madubuko, 2014) have examined the effects of oil exploration 
activities of the multinational oil companies operating in the region on the ecosystem.  
The findings show that the activities of the oil companies result in wiping out the 
aquatic life, environmental debasement of the region through oil spills, gas flaring, and 








Meanwhile, the narrative on the environmental problem in the Niger Delta has been 
associated with ethnic hegemony. This narrative holds that the dominant ethnic groups, 
namely the Yoruba, Hausa-Fulani, and Igbo which in local parlance are known as 
WAZOBIA (a term that stands for “come” in the three major ethnic groups' languages. 
WA- Yoruba word for come; Zo- Hausa word for come and BIA- Igbo word for come) 
used their position as the major ethnic groups occupying top positions in the nation to 
benefit their people and deprived the Niger Delta region of development funds to solve 
myriads of problems including environmental problems confronting the region 
(Osaghae, 1995; Ukaga, Ukiwo & Ibaba, 2012).   
 
However, this view has been debunked by Akpan (2006), who contends that 
environmental neglect, social exploitation and other problems confronting the region 
is not peculiar to the region alone and cannot be attributed to ethnic victimisation.  
Besides, a single factor cannot sufficiently explain the happenings in the Niger Delta. 
 
Other studies that have examined environmental conflict in relation to poverty abound 
in the literature. For instance, Saliu,  Saka, and Abdullahi (2007) and Ebegbulem, Ekpe 
and Adejumo (2013) argue that the unfriendly attitude of the oil exploration by the 
multi-national oil companies in the Niger Delta have caused environmental 
degradation which in turn caused poverty. Opukiri and Ibaba (2008), examine the 
connection between environmental degradation and population displacement in the 
Niger Delta and submit that oil-related conflict has reduced the productivity of the oil- 
bearing communities, resulting in occupational and income losses, and affecting both 





Similarly, Aworawo (2013), asserts that environmental degradation is central to the 
Niger Delta debacle, as it has hindered rural economic activities and threaten human 
security.   
 
The above studies and numerous others that centred on the environment and its affinity 
with other contemporary socioeconomic problems put to rest the primacy of 
environmental factor in the Niger Delta conflict.  This further confirms the assertion 
made by Aworawo (2013), that environmental degradation is central to the Niger Delta 
conflict. However, another scholar sees the alienation and dispossession of the people 
of their resources at the heart of the violent conflict in the region (Ukiwo, 2011). 
 
The socio-economic factors which include poverty, unemployment, corruption, and 
underdevelopment are drivers of violence in the Niger Delta region. For political 
marginalisation, the thesis holds that Niger Deltans have been excluded in the national 
politics of Nigeria.  However, Aaron (2015) and Osaghae (2015) reject this claim. The 
happenings in the polity between 2010 and 2015 served as an evidence that the region 
was not marginalised in national politics.  
 
Prior to his ascension to the prestigious office of the President and Commander- in-
Chief of the Armed Forces of the Federal Republic of Nigeria in 2010, Goodluck 
Jonathan was the vice-president of Nigeria from 2007-2010, the first by any civilian 
of Ijaw ethnic extraction and since then, indigenes from the region  have been 
appointed into covetable positions as Minister of Petroleum, National Security 





Maritime Administration and Safety Agency (NIMASA) and so on (Aaron, 2015; 
Osaghae, 2015, p. 120).     
 
Other studies (Watts, 2008; Emmanuel, Olayiwola and Babatunde, 2009; Babatunde, 
2010) attribute the Niger Delta debacle to economic and political marginalisation and 
suggest improvement in the infrastructure and fair distribution of resources. Other 
studies, (Wali, 2008; Saka, 2011a) have ascribed the conflict to governance deficit and 
suggest good governance as a panacea to the conflict.  
 
Scholars such as Duru (2010), Gilbert (2010) and Ojakorotu (2010) examine the 
consequence of oil violence and contend that it has deepened the country’s problem 
and that of the Gulf of Guinea. For instance, Ojakorotu (2010) examines the 
consequences of oil violence in the Niger Delta and contends that the major 
stakeholders in the conflict have different views of the meaning of security. He further 
maintains that the Nigerian state and the multi-national oil companies views of security 
centred on state-centric while the people of the region view it as human security. The 
failure to reconcile these views have perpetuated violence in the region.  This position 
improved our understanding of the conflict but it is insufficient to explain the dynamics 
of the conflict in the region. 
 
 Ugoh (2010) and Agbiboa and Maiangwa (2012) studies centred on the issue of 
development confronting the Niger Delta. They argue that the developmental 
challenges facing the region cannot be isolated from the general predicament facing 
the Nigerian state. Nigeria state is weak and marked by wasted oil rents, bureaucratic 





Other works examine the activities of the security forces of the Nigerian state, militants 
and the propelling factors for militants’ emergence. Scholars like Osaghae, Ikelegbe, 
Olarinmoye and Okhonmina, 2007, Ibaba, 2011, Okumabga, 2012 and Madubuko, 
(2014) examine the issue of militancy in the region and argue that the militarisation of 
the region through the Joint Task Force (JTF) has added to the increment in violence 
and the infringement of human rights of the general populace through the activities of 
the force who maimed, murdered and assaulted ladies.  
 
Nwonwu (2010) argues the activities of the militants are unconstitutional but that they 
are inevitable because of the neglect of the region by both the Nigerian state and the 
multi-national oil companies while Epelle (2010) avers that oil violence in the Niger 
Delta is the manifestation of the failure of the social contract between the Nigerian 
state and the people of the region. In other words, the neglect of the region by the 
central government to provide essential service for the people of the region and the 
country in general.  
 
Interestingly, Oyefusi (2009) and Agiboa (2013) attribute the violence to lack of trust 
and break down of the social contract between the government and the people. There 
are pertinent questions that they failed to address. What was the content of the 
agreement and how did the breakdown lead to violence in the region?  
 
In contrast to above studies, Enweremadu (2008) and Okonofua (2013) disagree with 
the narratives on the Niger Delta conflict which attribute the violence to corruption, 
unemployment, underdevelopment, poverty, weak state institution, defective federal 





by powerful individuals who use violence to secure an economic advantage from the 
transnational oil companies. He submits that unless the contribution of these powerful 
groups is painstakingly teased out and the structures they have constructed which serve 
their interests are destroyed, peace would remain an illusion in the Niger Delta.  
 
In as much as these studies offer a valuable understanding of the conflict in the region 
by critically examining the role of powerful individuals in the society, it fails to 
consider the collaboration between the powerful individuals and the ruling elite in the 
region. This present study incorporates these powerful individuals and the ruling elite 
in the region and also provides an updated analysis of the conflict in the region. 
 
From the foregoing studies or literature reviewed, the main causes of conflict are the 
defective federal system, environmental degradation, poor corporate social 
responsibility, unfair revenue allocation formula, ethnic-based political domination 
and so on (Ojakorotu, 2009). The studies identify the Federal Government and oil 
companies as being the cause of the problems confronting the region.  
 
This is buttressed by the Human Rights Violations Investigation Commission 
otherwise known as Oputa Panel, which accused both Federal Government and 
Multinational oil companies (MNOC) as being responsible for the Niger Delta crisis.   
 According to the report (as cited in Ojakorotu, 2009), the Nigerian state represented 
by the FGN was accused of not protecting the minorities by abandoning its primary 






The MNOCs were accused of not operating under internationally acceptable minimum 
standards, as their activities have caused oil spillage, gas flaring, and others.  They 
have also been accused of nonchalant attitude towards their host communities where 
they drill oil. Moreover, they gave the communities token as compensation, which 
cannot improve their standard of living. They also employed a divide and rule tactics 
to cause disaffection and conflict among different oil bearing communities in the 
region through a divisive strategy of compensation payment (Ojakorotu, 2009). 
 
From the literature -reviewed above, the roles played by the elite both political and 
non-political office holders of the Niger Delta extractions have been given little 
attention by previous studies (Enweremadu, 2008; Orluwene,2008; Otite, 2009; Watts, 
2009; Ibaba, & Ikelegbe, 2010; Omotoso, 2011; Saka, 2011a; Jegede,  Joshua,  & 
Olorunyomi, 2012;  Suleiman, 2013a; Babalola 2014 ). Besides, many of these studies 
are descriptive in nature and focus on corruption.  Furthermore, many of them also 
centred their attention on national elite and political office-holders only. More so, these 
studies have been overtaken by events in the country.    
 
Orluwene (2008) enumerates elites contribution to the Niger Delta conflict through 
environmental degradation, obnoxious laws, among others.  This study used a 
secondary source of data and analysis centred on the elites at the centre. In a like 
manner, Otite (2009) argues that the elites of the Niger Delta extraction have been 
responsible for the underdevelopment of the region through the pillage of the treasury. 





Moreover, a single factor cannot explain the complexity of the conflict. The paper 
relies on secondary sources of data. Notwithstanding, the paper offers an insightful 
analysis on the role of elites in the conflict.  
 
 By the same token, Omotoso (2011) argues that corruption and the accumulation of 
wealth by the elite are the causes of the Niger Delta conflict and identifies other actors 
as government officials, oil cartels, ethnic militants and other groups as being 
responsible for the conflict.  However, it fails to specify which of the elite- national or 
regional. Besides, the paper is a desk research that relies on secondary source data 
only. Nevertheless, it gives an insight into the cause of the conflict and the actors 
involved in the conflict.  
 
Jegede, Joshua, and Olorunyomi (2012) argue that corruption among the indigenous 
elites supported by the oil companies have been the bane of the problem in the Niger 
Delta. The paper relied on secondary sources of data.  Agbiboa and Maiangwa (2012) 
contend that the elites at both local and state levels are corrupt and are responsible for 
the poor state of governance in the region. However, they failed to pinpoint how the 
corruption was perpetrated. Similarly, Suleiman (2013a) analyses the role Niger Delta 
elites played in the underdevelopment of the region and avers that they have 
contributed to its underdevelopment through corruption. By the same token, Babalola 
(2014) argues that corruption among the regional political officer cannot be ignored in 







 These studies offer an invaluable contribution to the understanding of the elites role 
in the conflict. However, their focus on corruption alone cannot explain the dynamics 
and complex nature of the conflict and the numerous roles played by the elites.  This 
study takes a holistic view of the conflict and examines the different roles played by 
the elites in the conflict. 
 
This study will fill this gap in the literature by analysing the part played by these elite. 
This new explanation offers by this study will improve upon the previous ones and 
enable us to have a clearer picture and better understanding of the Niger Delta conflict 
to be able to find a lasting solution to the conflict. The figure 2.1 below shows the 










   
 
Figure 2. 1 Actors in the Niger Delta Conflict 
Source Adapted from Adeola (2009) p.146 
 
From the above diagram, the unholy alliance between the Federal Government and the 
Transnational Oil Companies (in the form of 60: 40 joint ownership of oil revenue) is 
responsible for the insensitivity to environmental issues and outright disregard for 
environmental law and human rights violation by the oil companies. The poor 
corporate social responsibility and inadequate compensation infuriated anger and 
violent conflict between the oil-bearing communities and the transnational oil 
companies operating in the area (Adeola, 2009).  
 
The state instead of acting as an unbiased arbitrator in mediating in the conflict, it 
became part of the problem and this is evident in the militarisation of the region and 





Thus, the oil- bearing communities have no confidence in the government to mediate 
in the conflict because of its vested interests.  The inner triangle represents the gap (the 
elite of Niger Delta extraction) and their roles in the conflict have not been fully 
examined in the literature. This study, therefore, fills that gap.  
 
As the figure above shows, there is a collaboration between the federal government 
and the elite at the regional level in the Niger Delta in the form of appointment of the 
indigenes to federal agencies (NDDC, MNDA) saddled with the responsibility of 
developing the area and different collaborative efforts between the centre and the 
regions in developing the area.  The elite of the region failure to provide good 
governance and prudent management of the scarce resources elicited violence on the 
part of the oil-bearing communities and the power struggle among the elite for the 
control of oil wealth led to militancy in the region (Adeola, 2009). 
 
For the elite to finance their activities such as payment of their retinue of staff and 
political campaign, they need extra cash; for security surveillance contract, for 
compensation pay to oil-bearing communities for the destruction of farmland or 
spillage; for corporate social responsibility and lot more. There is a collaboration 










Where incitement/ violence takes, place is when the multinational oil companies 
pursue divide and rule policy playing one community against the other and also a 
situation in which contracts are awarded to rival companies or outsiders by the multi-
national oil companies, the businessman/ businessmen who are affected by this action 
may incite their people against the oil companies  by brain-wash them that what is their 
right has been awarded to outsiders and indigene of such oil-bearing communities will 
be incited to  destroy oil infrastructure.  Some section of the elite of the region connived 
with some staff of the transnational oil companies and security agencies to steal crude 
oil (Akpomera, 2015). 
 
2.2 Theoretical Framework 
 
Scholars have used different theories to explain the Niger Delta conflict and some of 
the most popular theories are frustration-aggression theory, resource control and elite 
theory. Numerous studies (Abegunde, 2013; Aminu, 2013; Olusola, 2013; Oluwaleye, 
2013; Abang, 2014; Ojo, 2015; Akinbobola & Aderoba, 2016)  have used frustration-
aggression theory while others (Enweremadu, 2008; Watts, 2010; Jegede, et.al, 2012; 
Abegunde, 2014;  Osaghae, 2015) have employed resource curse theory to analyse the 
Niger Delta debacle.  Also, elite theory has been used to analyse the Niger Delta 
conflict (Orluwene, 2008; Otite, 2009; Omotoso, 2011; Suleiman, 2013a, 2013b).  
This study combined elite, resource curse and frustration-aggression theories to form 
an integrated theoretical approach. The advantage of this is that it makes up for the 
inadequacies or weaknesses of the others.  
 
The choice of elite theory as the main theory is because elite decide how the political 





developmental direction of a country by the way they allocate resources. When 
resources are equitably distributed, development and peace prevail but when resources 
are unjustly allocated, underdevelopment and violence prevail (Eghweree, 2015). 
While frustration-aggression and resource curse theories enrich our comprehension of 
the motive or driving force for the conflict. The figure 2.2 below illustrates the 




Figure 2. 2 Theoretical Framework Model.  
Source:  The Researcher.  
                               
 
The figure 2.2 above represents an onion which displays the relationship among the 
various layers of the concentric circles where the items in each ring depend on the 










part represents the oil and the fierce battles or struggle for its control among elite lead 
to violence.  
 
More so, the action or inaction of elite about oil resources management or its 
distribution among component units in a federation like Nigeria and among units 
within a federation can lead to violence.  To paraphrase Lasswell (1950), the elite 
decide who gets what of the oil wealth, when and how.  Moreover, the control of this 
resource as earlier pointed out is a source of conflict among different elite group.    
 
Meanwhile, elite are the managers that direct and allocate resources among competing 
groups in the society. The failure of the elite to use these resources to improve the 
living condition of all may cause people revolting against those they perceive to be 
responsible for their predicament (unemployment, poverty, etc.). 
 
The resource curse thesis states that resource (oil) abundance countries tend to perform 
poorly when compared to less endowed nations and are also associated with poor 
management of resources which results in corruption and violence.  From the resource 
curse theory, it can be deduced that oil instead of being a blessing to the inhabitant of 
the area where the resources are found, it becomes a curse to them because of 
mismanagement of the proceeds of the wealth.    
 
 
For the inhabitants of oil-producing communities or states, they expect to derive 
benefits from this resource in terms of the development of the region. For instance, 





electricity and other good things of life that make life meaningful. Unfortunately, these 
social amenities are lacking and the people live in abject poverty. As a result, they 
became frustrated and blamed those they perceived to be responsible for their 
predicament. For instance, the youth in the Niger Delta consider the multi-national oil 
companies and the federal government represented by the elite from the dominant 
ethnic groups as being the stumbling block to the realisation of their dreams of 
benefiting from the abundance natural resources found in their region and because of 
this the multi-national oil companies were the targets of the youth who used violence 
means to show their displeasure to them for depriving them of enjoying the benefits of 
being owner of the oil and gas resources found in their domains. They destroyed oil 
installations or facilities and also kidnapped oil workers for ransom.  
 
Thus, frustration-aggression arises because of the youths being unable to benefit from 
the oil wealth which has been cornered by the elite and used to take care of themselves 
and their immediate families. The consequence of this is violence which is also 
instigated by the elite.  
 
2.2.1 Elite Theory   
   
 In every society or organisation either developed or developing, simple or complex, a 
class of people selected or elected occupies the topmost position in such society or 
organisation and this is due to their educational attainment or skills position and in 
some cases, birth (royalty) this category of people are known as elite.  
 
The term elite refers to “a selected and small group of citizens and or organizations 





control or are situated at the top of societies” (Vergara, 2013, p.32). The elite theory 
stipulates that power is concentrated in the hands of a small group known as the ‘elite’ 
in any given society (cf. Julius, 2014).This small group is called ‘Guardians’ by Plato 
in his work “Republic” (cf Julius, 2014). There are several versions of the elite theory 
ranging from that developed by Vilfredo Pareto, Gaetano Mosca, Robert Michels, C, 
Wright Mills, Floyd Hunters and a host of others (Ibietan & Ajayi, 2015; Odubanjo & 
Alabi, 2014).  
 
Pareto, in his insightful study of the elite, divided the elite into governing and non-
governing elite and ascribes to the group scholarly prevalence or predominance which 
differentiated them from the general populace. Similarly, Mosca (cited in Odubajo & 
Alabi, 2014), divides society into the ruling class and non-ruling class. The ruling 
/political class is the elite and the sub-elite. The sub-elite class in this setting alludes 
to technocrats, managers and civil servants, who are above the masses as far as access 
to opportunity from a state.   The elite class which consists of governing and non- 
governing elite are highly organised compared to the masses and, as a result, they 
cannot be dared by the masses (Odubajo & Alabi, 2014).  
 
Mitchel analysis is centred on bureaucracy and not the actual government 
undertakings. He contends that every social and political organization in a society is 
run by a few minorities, which make the decisions. He attributes the oligarchic 
tendencies of an organisation to the complex nature of the organisation, the nature of 
human beings and the phenomenon of leadership (cited in Odubanjo & Alabi, 2014). 





Both classical and modern elite theorists emphasised the domination of the masses by 
the elite. Burnham (1943), examines the economic dimension of this domination while 
Mills (1956), discusses the institutional aspect of elite domination (Eghweree, 2015).  
The major thrust of the elite theory is as follows:  
 
In every society, there is and must always be a minority which rules. According to 
Michels (1962), “it is an organisation, which gives birth to the domination of the 
elected over the electors, of the mandataries over the mandators, of the delegates over 
the delegtators. Who says organisation says oligarchy” (p.15).  This indicates that the 
oligarchy is a rational derivative of the organisation. In addition, Pareto argues that 
minority is inevitable in all societies – developed or developing simple or complex 
society. This minority that rules derived its initial power almost always from a force 
like the monopoly of military power.  But with time, this power is transformed into 
domination through routinization. The minority ruling circle comprised all those who 
occupy powerful political positions.  
 
Changes in the ruling class occur through many ways; the recruitment of those from 
the lower strata of the society into the ruling elite group.  Another way is that a new 
group is integrated into the governing elite or by a complete replacement by a “counter-
elite” through a revolution.   These changes in the composition of the elite group are 
known as the circulation of elite.   
 
According to Pareto, people are ruled by elite, where throughout human history, the 





In his words, “elite or aristocrats do not last. They live or take a position in a certain 
time. History is a graveyard of aristocracies” (cited in Ibietan & Ajayi, 2015, p. 16).  
Interestingly, the changes in the composition of the elite group affect just the form and 
not the structure of society, which remain always minority dominated (Aregbesola, 
2013).  In other words, the rule by few minorities is unavoidable in human society.  
The importance or utility of this theory (elite theory) to Niger Delta conflict is that it 
enhances our understanding of the conflict. The elite through their actions such as 
sponsorship and financing of the militia group, involvement in oil bunkering and 
mismanagement of resources of the region have worsened the conflict in the region. 
 
2.2.2 Resource Curse 
 
The resource curse is a phenomenon in which country endowed with abundant natural 
resources experiences poor economic growth, poor governance and political violent 
compared to poor resource endowed state.  As Heston (2013), aptly notes, one of the 
most puzzling and perplexing discoveries of modern scholarship is a paradoxical 
phenomenon called resource curse. Similarly, Di John, (2010) described it as one of 
the influential ideas in development discourse.  
 
 Auty (1993) coined the term resource curse to depict how nations with abundant 
natural resources are unable to use their resources to support their economies and how 
they have a lower economic development contrasted with those nations without rich 
natural resources. In other words, the resource curse thesis stipulates that the resource 
endowed nations tend to have developmental issues like corruption, poor budgetary 





are a curse rather than blessing (Di John, 2010). This theory can be categorised into 
the following: 
 
2.2.2.1 Natural Resource and Economic Performance  
 
Before the twentieth century, natural resources consisting of primary commodity 
played an essential role in global trade. Several countries including Canada, United 
States, Norway, Sweden, the Netherlands and Australia benefited immensely from the 
natural resources export (cited in Bakwena, Bodman, Le & Tang, 2009; Di John, 
2011).  
 
However, since twentieth century, primary products have been described as harmful 
to the economic growth and causing conflict in the developing world.  Karl and Gray 
(2003) argue that oil abundant and dependent states “are among the most economically 
troubled, the most authoritarian and the most conflict-ridden states in the world.” (p.8).  
By the same token, Wenar (2016) argues that resource endowed states are disposed to  
conflict as opposed to those without abundant resources; they are 50% more liable to 
be ruled by the authoritarian government; are financially not transparent. Moreover, 
resource-rich states have a high proportion of poor people. About 40% of the resource-
abundant countries in the world lives on less thanUS$2 a day.  
 
Sach and Warner (1995, 1997) contend that there is an association between resource 
abundance and poor economic growth. However, they fail to take cognizance of the 
institutional and socio-economic factors that may affect the relationship and also fail 
to take into account the success stories of Botswana, Indonesia, Norway and Malaysia 








 In contrast, Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian (2003) argue that it is not the existence of 
natural resources per se that are causing resource-abundant countries to fail; instead, it 
is the quality of the institutions and public policies that result in the low economic 
development. Controlling for institutions, these authors found that natural resources 
are not significantly related to economic growth. Institutions are important to overturn 
resource curse and are also part of the solution to countries facing this problem. 
  
Similarly, Holden (cited in Kumah-Abiwu, 2017) notes that the success story of 
Norway is due to good governance, protection of property rights, high quality 
democracy and strong institutions.  On the contrary, Kumah- Abiwu (2017) argues that 
Ghana is unlikely to escape the resource curse as long as the emphasis is on the 
democratic credentials (strong institutions and democratic governance). He suggests a 
shift in focus to resource governance. 
 
2.2.2.2 Natural Resources and Conflict  
 
Collier and Hoeffler (2000, 2002) note that natural resources abundant and dependent 
countries are susceptible to civil violence. They contend that conflict may result from 
greed or grievances and submit that to comprehend the current civil war; there is need 
to ignore the political explanation and pay attention to an economic explanation. That 
is, the greed of the rebels to use the natural resources to finance their operations.  In 





rebellion are more important than objective grounds for a grievance.” (Collier & 
Hoeffler, 2002, p.1).  
On the contrary, Karl (1997, 2007) argues that resource curse is not an economic 
problem but political/ institutional problem. She maintains that oil itself does not cause 
resource curse rather the arrangement that govern its exploitation. She attributes it to 
international oil regime. By international oil regime, She meant “the institutions 
shaped by multinational oil companies, their host governments, and foreign lenders -- 
as it is to the structures of states and private actors in oil exporting countries -- another 
inconvenient reality that is often not addressed.” (p.259). 
 
In another study, Collier and Hoeffler (2004) identify six mechanisms through which 
oil-conflict connection occurs and these are honey-pot explanation which states that 
resources are subject of political struggle among political elite and this results in 
politics of corruption and supported by foreign corporate behaviour.  
 
The second is government detachment. The government is detached from the citizens 
because it does not rely on them for the running of affairs of the state. Accordingly, 
the citizens cannot hold it accountable. Put differently, if the people pay taxes to the 
state represented by the government, they hold their government accountable but 
because in the oil endowed states, governments do not rely on their citizens for taxes, 
the rent from oil revenues are not seen as belonging to the people in the way as income 







The third is a resource itself, which most of the time is located in a section of the 
country. The people of the area (s) where these resources are situated are brainwashed 
to believe that the resources are being used to develop other areas.  
 
Thus, the need for the secession of that part of the country. The fourth mechanism is 
that it provides a source of finance for the rebel groups. The revenues from the sale of 
the resources are used to purchase arms and ammunition and to finance their 
operations.  The remaining two are Dutch Disease and price of natural resources 
(Collier & Hoeffler, 2004).  
 
The Dutch Disease is a scenario in which natural resource bursts hamper both 
agricultural and industrial sectors of the economy which are the vital drivers of the 
economy either through currency appreciation or the absorption of factors of 
production (Torre, Afonso & Soares, 2013). As the price of natural resources 
particularly oil at the international market fluctuates and this causes unstable economy 
due to booms and busts. The resultant is a decline in the economy which itself is a 
cause of conflict or civil war. This explanation is not backed by an empirical evidence 
(Auty, 2001; Leite & Weidmann, 2002; Sala-i-Martin & Subramanian, 2003). 
According to Di John (2010), they are weak in terms of theory and evidence. 
 
 Similarly, Nathan (2005) argues that Collier and Hoeffler (2002) explanation of the 
causes of civil war was empirically, methodologically and theoretically flawed. 
According to him, the result was unsubstantiated, incomplete, inaccurate, and biased, 
thereby preventing an adequate understanding of the causes of the civil war. But this 






Collier and Hoeffler (2005) examine whether resource rent affects conflict risk. They 
suggest that the rents effect exists but contend that it is indirect. Elite embezzle 
resource rent instead of investing them in worthwhile projects that will impact on long-
run growth. Stagnant growth rate increases the likelihood of conflict. Unlike Collier 
and Hoeffler (2004), Hegre and Sambanis (2006) identify non-resources specific 
features such as income level and growth, rough terrain, population and size as having 
a strong link with civil war than resources. 
 
Ross (2003) asserts that natural resource abundance plays a significant role in the 
conflict. He found that 13 resources abundant countries from Sub-Saharan Africa 
support the assertion that resource abundant leads to conflict.  While oil and non- oil, 
a mineral such as diamond and illicit drugs influence conflict, other primary 
commodities, like agricultural products are unrelated to civil war in the 13 countries 
he studied.  But resource abundance has an effect on the duration of the conflict. 
However, Snyder and Bhavnani (2005) maintain that whether resource abundance 
nations experience conflict is a function of the quality of economic institutions and 
government spending of revenue.   To put it in another way, if government generates 
sufficient revenue through taxation or other income engendering activities, it will be 
able to discourage rebellion. 
 
Humphreys (2005) examines the link between natural resources and conflict and 
discusses six mechanisms through which the linkage occurs.  Firstly, the greedy rebel 
thesis which has three variants.  The first variant associated with/ credited to Collier 





finance their operation independent of the state; the second variant championed by 
Fearon and Laitin (2003) stipulates that natural resources increase the “prize” value of 
capturing the state. Nigeria fits into the first variant of the greed thesis where the armed 
groups fighting for the emancipation of the region engaged, among others, in oil 
bunkering, kidnapping of oil workers to finance their activities and also to acquire 
arms for their operations.   
 
The third variant emphasizes that if natural resources are concentrated in the section 
of the country, this may serve as an impetus for a disgruntled group to want to secede 
from the country. Other mechanisms are greedy outsiders (entails the role of state and 
corporation in conflict escalation), grievance, feasibility, weak state and sparse 
network.  He finds among others that the impact of natural resources on conflict cannot 
be caused by weak state structure; that the association between natural resources and 
conflict is caused by agricultural dependence rather than by natural resources.  
 
However, scholars like Frynas, Wood, and Oliviera (2003, 2007a), Lewis, (2007), 
Shaxson, (2007), and Akpan and Umoh, (2016) argue that oil abundant and dependent 
states are susceptible to state incapacity-violent conflict. They point to the threat they 
posed to international security. On the contrary, Rosser (2006) and Wennmann (2007) 
maintain that the idea of natural resource abundance having a negative economic 
outcome is inconclusive. Rosser examines the resource curse thesis from its economic 
and political perspectives and contends that it is difficult to prove that the abundant 
resources in the resources dependent states account for the many economic and 
political problems they are facing and the phenomena may be the product of 






This the author did not discuss. He argues further that it is unclear whether the myriad 
studies measured natural resource abundance. Some scholars measured resource 
abundance in terms of the ratio of country's exports to GDP or a ratio of the countries 
natural resources exports to total exports. Rosser suggests more research on the 
resource curse as other factors may have accounted for the curse.  
 
In the same vein, Ron (2005) submits that to prove a link between resources and 
conflict, there is need to delve deeper into its inner workings and show its conditions 
of validity that are likely universal. By the same token, Basedau and Lacher (2006), 
demystify the claim that resource endowed states are prone to violent conflict. In their 
study of 37 third world countries, they found that oil states with high revenue are 
stable.  The examination of the methods by which government spends oil proceeds 
shows two types- large scale state and the patronage-based system.  The latter is linked 
to instability or its absence. By the same token, Ross (2004) argues that the connection 
between natural resources and violence is a mere probability. 
 
2.2.2.3 Natural Resource (Oil) and Democracy 
 
 Scholars have examined the effects of the oil on democracy (Barro, 1999; Ross, 2001, 
2004; Wantchekon 2002; Jensen & Wantchekon 2004; Friedman, 2006; Smith 2007; 
Papaioannou & Siourounis 2008; Golberg, Wibbels, & Myukiyehe 2008; Aslaksen 
2010; Aytac, Mousseaub & Orsun, 2016) and contend that oil hurts democracy.  
However, there are other scholars that do not subscribe to the view that oil hampers 
democracy (Herb, 2005; Dunning, 2008; Haber & Melando, 2011; Brooks & Kurtz, 






Ross (2001, 2006, 2012) argues that oil hampers democracy and discusses three 
mechanisms (taxation, spending, and group formation) through which this occurs. The 
taxation effect involves the use of government revenue to “relieve social pressures that 
might otherwise lead to demands for greater accountability” (2001, p.328). This 
implies that government reliance on the bulk of its revenue from oil wealth makes it 
unaccountable and unresponsive to the yearning and aspirations of the people. It also 
makes it possible for the citizen to be uninterested in democracy and holding their 
leaders accountable.  
 
The spending effect entails government use of oil wealth on patronage, to prevent 
agitation for democratisation. The group formation involves the use of revenue by the 
government to prevent groups that are critical of its activities from being formed. 
Moreover, he contends that overabundance of revenue serves as an incentive for the 
government to use such revenue to equip the armed forces and security agencies to 
deal with agitators for democratic reform.   
 
Lastly, he discusses modernisation effect and this entails a situation in which the 
abundance oil wealth leads to diminishing social pressure for securing of higher 
education, urbanisation, and occupational specialisation. In other words, 
modernisation effect emphasises oil rent, lack of modernisation and the argument is 
that since oil has not motivated change in the society, it does not support democratic 







Likewise, Jensen and Wantchekon (2004) maintain that there is a strong negative 
association between resource abundance and levels of democracy in Sub-Saharan 
Africa. They argue that oil wealth causes the democratic government to break down 
and authoritarian government to endure in resource endowed states.  According to 
them, oil wealth causes an intense battle for the control of the state which results in 
political violence while in resource-poor nations such as Benin and Mali, there is less 
competition for the control of the state and this encourages elite cooperation and 
preservation of democratic governance.  
 
In the light of events in Mali, this assertion cannot hold.  In 2012, there was a fierce 
battle between the rebels in the North and the Central government in Bamako and 
attempts were made by the rebels to take over the control of the seat of government in 
Bamako but for the prompt intervention of French and ECOWAS forces prevented the 
rebels takeover of Bamako (Francis, 2013; Adeyemi, 2014; Nizeimana & Nhema, 
2015).  
 
 In a like manner, Friedman (2006) argues that there is an association between oil and 
politics. He maintains that the “price of oil and the pace of freedom always move in 
opposite directions in oil-rich petrolist states.” (p. 31). The higher the average price of 
crude oil in the world market, the more the essential features of democracy such as an 
independent judiciary, freedom of speech, freedom of the press, rule of law, free and 
fair elections are deteriorated.  
 
Also, the higher the price of oil, the less the leaders of these states are accountable and 





countries are transparent and sensitive to public opinion. More so, leaders are also 
sensitive to public opinion when prices are lower. However, this law does not hold true 
of Nigeria as there is no difference when the prices are high or low, the tenets of 
democracy are abused.   
 
Wacziarg (2012) criticised the first law of petrol-politics (FLP) because there is no 
econometrically important relationship between oil price and the pace of freedom. 
Meanwhile, Atzori (2013) queries the appropriateness of the econometric tools used 
by Wacziarg to measure “the pace of freedom” and the combined polity score used to 
rank countries from the most autocratic (-10) to most democratic (+10). Herb (2005) 
avers that resource-dependent states would have been poorer if they have not found oil 
and that lower GDP would have caused them to be less democratic.  
 
Haber and Melando (2011) contend that “oil and mineral resources-reliant does not 
promote dictatorship over the long run. If anything, the opposite is true.” (p.25). By 
the same token, Brooks and Kurtz (2012), assert that the connections between 
democracy and oil revenue are intricate because both are internal to the 
industrialisation processes and submit that oil wealth is not harmful to democratic 
development.  
 
From the literature survey on resource curse, three dominant topics have emerged and 
they are: natural resources abundance and poor economic performance, resources 
abundance and conflict and natural resources abundance and low level of democracy.  





resource curse occurred.  Several methods have been suggested as the path through 
which resource curse occurred.  
 
However, analysis of the resource curse has centred on the state ignoring the sub-state 
system and other actors that may have also contributed to the linkage between oil and 
conflict. And some of these are the elite, the international financial institutions, the 
multi-national oil companies and their home governments.  
 
This theory is relevant to this study because it practically shows the problem 
confronting the oil-bearing communities of Niger Delta, how the wealth of the region 
has not transformed into development because of mismanagement of the oil wealth. 
Its assumption of a linkage between oil and violence has enabled us to understand the 
dynamics of the conflict in the Niger Delta. 
 
2.2.3 Frustration-Aggression Theory 
 
The frustration-aggression thesis states that aggression is a product of frustration and 
frustration is a product of aggression. The theory analyses violence from the point view 
that when someone is prevented from realising his goal, he vents his anger on those he 
perceives as a hindrance to the realisation of his/her goal. 
 
The frustration-aggression theory is the brain-child of John Dollard (a psychologist) 
and his associates namely Doob, Miller, Mowrer and Sears (cited in Berkowitz, 1989) 
in their spearheading work on the subject and in the later research led by Leonard 
Berkowitz (1962).  This theory has been used by scholars to explain violence in the 





2013; Kaur, 2013; Okumagba, 2014). The theory as articulated by Dollard et.al (1939) 
states that “the occurrence of aggression always presupposes the existence of 
frustration and, contrariwise, that the existence of frustration always leads to some 
form of aggression."(p.338). 
 
However, Miller (1941) modified the second part of the statement that states “the 
existence of frustration always leads to some form of aggression to read: “frustration 
produces investigations to a number of different types of response, one of which is an 
instigation to some form of aggression”.  Dollard et.al (1939) cited in Berkowitz (1989, 
p.60), sees frustration as “an interference with the occurrence of an instigated goal- 
response at its proper time in the behaviour sequence”.  It is important to note that a 
hindrance does not constitute frustration. It becomes frustrating when one strives to 
achieve this goal.  For Dollard, et.al (1939) cited in Berkowitz (1989, p.60), aggression 
means “any sequence of behaviour, the goal-response to which is the injury of the 
person toward whom it is directed”.  
 
However, aggression is not likely to occur if aggressive behaviour is repressed through 
strategy associated with punishment (Feierabend, & Feierabend, 1966, p.250). 
Eminent political scientists such as James Davies (1962), Ted Gur, (1970) Ivo and 
Rosalind Feierabend (Feierabend & Feierabend, 1966), have applied this theory to the 
study of political violence.  
 
The theory examines violence from the psychological viewpoint and attributes it to 
inhibition or blockage of goal attainment (Okumagba, 2014). While trying to clarify 





or should and what they get, the need -get-proportion (Feierabend and Feierabend, 
1966) and contrasts between expected need fulfillment and actual need fulfillment 
(Davies, 1962). Where the people wants or desire is unmet, the inclination is for 
individuals to go against those they consider in charge of disappointing their 
aspirations (Anifowose, 2011).  
 
The crux of this theory is that aggression is the result of frustration and in a 
circumstance where the actual yearning of an individual is denied either directly or 
indirectly by the outcomes of the way the society is organised, the feeling of 
disillusionment may lead such a person to express his displeasure through violence 
that will be targeted at those he /she considers to be responsible for his/her predicament 
(Faleti, 2007). The revolts in the Niger Delta zone by the different militias against 
constituted authorities and the transnational oil companies in the area can be seen or 
attributed to frustration. 
 
The frustration-aggression theory is employed as an analytical tool to explain the 
conflict in the Niger Delta. The region exemplifies the unbearable gap between value 
expectations and value positions (Agbiboa, 2013). For instance, the oil wealth in the 
region has the potential for economic prosperity for the inhabitants but instead, it has 
caused repression, poverty, environmental debasement, etc. And due to this, the people 
became frustrated and revolt against the Nigeria state and multi-national companies. 
 
2.3 Summary  
 
The chapter reviews both the concepts and related studies on Niger conflict and from 





in the distribution of oil proceeds, governance failure, impacts of oil on the 
environment and strategies for addressing the conflict.   
 
The chapter argues that there is a paucity of studies on the role of the elites in the 
conflict.  It also examines the combined theories used for the study and these are elite, 
resource curse and frustration-aggression theories and the rationale behind their uses 
were thoroughly examined. Also, a theoretical model develops for the study was 
analysed.  
 
To understand the Niger Conflict, the next chapter is an exposition or expose on the 
conflict which is seen as part of the forceful formation of the Nigerian state.  The 
chapter analyses the various periods in the evolution of both the Nigerian State and the 
Niger Delta agitation and also discusses the contribution of oil to the Nigerian state, 














This chapter examines the historical evolution of Nigeria state with the aim to shed 
more light on how its formation affected the Niger Delta Struggle. And in doing this, 
Nigeria’s history is classified into three periods, pre-colonial era, colonial and post-
colonial era. The chapter also discusses the evolution and agitations of the Niger Delta 
and the contributions of its oil to the economic well-being of the country.   
 
3.2 Nigeria: Precolonial Era 
 
The conflict in the Niger Delta cannot be isolated from the history and violent nature 
of the Nigerian state formation.  Otoghile (2012), notes that the problems confronting 
Nigeria since independence can be understood by examining its nature and evolution. 
Though, Nigeria came into being on 1 January 1914 when the Northern and Southern 
protectorates were merged to together. Prior to this period, there was no country called 






Although life in the geographical expression called Nigeria did not start in 1914, nor 
did the European incursion or penetration into the continent start in that year. For 
instance, in 1472, in the time of the greatest Benin monarch, Ewuare, a Portuguese 
sailor Captain Ruy de Siqueria brought a sailing ship as far as the Bight of Benin 
(Davidson, 1985, p. 131).  The year 1914 was used by Nigerian scholars to mark the 
birth of the Nigerian state and as the source of the numerous problems confronting the 
country (Niger Delta inclusive). 
 
As stated above, prior to the British colonisation of Nigeria, there was no country or 
state called Nigeria (Efemini, 2009; Ojo, 2009; Osaghae, 2011). There were different 
nationalities such as Yoruba, Hausa, Igbo, Fulani, Edos, Igala, Kanuri, Urhobo, Ijaw, 
Ibibio, Annang, Isoko, Efik, Kalabari. They set-up sustainable pre-colonial states 
which included those with a centralised political system like the Benin kingdom, Oyo 
empire, Sokoto caliphate, Kanem-Bornu Empire and others with fragmented political 
system such as Igbos, Tiv, Ekoi, Ibibio/ Efik and many others in the middle belt of 
Nigeria now North-central  (Ikime, 1980; Cookey, 1987; Ajayi, & Crowder, 1988; 
Osaghae, 2011; Agbiboa & Maiangwa, 2012). These various kingdoms and stateless 
societies had efficient systems of administration before the occupation by the British.  
For example, the Benin Kingdom in today’s Edo state started as a city-state and rose 
to become an empire comprising many tribes. At the zenith of its power in the 17th 
century, it extended to Lagos, Niger, and Idah in the Northern part of the present today 








Similarly, Oyo kingdom in Yoruba land, grew from a small town to become an empire 
that extended to neighbouring countries of Benin and Togo Republics and Nupe in the 
present Niger state of Nigeria. It was the largest forest state in the West Africa and had 
efficient political institutions characterised by checks and balances (Ighodaro, 2005; 
Okonofua, 2011; Osaghae, 2011). 
 
The people of the areas that constitutes the South-South of Nigeria was independently 
ruled and had states institutions that were developed and efficient. It was the epic 
centre of trade in both slaves and later palm oil with the Europeans in the 19th and 
20th centuries. Consequently, the slave trades led to the emergence city-states along 
the coast such as Sapele and Warri in Delta state; Nembe, Brass, Akoso, and Twoa in 
Rivers state; Bakana, Buguma, and Abonnema in Bayelsa state and Duke Town in 
Calabar, Cross-Rivers state. These states had well-developed institutions that 
controlled family life, health, religion, commerce, and education. 
 
The Igbos occupied the South-Eastern part of Nigeria and by nature egalitarian and 
independent. They lacked a centralised political structure like the Yorubas and Edos. 
The Igbos belonged to a class of society Fortes and Evans-Pritchard (cited in Osaghae, 
2011) called stateless society. They had a small village republic where every adult 
male had a direct voice in governance.  
 
The Hausa-Fulani are in the present-day Northern Nigeria. Prior to Uthman Danfodio 
Jihad of 1804, there were different states in the Hausa land, such as Kano, Rano, Gobir, 
Zauzau (Zaria), Katsina and several others and were autonomous of one another.  In 





conquest of Hausa land and their rulers replaced by the Fulani.  The conquered states 
were divided into two kingdoms with headquarters in Sokoto and Gwandu. The pre-
colonial Hausa-Fulani political system was centralised with power vested in the Emir 
who was very powerful, an efficient taxation and Alkali court characterised the 
traditional political system. The British used this traditional institution in the 
governance of their territories. 
 
3.3 Nigeria: Colonial Era 
 
As the earlier section, has shown, the various nationalities in the country before British 
occupation and subsequent administration of the country had effective and efficient 
systems of administration with paraphilia of modern organs of government namely 
legislature, executive and judiciary. In some of the nationalities, for example, Yorubas 
and Edo, they had checks and balances incorporated into their systems.   
 
Therefore, there was already an efficient system in place which the British used in the 
administration of the areas they colonised. According to Mai-Lafia (2010, p.105) “it is 
fallacious and misleading the view expressed that Africans had no system of 
government before their invasion of the African continent.” 
 
 
The scramble for and partitioning of West Africa by the major European powers 
marked the beginning of colonial administration in West Africa. At the Berlin 
Conference of 1885, the major powers set a guideline for the state to fulfill before 






There must be the physical occupation of the area and the colonial lord in question 
must have set the machinery in motion for the proper administration of the territory.    
As Okonofua (2011) noted that the conference not only divided areas of exploitation 
but also pronounced the principle of governance known as the dual mandate. The 
principle stipulated that the colonisation of African territories would be beneficial to 
both the coloniser and the colonised.  
 
Under the mandate, European powers would have unhindered access to the resources 
and trade of the continent, while the continent would enjoy the Europe’s superior 
civilisation (cited in Okonofua, 2011).  The European powers, particularly Britain 
colonised Nigeria and other territories in Africa because she needed cheap and secure 
raw materials for her industries, market for surplus goods and re-investment of her 
surplus capital among others. 
 
Nigeria, a name invented or created  by Miss Flora Shaw later Mrs. Lord Lugard on 8 
January 1897, which she used it as the title of an article in The Times to describe the  
huge land round the River Niger and its basin.  It was then called Niger-area, but after 
a long usage, it was condensed to Nigeria (Adebanwi & Obadare, 2010; George, 
Amujo & Cornelius 2012; Gberevbie, & Oni, 2014). 
 
Nigeria, as already noted was a British creation and between 1861 and 1914, through 
several mechanisms or processes such as a treaty of protection or cunning, trade 
monopoly, gunboat diplomacy or force, divide and rule, outright conquest, the colonial 
Lord (British) subdued the different nationalities in the country and brought them 






In the same vein, Fatile and Adejuwon (cited in Ajayi  & Fashagba, 2014, p.13), note 
that “Nigeria is one state that owes their existence to the imperialistic activities, which 
by virtue of a superior technology economy subjugated people from diverse 
nationalities and organised them to construct Nigeria in 1914”. By the same token, 
Osaghae (2011) notes the way the various nationalities who have distinct cultures, and 
political systems were brought together had far-reaching implications for nation-
building. According to Falola (1998), by 1860, the British had established their control 
over Lagos.  
 
In fact, Lagos was annexed in 1861 and subsequently declared a crown colony (Uche, 
& Uche, 2004; Jegede, Joshua, & Olorunyomi, 2012).  From 1869 to 1874, it was ruled 
from Freetown and from 1874 to 1886; it was governed from Accra as part of the 
Colony of the Gold Coast. In 1886, it was granted autonomy and rechristened Colony 
and Protectorate of Lagos and placed under a governor (Emelonye, 2011). And 





By 1903, a substantial portion of what is today Nigeria was under the control of the 
British and was divided into three and administered by separate authorities.  The 
colony of Lagos and the Yoruba hinterland (Western) protectorate were administered 
by the Colonial Office. The Oil Rivers and later renamed Niger Coast Protectorates 





Foreign Office.  It later became the Protectorate of Southern Nigeria and was 
administered by the Colonial Office (Ayoade, 1998). 
 
The Northern Nigeria was initially managed by The Royal Niger Company and when 
the British government revoked the license of the company and took over its 
administration, it was administered by the Colonial Office (Ayoade, 1998; Osaghae, 
2011). In 1906, the colony of Lagos and the southern protectorate were merged and 
became the colony and Southern protectorate of Nigeria.  
 
A step in state formation occurred  in 1914 when the then colonial governor-general 
of Nigeria, Fredrick Lugard amalgamated the Northern and Southern protectorates to 
become a single political entity and this marked the birth of Nigeria state   (Albert, 
1998; Ebegbulem, 2002; Otoghile, 2012; Gberevbie, & Oni, 2014; Bourne, 2015). A 
Nigerian scholar described the importance of the amalgamation in these words:  
 Firstly, it ushered in the birth of a state called Nigeria as a new 
addition to the conglomeration of states on the world political map. 
Secondly, it signified the commencement of formal British 
occupation, colonisation and administration of Nigeria, which lasted 
till 1960. Thirdly, it introduced western, albeit British political 
system, structure, and culture in Nigeria. Lastly, it was the starting 
point for a number of issues, including political and constitutional 
changes and crises that shaped Nigeria’s socio-political history, with 
reactions of southern Nigerians to the amalgamation being the 
signpost of the crises to plague the country (Akanji, 2014, p.35). 
The merger of the diverse nationalities was not done to integrate them but was carried 
out for economic, administrative and strategic reasons without consulting the various 
ethnic groups to agree on the terms of the union. The merger was described as a “forced 






 For Kalu (2008), the amalgamation prepared the ground for later events that occur in 
the history of the nation.  Similarly, Muhammad (2007) maintains that Nigeria as at 
1914 had been installed with sufficient seeds of dissonance that would deface its future 
political stability.  Similarly, Rafiu, Owolabi, and Folasayo (2009, p.157), see the 
merger as a “by-product of a fraudulent social contract and not of a negotiated will of 
the welded parts”. For Adu (2015), the uneven union of 1914 created hindrance to 
constitutional development of the country.  
 
According to Odenigwe (cited in Ojo, 2009), the amalgamation was necessitated by 
two factors. The two administrations were answerable to the Secretary of State of the 
Colony and secondly, the economic and security of both required unity.  Despite the 
amalgamation of the two protectorates, they were administered separately. This 
development has been attributed to some British officials in the North who were 
determined to keep the region away from the “corrupt” south (Osaghae, 2011, p. 5).   
 
As earlier highlighted that the various nationalities were not consulted and so the 
amalgamation did not receive their blessing. An eminent nationalist and statesman, 
late Chief Obafemi Awolowo stated that: 
Nigeria is not a nation. It is a mere geographical expression. There 
are no Nigerians in the sense as there are “English”, “Welsh” or 
“French”. The word “Nigerian” is merely a distinctive appellation 
to distinguish those who live within the boundaries of Nigeria from 
those who do not (cited in Coleman, 1986, p.320). 
 
Also, another prominent Nigerian, Alhaji Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, who later became 
the first and only Prime Minister of Nigeria concurred with Obafemi Awolowo when 





Since the amalgamation of Southern and Northern Provinces in 
1914, Nigeria has existed as a country only on paper; it is still far 
from being united. Nigerian unity is only a British intention for the 
country (cited in Ojo, 2009, p.35). 
 
After the amalgamation of the northern and the southern protectorates, Lord Lugard 
extended the policy of indirect rule to the South.  The British adopted two colonial 
policies in her colonies namely direct policy (Crown colony) and indirect rule.  Indirect 
rule was a colonial policy in which existing political institutions were used to govern 
the people.  Lugard (cited in Kirk-Green, 1965, p.68) defined indirect rule as: 
rule through the native Chiefs who are regarded as an integral part 
of the machinery of Government, with well-defined powers and 
functions recognized by the government and by Law, and not 
dependent on the caprices of an Executive Officer (p.165). 
 
 
The adoption of the policy was caused by lack of manpower, economic factor, 
administrative convenience, language barrier, etc.  These points are discussed below: 
 
There was a shortage of British personnel to administer the vast territories occupied 
by the British and thus the colonial lord settled for an indirect rule system of 
administration using the traditional rulers and institutions to govern the people under 
the supervision of a British officer.  
 
Furthermore, the direct administration would have cost the British enormous amount 
of resources which were needed at home for its own development.  Therefore, indirect 






Administrative convenience also accounted for the introduction of indirect rule. The 
size of the country was too large and diverse with different nationalities scattered all 
over the territories which the colonialists had little knowledge about and coupled with 
the fact that some of these nationalities had well-developed and efficient political 
institutions which the colonialists found attractive decided to use  them in the 
administration of the occupied territories.  
 
Moreover, language barrier, only a few Nigerians could understand and speak the 
English Language. Equally, the British officials could not speak Nigeria languages 
which made communication with the indigenes difficult. Therefore, the alternative was 
to allow the traditional rulers to govern their people (Mai-Lafia, 2010). 
 
An assessment of indirect rule policy shows that it was successful in the North and 
failed in the South (combination of East and West).  Some scholars (Oronsaye & Bello, 
2011) argued that indirect was partially successful in the West and complete failure in 
the East.  
 
The success of the policy in the North could be attributed to the existence of a 
centralised traditional political system in which the Emirs enjoyed absolute and 
unquestionable loyalty from their subjects.  Whereas in the West, the Yoruba’s Obas 
had no same powers as the Emirs in the North, there were institutions that acted as a 
check on the excesses of the Obas. In other words, the powers and authority of Obas 
in Yoruba land could be challenged by other institutions or directly by the people 






Moreover, the attempt by the British to reinstate the highest authority of Yoruba land 
to the Alaafin of Oyo, whose power had reduced significantly in the 19th century was 
disliked and opposed by other Obas in Yorubaland. Furthermore, the barring of the 
educated elite in local administration provoked serious protest from them (Okonofua, 
2011).  
 
The cause of the failure of indirect rule policy in the East, particularly in Igboland was 
because, it lacked centralised political institutions (Oronsaye, & Bello, 2011). The 
Igbo society being stateless, egalitarian and democratic had no centralised traditional 
political system like the Emirs in Hausa-Fulani land and the Obas in Yorubaland to 
command the obedience of their people.  
 
Anxious to accomplish the success it recorded in the Northern Nigeria, the British 
appointed warrant chiefs conferring on them powers unknown in the Igbo traditional 
political system. These chiefs using arbitrary powers and control of the judiciary 
became tyrannical and unpopular among the people of the area. The attempt by these 
chiefs to collect taxes on behalf of the Colonial Masters caused the Aba Women Riot 
of 1929.  
 
In 1939, Benard Bourdillion, then colonial Governor-General of Nigeria split the 
country into three administrative units, namely the Northern, Eastern and Western 
provinces. He proposed a federal system of government for the country with regional 
assemblies to be created in North, East and West and a central legislative council in 
Lagos. His proposal could not be implemented before he left the country in 1943. He 






The Richards Constitution of 1946 which came into operation in 1947 was aimed at 
promoting the unity of Nigeria and ensuring greater participation of Nigerians in the 
discussion of their affairs.  For the first, the Northerners sat side by side with their 
counterparts from the South in the same legislative council.  Under Richards, the 
provinces became regions but were still governed from the centre. Thus, the 
constitution introduced regionalism into the country (Akanji, 2014). The constitution 
also compounded the shared suspicion among the different ethnic groups in the country 
and marked the cause of rancorous ethnic politics in the country (Albert, 1998). It was 
replaced by a Macpherson constitution in 1951.  
 
The Macpherson constitution was the first pre-independence constitution that 
Nigerians took part in its making. The consultations started from the village and ended 
at a national conference held in Ibadan in 1950. The decisions reached at the 
conference formed major provisions of the constitution. It empowered the regional 
legislature to make laws on specific matters, but subject to the approval of the central 
legislature.  The Constitution collapsed in 1953 because of many problems and crises 
which attended its implementation. These included the exclusion of Dr. Nnamdi 
Azikiwe from the House of Representative in 1951, the Eastern regional crisis of 1953, 
the 1956 motion for self-government moved by Chief Anthony Enahoro in 1953 and 
the Kano riot of 1953.   
 
These developments led the British government to redraw the constitution for one that 





centre in matters which could without detriment to other regions be placed entirely 
within the regional competency.” (Omu, 1996, p.184). 
 
The 1954 Constitution named after Mr. Oliver Lyttelton, colonial secretary. The 
constitution retained some of the features of the 1951 constitution which included 
regionalism, unicameral legislatures at the centre and Eastern and bicameral in North 
and West.  It introduced federalism, with the existing regions forming the constituent 
units. The civil service, judiciary, and marketing boards were regionalised and the 
constitution also divided powers between the centre and the federating units 
(Nwabughuogu, 1996; Ojo, 2009; Akanji, 2014; Lucky & Olarenwaju, 2014). 
According to Nwagbughuogu (1996, p.55), Nigeria federation was hunted by “regional 
imbalances and the search for sectional security”. 
 
Before Independence in 1960, two constitutional conferences were held in London in 
1957 and the resumed conference in 1958 in Lagos. The 1957 London was significant 
to this study because the issue of the minority was part of the agenda and a Commission 
to allay the fear of the minority was set-up. The Commission was headed by Sir Henry 
Willink and the commission terms of reference included: 
 To ascertain the facts about the fears of minorities in any part of 
Nigeria and to propose means of allaying those fears whether well 
or ill-founded; to advise what safeguards should be included for this 
purpose in the constitution of Nigeria; if, but only if, no other 
solution seems to the commission to meet the case, then as a last 
resort, to make detailed recommendations for the creation of one or 
more new states, and in that case:  to specify the precise area to be 
included in such state or states; to recommend the governmental and 
administrative structure most appropriate for it; to assess whether 
any state recommended would be viable from an economic and 
administrative point of view and what the effect of its creation would 
be on the region or regions from which it would be created and on 






The minority groups from various parts of the country appeared before the commission 
and they included those from the North, East and West.  From the North came the 
minorities from Southern Zaria, Niger, Borno, Kwara, Plateau, Adamawa, Kogi and 
Southern Bauchi. From the Eastern region were the Ogoja, Calabar and Rivers; in the 
West were the Edos, and Deltas (Elaigwu, 2005).   
 
The findings of the Commission showed that: 
Each regional minority expressed the fear that independence would 
make it difficult for autocratic regional governments to be changed 
because of their dependence on the votes of majority ethnic groups. 
In the West, minorities feared Action Group (AG) dependence on a 
Yoruba majority; in the North, minorities expressed anxiety about 
Hausa-Fulani domination through the Northern People Congress 
(NPC); while minority groups in the East feared Igbo domination 
through the National Council of Nigerian Citizens (NCNC) (cited in 
Elaigwu, 2005, p.38). 
 
The commission found proof of discernment and other problems, purported by the 
minorities and recommended the entrenchment of fundamental human rights, in the 
constitution and the establishment of a special commission to tackle the peculiar needs 
of the Niger Delta (Elaigwu, 2005; Ibodje, 2008; Wali, 2008; Osaghae, 2011; Watts & 
Ibaba, 2011).  
 
3.4 Nigeria: Post-Colonial Era 
 
The Nigerian state is a classic example of the disappointment of the African 





resources, she has failed to utilise them for the progress of the country and the well-
being of its people. Since independence fifty-six (56) years ago, she is still grappling 
with numerous challenges such as nation-building, economic problems, insurgencies 
in the Niger Delta and Boko Haram in the North-East. This segment of the study is the 
concluding part of the trilogy of historical origin of the Nigerian state. 
 
 
Nigeria lies in the tropics, on the eastern frontier of the Gulf of Guinea on the West 
Africa and shares border with Chad and Niger Republics in the North, Cameroun in 
the East, Benin Republic in the West and Atlantic Ocean in the South (Otuene, 2006).  
She has a total area of about 923,768 square kilometres (km2) out of which 13,000 
km2 constitutes water and the remaining 910,768 km2, land.   She is the most populous 
black nation on earth, with an estimated population of about 186,053, 387 (CIA, 2016).  
The country is rich in natural and mineral resources like gold, limestone, oil, copper, 
rubber, uranium, natural gas, diatomite, bauxite, timber and many others (Otuene, 
2006). 
 
Nigeria has different geographical features, ranging from tropical to arid. The region 
nearest to the Niger delta contains thick mangrove swamps while the residual of the 
southern division of the land is heavily forested. The southern forests were replaced 
by hills and plateaus further north, in the area called the middle belt. There are also 
mountains in the east. Farther north are the plains of the savanna and, in the extreme 






Nigeria has two main seasons namely the wet and the dry seasons.  The wet season 
lasts from March to October, reaching its peak in June and followed by a short dry 
season called August break which lasts for two-three weeks in the same month and 
this is followed by a short wet or rainy season starting from September to Mid-October.  
The long dry season commences from October to March, reaching its peak between 
December and February (Falola & Heaton, 2008). Precipitation diminishes from south 
to north, and temperatures are for the most part entirely high all through the nation.  
Amid the dry season, a strong cool wind called the Harmattan blows in from the 
Sahara, bringing respite from the hotness but also carrying particles of desert sand, 
increasing the desertification of the northern savannas (Falola & Heaton. 2008). 
 
Nigeria is a multi-ethnic and multi- religious state and belongs to the category of 
problematic states called divided or deeply divided state (Osaghae, 2011).  There is no 
agreement among scholars as to the actual number of nationalities or ethnic groups 
that make up the Nigeria state. For example, Osaghae (2011), puts the figure at more 
than 250 on the basis of different languages and dialects, while Osuntokun (2013) puts 
the figure at 350.  The doyen of Nigerian studies in Britain, Kirk-Greene (1967) 
estimated that Nigeria is inhabited by over 400 ethnic groups. Some of these ethnic 
groups are Edos, Efik, Kanuri, Isoko, Itsekiri, Angas, Jukun, Igala, and many others. 
The most populous and political influential ones are the Hausa- Fulani- 29%; Yoruba-
21%, Igbo-18%, Ijaw-10%, Kanuri-4%, Ibibio-3.5%, Tiv-2.5% (CIA, 2016) and 
others 12%. Meanwhile, these nationalities are always in conflict and competition over 






In terms of religion, the Nigeria’s religious population is split between Islam (50%), 
Christianity (40%) and traditional religion or beliefs (10%). Religious issues have set 
groups apart and at loggerhead in the country. Inter-religious conflict has been a major 
destabilising factor in the Northern part of the country. Evident of religious intolerance 
have been demonstrated over and over in the north and it has caused the death of 
thousands of people, mostly Christians (Ajayi & Fashagba, 2014).  
 
Nigeria became independent on October 1, 1960 with a strong region and a centre with 
a limited power.  In other words, Nigeria operated a federal system with weak centre 
and strong regions.  The major ethnic groups (Hausa-Fulani- North, Yoruba- West and 
Igbo-East) held sway in the regions and in 1963, the country became a republic thereby 
removing the remaining traces of colonialism. In addition, the country practised a 
Westminster or a parliamentary system characterised by dual executives (a ceremonial 
president and prime-minister). Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe was the ceremonial president 
while Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa was the prime-minister.  
 
In 1963, Nigeria became a federation of four regions, North, East, West and Mid-West. 
The Mid-West region was carved out of the Western region. The creation of the Mid-
Western region was borne out of the protest by the minorities in the defunct Western 
region that they wanted their own region that would protect their interests and 
accelerate the development of their various communities. Besides, the region was 
created to nip the overwhelming dominance of the Action Group in the bud and to 
ensure the continued domination of both the NPC and the NCNC over the country’s 





administration in Nigeria and subsequent state creation exercises were done during the 
military regimes.   
 
On 27 May 1967, then Head of State, Major General Yakubu Gowon created twelve 
(12) states out of the existing four regions to check the Biafran breakaway threat. Put 
differently, the state creation exercise of 1967 was aimed at whittling the influence of 
Odumegwu Ojukwu then Governor of Eastern Region at the height of conflicts 
between the Region and the Federal Government of Nigeria (Adeleye, 2015).   
 
The states created were: Lagos State (comprising the Colony Province and the Federal 
Territory of Lagos), Western State (comprising the existing Western Region but 
excluding the Colony Province),  East-Central State (comprising the existing Eastern 
Region but excluding (Calabar, Ogoja, and Rivers Provinces), South-Eastern State 
(comprising Calabar and Ogoja Provinces), Mid-Western State (comprising the Mid-
Western State), Rivers State (comprising Ahoada, Brass, Degema, Ogoni, and Port 
Harcourt Divisions),  Benue/Plateau State (comprising Benue and Plateau provinces), 
North-eastern State (comprising Bornu, Adamawa, Sardauna, and Bauchi Provinces), 
North-Western State (comprising Sokoto and Niger Provinces), North-Central State 
(comprising Katsina and Zaria Provinces) and  Kano State (comprising Kano 
Province).  The map below shows the state created in May 1967 by Major General 










 Figure 2. 3 Map of Nigeria showing twelve states created in 1967 
Source: Ekeh (1997).  
 
In 1976, the Late General Murtala Mohammed administration following the demands 
by various nationalities for states created seven additional states and this brought the 
number states then in Nigeria to nineteen (19) states. The states were Anambra, 
Bendel, Bauchi, Benue, Bornu, Cross River, Gongola, Imo, Kaduna, Kano, Kwara, 








In 1987 and 1991, the administration of General Ibrahim Babangida created Akwa-
Ibom (from Cross-River) and Katsina States (from Kaduna state) and nine others 
namely Delta (carved out of Bendel state), Edo (created from Bendel state), Enugu 
(carved out of Anambra state), Jigawa (carved out of Kano state), Kogi (created out of 
Kwara and Benue states), Osun (carved out of Oyo state), Taraba (carved out from 
Gongola state), Anambra (from old Anambra State) and Kebbi (carved out of Sokoto 
state). This brought the number of states in Nigerian federation to thirty. 
 
In 1996, the late maximum ruler General Sani Abacha in his nationwide broadcast 
marking the thirty-six years independence anniversary announced the creation of Ekiti 
(created from Ondo), Ebonyi (carved out of Abia and Enugu states), Gombe (created 
out of Bauchi state), Nassarawa (carved out from Plateau state), Yobe (created from 
Borno state) and Zamfara (carved out from Sokoto).   With this exercise, Nigeria 
became a federation of thirty-six states and with a federal capital located in Abuja.   
 
As Okonofua (2011) has rightly noted, the politics of state creation in Nigeria is the 
politics of ethnicity. Ethnic awareness continues to play a key role in the political 
process and in the sharing of political positions, patronages, and rewards. Therefore, 
there is no limit to the requests for states creation in Nigeria, for as long as ethnic 
bigots and political vendors keep agitating for state creation in order to resolve the 








It is important to note that the exercise has not only failed to tackle the problem of 
ethnic minorities or majorities but also become a tool employed by successive military 
rulers to weaken the structure of Nigerian federalism. The state creation exercise has 
weakened the federating units, vis-à-vis the federal government. 
 
The discussion on Nigeria’s post-colonial era will be incomplete without examining 
the role played by the military during this era. On 15th January 1966, five Majors 
(Nzeogwu, Ifeajuna, Anuforo, Okafor, and Adeboyega) led by Major Patrick 
Chukwuma Kaduna Nzeogwu staged a coup that led to the collapsed of the First 
Republic of Nigeria. It was a bloody coup and some prominent civilians and military 
officers were killed, among whom were the first and only Prime Minister of Nigeria, 
Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, the then Finance Minister, Chief Festus Okotie-Eboh, 
Sir Samuel Ladoke Akintola, Premier of Western Region and the powerful Premier of 
Northern Nigeria, Sir Ahmadu Bello, the Sardauna of Sokoto.  The military officers 
killed in the coup included Colonels Shodeinde, Kur Mohammed, Lt. Colonel Yakubu 
Pam, Brigadiers, Ademulegun, Maimalari and many others (Osaghae, 2011). The coup 
was executed to end tribalism and corruption (Falola, & Heaton, 2008).  
 
Unfortunately, the coup was unsuccessful, the top brasses in the military hierarchy 
thwarted it, and Major-Gen. Aguiyi Ironsi became the beneficiary of the coup by 
becoming the first military Head of State of Nigeria. The coup was perceived as Igbo 
coup because of the sectional nature of those killed and the organiser of the coup.  
General Ironsi’s actions further confirmed the speculation that the coup was executed 






 Several reasons were adduced for these, his failure to put the coup plotters on trial as 
demanded by segment of the army; acceleration promotions he gave to officers of Igbo 
extraction; he surrounded himself with Igbos intelligentsia and bureaucrats and the 
abrogation of Nigeria’s federal system by decree no.34 of May 24, 1966; by that decree 
the country ceased to be a federation (Osghae, 2011).  A counter- coup was staged by 
the northern officers in which Aguyi Ironsi and his host (Colonel Adekunle Fajuyi, 
military governor of the Western Region) were killed. 
 
 On 29 July 1966, Gen. Ironsi’s government was toppled in another violent coup led 
by Murtala Mohammed, T.Y Danjuma, and others. Lt-Col. Yakubu Gowon was 
appointed as Head of State and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces ahead of 
most senior army officers such as Brigadier Ogundipe. Colonel Odumegwu Ojukwu, 
the then governor of Eastern Region declined to accept Gowon’s accession to power.  
The personal conflict between Gowon and Ojukwu, over the Igbo officers killed in the 
counter-coup of July 1966 and the killings and destruction of Igbo properties in the 
various parts of the North culminated in the secession of the Eastern Region in 1967 
(Osaghae, 2011; George, Amujo, & Cornelius, 2012). 
 
On 29 July 1975, General Yakubu Gowon was overthrown while attending the annual 
summit of Heads of State and Government of defunct Organisation of African Unity 
(O.A.U) in Kampala, Uganda.  The Gowon regime was accused of ineptitude, 
corruption, crimes, leading to national insecurity and lack of economic development 
(Soboyejo, 2014). He was succeeded by Brigadier Murtala Mohammed who was 
assassinated six months later in a military putsch led by Lt.Col. Busaka Dimka on 13 





The then Brigadier Olusegun Obasanjo succeeded General Murtala Muhammed after 
his assassination on 13 February 1976 and he handed over the rein of government to 
elected civilian government of Alhaji Shehu Usman Aliyu Shagari on 1 October 1979.  
 
On 31 December 1983, the military struck and Major-General Muhammadu Buhari 
became the Head of State and Commander -in- Chief of the Armed Forces of the 
Federal Republic of Nigeria.   The civilian administration of Alhaji Shehu Shagari was 
ousted due to mismanagement of the economy and consequent decline in the living 
condition of Nigerians, electoral malpractices and democratic instability which 
followed the 1983 general elections (Osaghae, 2011).  
 
Major- General Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida who was then the Chief of Army Staff 
in what scholars referred to as palace coup (George, Amujo, & Cornelius, 2012) 
deposed Muhammadu Buhari in a bloodless coup twenty months later (27 August 
1985). The reasons advanced for Buhari being toppled were among others, failure to 
salvage the country’s economic decline, lack of consultation with the members of the 
supreme military council and failure to articulate a programme for the return to civil 
rule (Osaghae, 2011). 
 
General Ibrahim Babangida stepped aside on 26 August 1993 because of the popular 
protest of annulment of the freest and fairest elections ever conducted in the annals of 
Nigeria political history- the June 12, 1993, Presidential Election won by Chief 
Moshood Kashimawo Olawale (MKO) Abiola. He handed over the government to 
Chief Ernest Shonekan, who was unseated by Abacha eighty-two (82) on 17 





The maximum military ruler, General Sani Abacha died while in office on 8 June 1998, 
the acclaimed winner of the 12 June 1993 elections died a month late (George, Amujo 
& Cornelius,2012). 
 
General Abdulsalam Abubakar then Chief of Defence Staff succeeded late General 
Sani Abacha and handed over to a democratically elected civilian president Chief 
Olusegun Aremu Okikiola Obasanjo on 29 May 1999. He ruled for two terms of four 
years each and was replaced by Umaru Musa Yar’adua on 29 May 2007.  
 
Dr. Goodluck Ebele Azikiwe Jonathan succeeded Yar’adua after the latter death and 
contested for the presidency in 2011 General Elections, which he won. In 2015, he lost 
to his 2011 opponent in the person of Muhammadu Buhari. President Muhammadu 
Buhari, thus, became the first opposition candidate to unseat the then incumbent 
president and Dr. Goodluck Jonathan would also go down in history as the first sitting 
president to accept the verdict of the people and congratulate his opponent before the 
formal declaration of the winner by the electoral body.  
 
3.5 Niger Delta Conflict:  Evolution and Agitation 
 
The Niger Delta region of Nigeria dubbed by Osaghae (2015) as the “Oil Republic” of 
Nigeria has been the theatre of militancy since the restoration of democratic rule in 
1999.  This section of the study examines the evolution of the conflict in the region.  
 
Following the Berlin Conference of 1884-1885, in which African territories were 
shared among European powers, British declared the area known today as Niger Delta 





it was a centre for both legitimate and illegitimate trades. To put it another way, it was 
known for trade in human known as Trans-Atlantic trade or slave trade and when trade 
in a human being was abolished, it became famous for palm oil trade.   
 
In conquering this area, British adopted two strategies. The first involved the signing 
of a treaty with local rulers compelling them to open their areas to the British market 
and or to accept Christianity in a swap for guns and ammunitions. These treaties were 
written in the English language, which the local rulers did not comprehend and when 
the local rulers discovered that the treaty amounted to taking over of their possession, 
the treaties were rejected and this attracted punishment in form of full - scale war 
against the erring local rulers and this war is termed expedition (cited in Ekpolomo, 
2015).  
 
The Niger Delta people during the colonial era opposed economic deprivation by the 
British merchants (Oloya, & Ugeyaywighren, 2009; Obi, & Rustad, 2011; Adebanjoko 
& Ojua, 2013; Etekpe, & Ibaba, 2013; Okoli, 2013; Saka, Azizuddin, & Omede, 2014; 
Nwankwo, 2015). According to Oloya and Ugbeyavwighren (2009), prominent 
traditional rulers from the region such as King William Dappa Pepple of Bonny was 
removed from the throne and banished to Fernando Po in 1884; Jaja of Opobo was 
unseated and deported to West Indies; Nana of Itsekiri was exiled to Accra in 1894; 
the Oba of Benin was deposed and banished to Calabar in 1897 where he died sixteen 







The root of the conflict in the Niger Delta has also been linked to the Akassa Raid 
which occurred in 1895. The Royal Niger Company denied the people of Nembe 
(Akassa) to take part in oil and palm produce business and the people revolted and 
attacked the company’s depot in Akassa (Aghalino, 2006; Ako, Okonomah, & 
Ogunleye, 2009; Oloya & Ugbeyavwighren 2009; Nwankwo, 2015). After the oil palm 
trade, came the discovery of oil in the region in 1956.   
 
However, the pre-independence conflict in the region was not concerned with oil. This 
was because oil has not become foreign exchange earner for Nigeria. It was centred on 
infrastructure development and marginalisation by the major ethnic groups in the East 
and Western regions.  According to Ekpebu (2008), the present state of affairs in the 
Niger Delta was caused by abandonment and repression by the Igbos of former Eastern 
region of its minority ethnic groups in present states  Akwa-Ibom, Rivers, Cross-River, 
Bayelsa and Southern part of Cameroun.  
 
The neglect and domination by the Yoruba ethnic group of the West accounted for the 
agitation by the minority in the region for the creation of Mid-West region. For Ibaba 
(2011), the dominance of oil as the live-wire of the Nigerian economy, politicisation 
of the principle of revenue allocation, the struggle for access to oil resources by both 
the majority and minority ethnic groups, among others, brought oil into the conflict 








The conflict in the region took a different dimension when in 1966, Isaac Adaka Boro, 
together with Sam Owonara and Nottingham Dick attempted to secede the Niger Delta 
region from Nigeria through armed struggle and proclaimed the region as an 
independent state called Niger Delta Republic (Okolie-Osemene, 2013). The action of 
these trios was grassed by the perceived marginalisation and deprivation suffered by 
the people of the region because of oil exploration activities (Okoli, 2013).  This 
rebellion was crushed by the federal troops twelve (12) days later. The rebellion is 
known as the Twelve Days Revolution. The revolution was symbolic because 
subsequent protest derived its inspiration from Boro’s twelve days’ revolution.  In fact, 
Asari Dokubo group name Niger Delta People Volunteer Force was derived from 
Boro’s Niger Delta Volunteer Service (Asuni, 2009). 
 
The current conflict in the Niger Delta dates to the Ogoni uprising of the early 1990s 
and it arose because of tension between multi-national petroleum companies and the 
ethnic minorities in the Niger Delta, who felt cheated or short-changed. Since then, 
competition for oil has caused violence in the area contributing to the militarisation of 
the area by the ethnic militias and the Nigerian armed forces. 
 
As earlier highlighted, the present crisis was ignited by the Ogoni uprising of the 
1990s.  The Ken Saro-Wiwa led Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People 
(MOSOP) demanded compensation from the oil companies for the environment 
debasement and presented to the government a list of their demands. The Bill 
expressed the anguish of the masses because of petroleum exploration, neglect by 
central and state, infrastructural deficit and political marginalisation (Adebajoko & 





Consequently, they demanded the control of their resources. A thirty-day ultimatum 
was issued to all oil multi-national companies in the communities to pay the sum of 
US$10 billion in arrears as royalties and damages for environment degradation and 
total stoppage to gas flaring in oil producing communities in Ogoni land (Adebajoko 
& Ojua,2013). The federal government reacted by banning all public gatherings and 
declared disturbance that prevents the free flow of oil production as treasonable and 
punishable by death. Subsequent revolts among the Ogonis caused the death of four 
prominent chiefs from the area and the later hanging of the “Ogoni Nine” including 
Saro-Wiwa by the military administration of Late General Sani Abacha.  The hanging 
of Saro-Wiwa marked a new phase in the Niger Delta struggle.  This new phase 
featured violence, the bombing of oil installations, hostage taking, kidnapping and 
much more (Esikot & Akpan, 2013). 
 
Scholars have identified distinct phases of the conflict in the Niger Delta. Idemudia 
(2009), categorised the conflict in the Niger Delta into three phases.  The first phase 
which was characterised by need dimension of the conflict occurred from 1950 to 
1980s.  This period was marked by political and economic exclusion as well as the 
hegemony of the ethnic majority nationalities in the eastern and western regions of 
Nigeria.   The main actors that spearheaded the struggle during this period were the 
traditional rulers and elite of the minority ethnic groups. 
 
The second phase which he dubbed the era of the creed was from 1990s-2000 and this 
era was powered by “proliferation of a sense of ‘relative deprivation’ based on 





According to Idemudia (2009), three factors accounted for these relative deprivations 
and they are the issues of revenue allocation, the social responsibility of transnational 
oil companies operating in the region and the rapacious nature of the military rule.   
 
The third phase which he called the era of grievance and greed was from 2000 to date. 
The period featured an increase in the strength of violence. Several factors were 
identified as responsible for this and these are the socio -economic reality and the 
experience of oil-bearing communities such as Olobiri and Ogoni that have nothing to 
show for their contributions to the economic well-being of the country; the realisation 
by other oil communities that oil was not renewable and do not want to be another 
empty Olobiri. These experiences prompted the people to take their destiny in their 
hands. 
 
The proliferation of social movements also accounted for the increase in violence 
activities during the period.  Social movements such as National Youth Council of 
Ogoni People, Isoko Development Union, Chikoko, Itsekiri National Patriots and 
many others, have different objectives, for instance, environment, democratisation and 
human rights. And due to this, they were pushed in different directions by different 
social forces (Idemudia, 2009). The youth who led these social movements also 
belonged to other associations with different agenda. These social movements were 
weak and vulnerable to organisation capture by either youth leaders or political elite 
who used them to ferment trouble and thereby increasing violence in the region.  
Besides, the use of force to manage conflict in the region was also responsible for the 






The destruction and killing of innocent people of Odioma village in 2005 by the 
administration of Obasanjo further worsen the conflict in the region. Unlike in the 
previous era when government alone controlled the monopoly of violence, the militia 
groups have acquired sophisticated weapons which they got through resources 
obtained from oil bunkering, transnational oil companies social license of operation 
and many others. The effect is that they can meet the armed forces of the Federation 
force with force (Idemudia, 2009).  Others like Ibaba and Ikelegbe (cited in Watts & 
Ibaba, 2011) identified six phases and these phases are contained in the Table 3.1. 
 
 Table 3. 1 
 Phases of Conflict in the Niger Delta 
  Period Nature of the Agitation 
1 Pre-independence Agitation for special developmental attention 
because of unique ecological difficulties 
 
2 1966 Militant insurgent engagement by Adaka Boro 
and the NDVS. Separation or autonomy was 
the goal of engagement 
 
3 1970s Agitations by host communities against oil 
TNC’s demanding for basic social 
infrastructure/amenities and payment of 




4 Mid 1980s Conflict between host communities and oil. 
MNC’ sever payment of adequate 
compensation for damages to property. 
Litigation was the instrument of engagement 
 
5 1990–1996 (a) Emergence of civil, community, ethnic, 
and regional groupings in response to state 
and oil TNC’s insensitivity and repression. 
(b) Peaceful demonstrations by host 
communities and occupation of oil production 
facilities, demanding for adequate 







6 1997– till date (a) Militant and militia actions against 0il 
TNC’s 
(b) Demand for resource ownership and 
control by civil, political, and militia groups 
(c) Violent confrontations and low -intensity 
war between militia groups and the military 
 
Source: Adapted from Ibaba and Ikelegbe (cited in Watts & Ibaba, 2011). 
 
 
3.5.1 Niger Delta Avengers and the Conflict in the Niger Delta 
 
The current crisis in the Niger Delta share some features highlighted in the table 3.1 
above. However, the current conflict has moved beyond the issue of resource control 
and ownership to self-determination and glorification of corruption by those that are 
wanted or being prosecuted for corruption-related offences.  
 
The Niger Delta Avengers, one of the current militia groups fighting for the 
emancipation of the Niger Delta came into being in February 2016 and declared that 
they were a group of educated and well-travelled individuals that were ready to take 
the Niger Delta struggle to another level that has never been seen in the annals of the 
country. They claimed to possess both the equipment and human resources to 
accomplish this task (Ewokor, 2016).  
 
The emergence of the group has been linked to the present administration cancellation 
of the juicy pipeline security contracts awarded to the ex-warlords by the previous 
administration. For instance, a pipeline security protection contract worth US$103 
million a year was awarded to Global West Vessels Specialist Ltd owned by 
Government Ekpemupolo alias Tompolo (Ezugwu, 2016).  The prosecution of ex-





He is being tried in connection with US$231million missing government fund 
(Ewokor, 2016).   Also, the cut in the budget of the Amnesty Programme from N60 
billion to N20 billion which resulted in the reduction in stipend pay to the ex-militants 
(Ezugwu, 2016). 
 
The Niger Delta Avengers demands included implementation of the 2014 National 
Constitutional Conference; commencement of academic programme at newly 
established Nigerian Maritime University at Okerenkoko in Delta State; cleaning up 
of Ogoni land and other oil polluted areas in the region; funding and continuation of 
Presidential Amnesty Programme; the allocation of 60% of the oil blocs to the indigene 
of the region; unconditional release of Mr. Nmamdi Kanu,, detained leader of the 
Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) and the release of Sambo Dasuki, erstwhile 
National Security Adviser to immediate past president of Nigeria, Goodluck 
Jonathan((Durden, 2016). 
 
A critical assessment of these demands show that some of the items listed have nothing 
to do with the region and this is an indication that the group was formed to destabilise 
the administration of President Muhammadu Buhari by some politicians whose present 
administration anti-corruption policy they opposed. It behoves on this administration 
to ensure that the root causes of the militancy such as poverty, unemployment, 
environmental degradation, underdevelopment, resource control and political 
restructuring of the polity are quickly addressed in order not to give room in future for 
another group to emerge and claim, it is fighting for the cause of the people of the 






The Table 3.2 shows the timeline of Niger Delta Avengers attacks on oil installations.  
 
Table 3. 2  
Timelines of Niger Delta Avengers Violence Activities in the Niger Delta. 
S/no Date Nature and location of attacks 
1 January 14, 2016 Several gas pipelines and oil installations 





Bonny-Soku Export Gas line was blew-up 
 
3 February 14, 
2016 
The SPDC underwater 48 inch  crude oil 
export  pipeline at Forcados Export terminal  
was bombed  
 
4 February 19, 
2016 
Agip pipeline manifold Clough Creek-
Tebidaba Pipeline in Bayelsa State was 
destroyed. 
 
5 May 4, 2016 The   Chevron Valve Platform located at 
Abiteye, Warri South was bombed by 
militant. 
 
6 May 4, 2016 Shell’s underwater  Forcados 48 inch crude 
oil Export Pipeline was blown up by militants 
after  repairs commenced following the 
February 14 attack 
 
7 May 5, 2016 The Escravos-Lagos Pipeline System, linking 






8 May 5, 2016 A coordinated attack on several Chevron oil 
installations located in Abiteye, resulting in 
the destruction of Chevron Well D25 and 
several other major pipelines in the area. 
 
9 May 6,2015 The crude oil pipeline linking Warri to 
Kaduna and gas line that supplies both Lagos 
and Abuja with electricity. 
 
10 May 6,2016 Oil pipelines located near the villages of 
Alero, Dibi, Otunana, and Makaraba were 
destroyed by militants 
 
11 May 9, 2016 3 Nigerian soldiers were killed during a 
shootout with militants in the village of 
Foropa, Southern Ijaw LGA, Bayelsa. 
 
12 May 13, 2016 The Chevron pipeline at Makaraba was 
blown up for a second time in 7 days 
following repairs done by Chevron 
 
13 May 17, 2016 Agip’s sagbama-Tuomo gasline in Bayelsa 
was destroyed by militants 
 
14 May 20, 2016 Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation’s 
Escravos-Lagos Pipeline System was once 
again blown up by militants following the 
commencement of repairs being done on the 
pipeline following the May 5 attack. 
 
15 May 22, 2016 Agip oil Pipeline, Azuzuama axis of the 






16 May 25, 2016 Chevron's main electricity feed pipeline, 
located at the Escravos Tank Farm at Ciera 
Creek was blown-up by militants 
 
17 May 26, 2016 NNPC gas and crude trunk line in Warri were 
destroyed by militants 
 
18 May 27, 2016 Eni and Shell's pipelines 1, 2, and 3 located 
at Nembe, Bayelsa State were blew by the 
militants 
 
19 May 27, 2016 Several gas and oil pipelines belonging to the 
Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation 
located near Warri were bombed by the 
militants 
 
20 May 30, 2016 Militants were forced to retreat from the 
villages of Gulobokri and Eweleso, Brass 
following a series of clashes with Nigerian 
soldiers, resulting in the deaths of 
approximately 20 civilians, 2 police officers, 
and an unknown number of  militants and 
soldiers 
 
21 May 31, 2016 Chevron's Oil Wells RMP23 and RMP24 
located near the village of Dibi, Warri South-
West, Chevron's highest producing wells in 
the Niger Delta, were destroyed by the 
militants 
 
22 June 1, 2016 Five boats loaded with heavily armed 
militants attacked a houseboat near the 





soldiers were reportedly stationed. 2 Nigerian 
soldiers and 4 civilians were killed during the 
attack. 
 
23 June 2, 2016 Militants blew up the Ogboinbiri-Tebidaba 
and Cough Creek-Tebidaba pipelines, 
belonging to  Eni in Bayelsa state 
 
24 June 2, 2016 Boat belonging to NNPC in Warri, Delta 
State  was destroyed by militants 
 
24 June 3, 2016 Militants blew up Shell’s Forcados 48-inch 
Export Pipeline for a third time following a 
series of repairs done by Royal Dutch Shell. 
 
 25 June 3, 2016 Militants bombed Eni's Brass-Tebidaba oil 
pipeline in Bayelsa State 
   
26 June 8, 2016 Militants blew up Chevron's Well RMP20, 
located 20 meters from the Dibi Flow Station 
in Warri North Local Government Area 
 
27 June 9, 2016 Militants blew up the Chanomi Creek oil 
facility, belonging to Royal Dutch Shell, near 
the village of Ogidigben, Warri South West. 
 
28 June 10, 2016 Militants bombed the Obi Obi Brass trunk 
line, belonging to Eni. It is one of Eni's most 








29 June 16, 2016 Militants destroyed a crude oil pipeline 
belonging to the Nigerian National Petroleum 




30 July 1, 2016 A crude oil trunk line belonging to the 
Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation 
linked to the Warri refinery was bombed by 
militants 
 
31 July 2, 2016 Two major crude oil trunk lines belonging to 
the Nigerian Petroleum Development 
Company, located near the Batan flow station 
in Delta State was blew up by the militants 
 
32 July 3, 2016  Militants blew up Chevron Wells 7 and 8, 
located near the Abiteye flow station in Warri  
South-West Local Government Area of Delta 
state 
 
33 July 5, 2016 Militants blew up Chevron Well 10, located 
near Otunana flow station.   
 
34 July5, 2016 Militants blew up a manifold belonging to the 
Nigerian Petroleum Development Company, 
located near Banta, as well as two crude oil 
trunk lines belonging to the Nigerian 







35 July 6, 2016 Chevron’s manifolds RMP 22, 23 and 24 in 
Delta State were blew up.  These manifolds 
are major convergence points for numerous 
crude oil pipelines operated by Chevron 
Corp. 
 
36 July 8, 2016  Militants blew up Nembe pipelines 1, 2, and 
3, belonging to Shell and Eni, in Bayelsa 
State while simultaneously blowing up the 
Brass-Tebidaba trunk line in Rivers State 
 
31 July 11, 2016 Militants blew up Exxon Mobile’s Qua Iboe 
48 Crude oil pipeline 
 
32 July 12, 2016 Militants blew up a natural gas pipeline 
belonging to the Nigerian National Petroleum 
Corporation located in Ogijo, Ogun State. 
 
33 July 18, 2016 Militants blew up a crude oil trunk line 
belonging to Shell located near the Batan 
Flow Station in Warri South-West Local 
Government 
 
34 July 24, 2016  A natural gas pipeline belonging to the 
Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation 
located in Nsit-Ibom LGA, Akwa Ibom  was 










35 July 31, 2016 Militants blew up the Trans Ramos crude oil 
pipeline, owned by Royal Dutch Shell, 
located near the village of Odimodi, Burutu 
LGA, Delta State. 
 
   
Source: Adapted from Amaize and Brisibe (2016) and updated by the Researcher  
 
 
3.6. Origin and Development of Oil in Nigeria 
 
The historical origin of oil in Nigeria dates to 1908 when a company called Nigerian 
Bitumen Corporation, a subsidiary of a German company, began exploring for oil in 
Western part of Nigeria and its exploration activity was conducted at Araromi area 
(Eghweree, 2015). The effort was unsuccessful, but further exploration by Shell 
D’Arcy turned out to be a success.   
 
In 1956, oil was discovered in marketable quantities at Oloibiri, the present day 
Bayelsa State in South-South geo-political zone of Nigeria, and exploitation began in 
1958. Nigeria crude oil is of high quality and contains low sulphur and may be applied 
to create more light oil products such as kerosene and propane.  This, paired with other 
ingredients, such as low operating costs, high success rate of drilling, number and size 
of proven oil reserves, high incentives offered by the Nigerian government, high gain 
potential and propinquity to the western market, makes Nigeria’s oil attractive, very 
much in demand and of great international importance (Otuene, 2006). The Table 3.3 








Table 3. 3  
Major Landmark in Oil and Gas in Nigeria 
S/No Year Events 
1 1908 Nigerian Bitumen Co. & British Colonial Petroleum 
commenced operation  
 
 
2 1938 Shell D’ Arcy granted exploration rights for oil throughout 
Nigeria  
 
3 1956 First successful well drilled at Oloibiri by Shell D’ Arcy  
 
4 1956 Shell D’Arcy changed to Shell-BP Petroleum Development 
Company of Nigeria Limited  
 
5 1958 First Shipment of oil from Nigeria  
 
6 1961 Shell’s Bonny Terminal was commissioned  
 
7 1961 Texaco Overseas started operations in Nigeria  
 
8 1962 Elf started operations in Nigeria as Safrap  
 
9 1962 Nigeria Agip Oil Company started operations in Nigeria  
 
10 1962 Construction of the first refinery at Alesa—Eleme, 
PortHarcourt  
 
11 1963 Elf discovered Obagi field and Ubata gas field  
 
12 1963 Gulf’s first production  
 






14 1965 Philips Oil Company started operations in Bendel State  
 
15 1965 Commissioning of the Alesa—Eleme Refinery  
 
16 1966 Elf started production in Rivers State with 12,000 bb/d  
 
17 1967 Philips drilled its first well (Dry) at Osari-1  
 
18 1967 Philips first oil discovery at Gilli—Gilli-1  
 
19 1968 Mobil Producing Nigeria Limited was formed  
 
20 1968 Gulf’s terminal at Escravo was commissioned  
 
21 1970 Mobil started production from four wells at Idaho Field  
 
22 1970 Agip started production  
 
23 1970 Department of Petroleum Resources Inspectorate commenced  
 
24 1971 Nigeria joined the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (OPEC)  
 
25 1971 Shell’s Forcados terminal commissioned  
26 1971 Nigerian National Oil Corporation (NNOC) established by a 
decree  
 
27 1971 Mobil’s terminal at Qua-Iboe commissioned  
 
28 1973 First participation agreement; Federal Government acquires 
35% shares in the oil companies  
 






30 1974 Second Participation Agreement, Federal Government 
increases equity to 55%  
 
31 1974 Elf formally changed its name from Safrap  
 
32 1974 Ashland’s first oil discovery at Ossu-1  
 
33 1975 First oil lifting from Brass terminal by Agip  
 
34 1975 DPR upgraded to Ministry of Petroleum Resources (MPR)  
 
35 1976 MPE renamed Ministry of Petroleum Resources (MPR)  
 
36 1976 Pan Ocean commenced production via Shell-BP’s pipeline at 
a rate of 10,800 b/d  
 
37 1977 Government established Nigerian National Petroleum 
Corporation (NNPC) by Decree 33 (NNOC &MPR 
extinguished)  
 
38 1978 Warri Refinery Commissioned with an installed refining 
capacity 100,000 bpd and upgraded to 125,000 bpd in 1986  
 
39 1979 Third Participation Agreement (throughout NNPC) increases 
equity to 60%  
 
40 1979 Fourth Participation Agreement; BP’s shareholding 
nationalised, leaving NNPC with 80% equity and Shell 20% in 
the joint venture  
 
41 1979 Shell-BP changed name to Shell Petroleum Development 






42 1980 Kaduna refinery commissioned with an installed capacity 
refining capacity of 100,000 bpd and upgraded to 110,000 bpd 
in 1986  
 
43 1984 Agreement consolidating NNPC/Shell joint venture  
 
44 1986 Signing of Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)  
 
45 1988 NNPC restructured into six Directorates  
 
46 1989 Fifth participation Agreement (NNPC = 60%, Shell = 30%, Elf 
= 5%, Agip = 5%)  
 
47 1989 The second Port Harcourt Refinery commissioned with 
150,000 bpd  
 
48 1990 Ken Saro—Wiwa founded the Movement for the Survival of 
Ogoni People (MOSOP)  
 
49 1990-91 Jump in oil prices due to the First Gulf War  
 
50 1991 A private indigenous company—Consolidated Oil, recorded 
its first discover, Bella-1  
 
51 1993 Production Sharing Contracts signed –SNEPCO  
 
52 1993 Sixth Participation Agreement (NNPC = 55%, Shell = 30%, 
Elf = 10%, Agip = 5%)  
 







54 1995 SNEPCO starts drilling  the first Exploration well  
 
55 1995 NLNG’s final investment decision taken  
 
56 1995 Ken Saro-Wiwa and five others hung and buried in an 
unmarked common grave  
 
57 1999 NLNG’s first shipment of gas out of Bonny Terminal  
 
58 2000 NPDC/NAOC service contract signed  
 
59 2001 Production of Okono offshore field  
 
60 2002 New PSC’s agreement signed  
 
61 2002 Liberalisation of the downstream oil sector  
 
62 2002 NNPC commences retail outlet stream  
 
63 2002 Nigeria estimated to have emitted more than 34.38 million tons 
in gas flaring  
 
64 2005 The Federal High Court of Nigeria ordered that gas flaring 
must stop in Niger Delta community as it violates guaranteed  
 
65 2012 Consideration of the Petroleum Industry Bill by the National 
Assembly  
 
66 2012 National Assembly rocked by $3million oil subsidy bribery 
scandal  
 
67 2013 Dutch Court ruled that Shell can be held accountable for the 











The Table 3.2 shows the major developments that have taken place in the Nigerian oil 
and gas sector. As the table indicates the search for oil began in 1908, oil was 
discovered in 1956 and exported in 1958 and among other major events are the ruling 
by a Nigerian Court that gas flaring must stop in the Niger Delta as well as the Dutch 
Court verdict that Shell be held responsible for pollution in the Niger Delta.  
 
3.6.1 Oil and its Contributions to Nigeria Economy 
 
Nigeria is Africa’s leading oil -producing nation with a daily production of 2.05 
million barrels per day in 2016 (Statista, 2016). And she occupies 13th position in the 
world (African Vault, n.d).  She also has the second largest proven oil reserve in Africa 
estimated at 37.5 billion barrels (OPEC, 2016). Nigeria is also the 10th largest proven 
oil reserve in the world (African Vault, n.d). Thus, oil is central to the Nigerian 
economy and is the nation’s major foreign exchange earner and the fiscal base of the 
country’s economic growth and development. The Table 3.4 shows the contributions 












Table 3. 4  
Contribution of Oil and Non-oil revenue to Total Federally Collected Revenue 1958-
2015 (=N=Million) 
 











contribution of               
                          
 Oil          Non-oil 
1 1958 154.6 0.1 154.5 0.1 99.9 
2 1959 177.7 1.8 175.9 1 99 
3 1960 223.8 2.5 221.3 1 99 
4 1961 229 17.1 211.9 7.5 92.5 
5 1962 231.6 16.9 214.7 7.3 92.7 
6 1963 249.2 10.1 239.1 4 96 
7 1964 299.2 16.1 283.1 5.4 94.6 
8 1965 321.9 29.2 292.7 9.1 90.9 
9 1966 339.2 45 294.2 13.3 86.7 
10 1967 300.2 41.9 258.3 14 86 
11 1968 300 29.6 270.4 9.9 90.1 
12 1969 435.9 75.4 360.5 17.3 82.7 
13 1970 634 166.6 467.4 26.3 73.7 
14 1971 1168.8 510.1 658.7 43.6 56.4 
15 1972 1405.1 764.3 640.8 54.4 45.6 
16 1973 1695.3 1016 679.3 59.9 40.1 
17 1974 4537.4 3724 813.4 82.1 17.9 
18 1975 5514.7 4271.5 1243.2 77.5 22.5 
19 1976 6765.9 5365.2 1400.7 79.3 20.7 
20 1977 8042.4 6080.6 1961.8 75.6 24.4 
21 1978 7371.04 4555.8 2815.2 61.8 38.2 
22 1979 10912.4 8880.82 2031.6 81.4 18.6 
23 1980 15233.5 12353.3 2880.2 81.1 18.9 
24 1981 13290.5 8564.4 4726.1 64.4 35.6 





26 1983 10508.7 7253 3255.7 69 32 
27 1984 11253.3 8269.2 2984.1 73.5 26.5 
28 1985 15050.4 10923.7 4126.7 72.6 27.4 
29 1986 12595.8 8107.3 4488.5 64.4 35.6 
30 1987 25380.6 19027 6353.6 75 25 
31 1988 27596.7 19831.7 7765 71.9 28.1 
32 1989 53870.39 39130.5 14739.9 72.6 27.4 
33 1990 98102.4 71887.1 26215.3 73.3 26.7 
34 1991 100991.6 82666.4 18325.2 81.9 18.1 
35 1992 190453.2 164078.1 26375.1 86.2 13.8 
36 1993 192769.4 162102.4 30667 84.1 15.9 
37 1994 201910.8 160192.4 41718.4 79.3 20.7 
38 1995 459987.3 324547.6 135439.7 70.6 29.4 
39 1996 520190 408783 111407 78.6 21.4 
40 1997 582811.1 416811.1 166000 71.5 28.5 
41 1998 463608.8 324311.2 139297.6 70 30 
42 1999 949187.9 724422.5 224765.4 76.3 23.7 
43 2000 1906159.7 1591675.8 314483.9 83.5 16.5 
44 2001 2231532.9 1707562.8 523970.1 76.5 23.5 
45 2002 1731837.5 1230851.2 500986.3 71.1 28.9 
46 2003 2575095.9 2074280.6 500815.3 80.6 19.4 
47 2004 3920500 3354800 565700 85.6 14.4 
48 2005 5619.4 4762.4 857.0 84.7 15.3 
49 2006 6061 5287.6 773.4 87.2 12.8 
50 2007 5715.4 4462.9 1252.5 78.1 21.9 
51 2008 7866.3 6530.3 1336.0 83.1 16.9 
52 2009 4844.6 3191.9 1652.7 65.9 34.1 
53 2010 7303.7 5396.1 1907.6 73.9 26.1 
54 2011 11116.9 8879 2337.9 82.8 17.2 
55 2012 10654.8 8026 2628.8 75.3 24.7 
56 2013 9759.6 6809 2950.6 69.8 30.2 
57 2014 10068.8 6794 3275 67.5 32.5 





58 2015 7055.13 3830.05 3225.08 54.3 45.7 
  
Source: Compiled from Central Bank of Nigeria, Statistical Bulletin, Vol. 14 (2003, pp. 196, 
202-209); Annual Reports for 2005; 2006 (pp.66-67, 164); 2010 (p.93); 2011 (p.121); 2013 
(p.155); 2014 (p.114); Central Bank of Nigeria Quarterly Economic Reports for  2015, first 




From the Table 3.4, oil contributes 0.1% to federally collected revenue in 1958 and by 
1970 it increased to 26.3%. In 1972, oil's contribution was 54.4%, while the non - oil 
sector contributed 45. 6%. Since the 1970s, oil has supplanted agriculture in its 
contribution to the foreign exchange earnings of Nigeria. However, from 2011 -2015, 
oil’s contribution to revenue fall from 82.8% in 2011 to 54.3% in 2015.  The 
continuing fluctuation of oil prices in the global market and the attacks by the militia 
groups in the oil producing states are some of the reasons for the decline in oil sector 
contribution to the revenue of the Nigerian state.   
 
Oil has played and will continue to play significance role in the Nigerian economy. It 
contributes to the growth and development of the country by making her one of the 
leading producers of the product in the African continent.  According to Peel (2010), 
“oil is the spirit and the soul of Nigeria, take away oil earnings, and the country will 










Similarly, Gboyega, Soreinde, Minh le, and Shukla (2011) acknowledged the 
significance contribution of oil to the nation’s economy in these words:    
Nigeria is recognized as a country with the most known reserves of 
petroleum and gas in Sub-Saharan Africa. Petroleum has long 
become the most important aspect of the national economy, 
accounting for more than half of GDP, about   85 percent of 
government revenues, and over 90 percent of exports (p.7). 
 
By the same token, Ademola, Olasode, Raji, & Adedoyin, (2015) argue that oil plays 
a critical role in influencing the economic and political destiny of Nigeria. Besides, the 
revenue accrued from oil are used by government at all levels to execute 
developmental projects. At the centre, these resources are used to provide social 
amenities such as electricity, roads, schools, scholarship for students through 
Petroleum Trust Development Fund (PTDF), Tertiary Education Trust Fund 

















 Table 3. 5  
Oil Production in Nigeria from 1998-2016 (in 1,000 barrels per day) 
S/No           Year       Production 
1 1998 2,167 
2 1999 2,066 
3 2000 2,159 
4 2001 2,268 
5 2002 2,087 
6 2003 2,233 
7 2004 2,430 
8 2005 2,527 
9 2006 2,433 
10 2007 2,314 
11 2008 2,109 
12 2009 2,185 
13 2010 2,471 
14 2011 2,408 
15 2012 2,370 
16 2013 2,270 
17 2014 2,347 
18 2015 2,329 
19 2016 2,053 
 
Source:  Statista, (2016) 
 
 From the Table 3.5 oil production has been rising and falling. From 2010 to 2016, oil 
production has been consistently declining. For instance, the oil production for 2010 
was 2.5million barrels per day, and it dropped to 2.1 million barrels per day in 2016. 






 Meanwhile, oil has contributed negatively to the socio-political advancement of the 
nation. At the present, the socio-economic and political crises confronting the nation 
have been credited to the effects of oil resources.  
 
Thus, to many Nigerians, the discovery of oil resources remains a defining moment in 
Nigeria’s socio-political and economic history. Not only did this remarkable discovery 
change the nature of Nigeria’s economic development and growth, it reset its political 
development, socio-political cultures and the political dynamics in the country 
(Omeje, 2006). According to Obi (2004) oil resources sustained a “legacy of three 
decades of military (mis) rule” (p.43). For Ross (1999), oil has hindered democracy in 
the nation.  
 
The battle for political power has been connected to the access it provides to oil 
resource opportunities. Oil contributes to various military coups, political and civil 
violent conflicts in the country such as the 1966-1970 Nigerian civil war left terrible 
experience to the nation’s advancement (Nwobodo, 2012). 
 
The examination of the evolution of Nigerian state has thrown up quite many issues 
prominent among which are the artificial nature of the Nigerian state in which the 
various ethnic nationalities were forced to cohabit in a country without their consent; 
lack of unity or national integration among the various nationalities which can be 
attributed to the colonial policies of divide and rule. Moreover, the identity politics in 
which the various leaders at the helm of affairs in the regions and later states 






More so, the recurring ethnic minorities struggle, particularly the Niger Conflict which 
dates to the colonial era and has persisted because of lack of commitment among the 
leadership to address the conflict. The impact of all this is that it creates suspicion 
among the various nationalities not only among the major ethnic groups but also 
among the minorities.  For example, the minority ethnic group blamed the major ethnic 
group for their present predicament. Policies or programmes of government as regard 
Niger Delta conflict are viewed with suspicion. There is this feeling that it is only when 
one of our own is there that our problem can be solved. But the Goodluck Jonathan 
Presidency, an Ijaw man has proved this assertion wrong.  
 
Today, the Niger Delta conflict just likes during the colonial period remains on the 
front burner of the Nigerian politics and the immediate past administration did its best 
to find a lasting solution to the problem, but the root or fundamental problems of the 
conflict are yet to be addressed and the present administration (Muhammadu Buhari) 
inherited the problems and is on course in trying to address the problem. But it appears 
the right chord has not been hit because since the present administration came on 
board, there has been a resurgence of militancy activities in the region. A new group 
called the Niger Delta Avengers has taken upon itself to a wage a limited war against 
the Nigerian state by destroying oil infrastructure facilities which have led to a decline 




This chapter has examined among others, the evolution of Nigerian state and how the 
nature of its formation impacted on the Niger Delta conflict. In analysing the formation 





colonial and post-colonial. The chapter also discussed the evolution and agitation of 
the Niger Delta conflict and the different phases of the conflict.  The discovery of oil 
and subsequent emergence of oil as the live-wire of Nigerian economy led to a new 
phase of struggle in the region.  
 
The chapter also revealed how peaceful demonstration by the people for improvement 
in the condition of their environment and means of livelihood became violence because 
of high-handedness of the ruling elite at the centre.   
The chapter submits that the current violence in the region which came into existence 
in the early life of this present administration was due to an anti-corruption war and 
revocation of contracts given to some ex- warlords.  
 
The role of the elites of Niger extraction in the conflict is the focus of the next chapter 
and among issues to be examined are the emergence of both national and regional 























This chapter essentially examines the political role played by the elite in the Niger 
Delta conflict. It addresses the research question that focuses on the contributions of 
the elite to political-cum electoral violence in the region.  It discusses among others, 
the emergence and the composition of elite, meaning of political violence, impacts and 
cases of political violence.  
 
4.2 The Emergence and Composition of Nigerian Elite 
 
Prior to the  British colonisation of what is today known as Nigeria, the elite were 
traditional rulers such as King Dosunmu of Lagos,  Sultan Attahiru of Sokoto, the Ooni 
of Ife, Alaafin of Oyo, Oba of Benin and many other prominent traditional rulers. 
Consequently, the colonisation of Nigeria led to the spread of Western education and 
the emergence of elite that had acquired western education and challenged the 
continued occupation of the country by the British. These new set of elite included the 
likes of Herbert Macaulay often regarded as the father of Nigerian nationalism, Dr 
Nnamdi Azikiwe who later became the  Eastern Region Premier, Governor-General of 






Chief Obafemi Awolowo, the first premier of Western Region and the opposition 
leader the Federal House of Representative; Chief Ernest Ik oli, Chief Bode Thomas, 
Dr. Michael Okpara,  Kashim Ibrahim, Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, Ahmadu Bello,  
Aminu Kano,  Melford Okilo and many others (Bassey, 2009; Bariledum & 
Vurasi,2013).  These elite were united in their struggle against their common enemy, 
the British and as soon as independence was won, the unity collapsed and each leading 
elite from the regions wanted to achieve powers using his ethnic group.  
 
Amundsen (2012) has identified three characteristics in elite formation in Nigeria and 
these are establishment through the fusion of elite (domination of the military); 
consolidation through power diversification (conversion of political power into 
economic power) and aggrandizement through economic extraction.  
 
The Nigerian ruling elite was formed through the fusion of elite. This involved the 
coming together of different segments of the elites such as traditional, religious, top 
civil servants, nationalists of the independence era and the military. The fusion of elite 
in Nigeria was different from other climes because Nigerian elites were dominated by 
the military (Campbell, 2011). For instance, between 1999 and 2007, the first -three 
positions in the country were occupied by military personnel. The president, Chief 
Olusegun Obasanjo was an ex- General in the Army, the Vice-President, Alhaji Atiku 
Abubakar was an ex-paramilitary officer and the president of the Senate, David Mark 
was an ex-General in the army. In the present dispensation, the President is an ex-
military ruler, the Defence Minister also ex-military officer, the Minister of Interior 





The military has also dominated the economy sector, many of the blue-chip companies 
are chaired by these former military top brasses. However, Julius (2014) argues that 
since the restoration of democratic rule in 1999, the nature and character of Nigerian 
political elite have changed. This transformation from military to civil has prevented 
the dominance of the military segment of the elite in the management of the state.  The 
reason for this is that the military sub-elite relies on other segments of the elite group 
to assist in moving the country towards a new global order, but could not prevent the 
dominance of this group especially the managerial sub-elite in the management of state 
affairs. 
 
The second is elite consolidation that involves the conversion of political power into 
economic power through the appropriation of economic advantage derived from one’s 
position. Nigeria elite differ from other countries because of the domination of the elite 
cadre by the military and the tendency to use political power to acquire economic 
power and not the opposite. The top brass of the military, politicians and the top 
echelon of the civil service established private companies or firms because they are 
well placed to benefit from government contracts and subsidies.   
 
The third characteristic which is the economic extraction which is based on the rentier 
nature of the economy. The elite use oil rent as an incentive to control state machinery 
and also to retain control of the state apparatus (through coercion and patronage). Oil 







Similarly, Kifordu (2011) has recognised five types of elite namely:  economic, 
military, political elites, socio-cultural, and traditional institutional elite. The military 
sub elite is categorised as being at the topmost of the political elite hierarchy. There is 
no doubt that the political elite occupy a prime of place among the different segments 
of the Nigerian elite because of its role as initiator and executors of policies at all tiers 
of government (Kifordu, 2011). It is the group that integrates all other elites into its 
fold with consequence for power arrangement at the centre (Tenuche, 2011; Isumonah, 
2012). 
 
As the foregoing analysis has shown, elite are vital elements of the socio-political life 
of the nation and in every state, the stability of the country and the regime depend on 
the way in which the elite are organised and relates with other sectors.  These are 
distinguishing features of an efficient elite group.  These qualities are not only essential 
for national development but are also an ingredient necessary for tackling conflict in a 
society.  
 
Thus, the failure and the success of the country’s development, political stability, and 
resolution of conflict depends on elite competence in bringing together political 
influence so that it responds to functional demand on the system.  In fact, the quality 
of a country’s elite and the image they project to the outside world constitutes an 








Meanwhile, Nigerian elite are few in numbers, but the role they played far outweigh 
their numbers. In Nigeria, the commanding positions at all levels of governments are 
controlled by the elite.  The same goes for the economy which is not under the direct 
control of the foreign business concerns.  The elite played a major role in decisions 
making in government and also exercise influence on the value orientation of the 
people (Attah, 2013).  In a like manner, Adeolu, (2010) argues that the elite played 
significant roles in the development of a country through pursing of developmental 
programmes.   
 
However, it is rather sad that Nigeria and Niger Delta inclusive have not been fortunate 
to have leaders who are leaders in the real sense of the word. This is because Nigerian 
elite tow ethnic path with the absence of a comprehensible policy of governance, 
recruitment of leaders and economy ((Bariledum & Vurasi, 2013). This has resulted in 
the emergence of leaders who are not national in outlook but pursue an ethnic agenda. 
 
In Nigeria, elite mobilise their kinsmen to make various agitation on the state for the 
distribution of oil wealth and appointments as representatives of their ethnic groups. 
Instead of uniting to transform the country economically through cake baking rather 
than distributing, the elite organise their nationalities to threaten the national security 
of the nation (Bariledum & Vurasi, 2013).   
 
Ojukwu and Shopeju (2010) argue that the elite are the social agents via which the 
ordinary people learn about ethnicity, religion, and class. Moreover, the ruling elites 






This has led to underdevelopment and political violence in the country.  Thus, average 
Nigerian elite does not care about the improvements or making lives better for 
Nigerians but only interested in his pocket and how he can better the lots of his 
immediate family (Azeez & Ibukunoluwa, 2015). 
 
4.2.1 Emergence of Niger Delta Regional Elite 
 
Prior to the colonial occupation of the Niger Delta region and the earlier part of the 
colonial era, the traditional rulers made up the ruling class and wielded powers in the 
region. During this period, there was nothing called the Niger Delta, rather the region 
then was self-autonomous units or village states and kingdoms made up of people with 
different cultures and tradition and was prosperous in trans-Atlantic trade (Davidson, 
1985; Mochizuki,  2004).  Notable traditional rulers of that period were King William 
Dappa Pepple of Bonny, Jaja of Opobo, Nana of Itsekiri and many others. These 
traditional rulers were later deposed by the British because of their opposition to 
British domination and exclusion of the locals in the lucrative palm oil trade (Falola & 
Heaton, 2008).  The traditional rulers formed the nucleus of ruling elites during the 
colonial era as they were used to administer their areas by the British through the 
Native Authority System (Fatile, Majekodunmi & Adejuwon, 2013).  
 
The emergent educated elites who in the precolonial period would have been 
categorised as commoners because they were not from the royal families (Afigbo, 
1985) together with traditional elites led the agitation for independence from Britain 






 By this, he meant the way and manner the majority ethnic groups have used their 
positions to corner the resources of the region through the de-emphasis of derivation 
as a principle of revenue allocation in the country. In a like manner, Isumonah (2015) 
notes that the misfortune that has befallen derivation principle stress the relationship 
between the control of the political process and the establishment of criteria for 
revenue allocation.  
 
  According to Osaghae (1995), the imbalances in power distribution and demands for 
a fair deal by the oil-bearing communities served as an impetus for the emergence of 
the elites.  Similarly, Nwozor (2014) identifies marginalisation as one factor that 
encouraged its emergence and it was this fear of perpetual domination by the majority 
ethnic groups that propelled the elites to demand a separate region.  Meanwhile, the 
emergence of this new class of elites led to the gradual whittling down of the powers 
and prestige of the traditional rulers and the ascendancy of the educated elite due to 
British colonisation and this has continued in the post-colonial era (Idonije, 2008; Ejitu 
& Chinyere, 2016). 
 
It is important to note that the first generation of the political elites of the region such 
as Chief Harold Dappa-Biriye, Chief Amachree, Dr Isaac John Fiberesima, Chief 
Dennis Osadebe, Jereton Marierie, and James Otobo were altruistic and more 
passionate about the development of the region as they sacrificed their times, lives and 
wealth for the welfare of their people and instrumental to the creation of Mid-Western 





Others, such as Melford Okilo and Samuel Ogbemudia were appreciated for their 
infrastructural developments of their respective states in the region (Thisday, March 
12, 2017).  
 
However, the present crops of elites, especially the political elites from the region fit 
into what Sklar, Onwudiwe and Kew (2006) described as “self -interested and power 
seekers” (p. 105).  These elites are not altruistic and passionate about the development 
of the region as their forerunners and this is amply shown by the pillage of the treasury 
and violence that have characterised the body politic in the region.  
 
In fact the extent of corruption and governance failure in the region is worrisome as 
compared to those at the centre (Enweremadu, 2008; Saka, 2011a). The elites that 
make up the legislative arm of government at the centre have been very dutiful of their 
oversight roles in ministerial, extra-ministerial agencies, parastatals and government 
departments.  The presidency is also under the searchlight of the elites at the centre 
that constitute a member of the national assembly. The opposite is the case in the Niger 
Delta, where the elites that perform the same functions like those at the centre cannot 
discharge their constitutional responsibility because of the domineering position of 
their respective state Chief executives. For instance, the impeachment of the former 
Governor of Bayelsa state who jumped bail in the United Kingdom by the State House 
of Assembly was influenced by the central government under the leadership of Chief 







At the regional level, transparency and accountability, two key features of good 
governance are lacking among the elites at this level as compared with their national 
counterpart at the centre.  The elites at the regional level do not deem it fit to explain 
the financial position of the state to the people or give details of their budgetary 
allocation and the performance of the budget. There has been a systematic looting of 
the state treasury by the regional elites through money laundering, allocation of a huge 
sum of money to non- social sector and more importantly encouragement of militia 
groups who are a thorn in the flesh of the people (Enweremadu, 2008; Suleiman. 
2013a).  
 
At the centre, available information exists as to the activities of the government and in 
order to make information accessible to the public, a law was enacted to make 
information freely available to the public. This law is known as the Freedom of 
Information Act 2011 (Freedom of Information Act, 2011). The FOI states that denial 
of such information by an individual or institution attracts a conviction and a fine of 
500, 000 naira.  Also, in terms of management of resources, the elites at the centre 
have fared better, unlike their counterpart in the region who have looted the treasure 
as the examples of Ibori, Alamieyeseigha and Igbinedion have shown (Osaghae, 2015).  
 
Moreover, unlike in the Niger Delta, where the elites denied the indigenes participation 
in governance, the elites at the centre allowed the citizen to participate in governance. 
One of such avenue is through the transparency of government by providing 






Since 2004, the Federal Government of Nigeria through the Federal Ministry of 
Finance has improved transparency in the art of governance by publishing the amount 
share to all tiers of government from the federation account. The political elites from 
the Niger Delta especially those holding elective offices did not support this 
development. As Okonjo-Iweala, former Nigerian Federal Minister of Finance, in both 
Obasanjo and Jonathan administrations rightly noted that: “Putting information in the 
hands of the people didn’t make me popular at all with the state governors. Some of 
them felt I was deliberately after them.  
 
Even today, some of them are still sore” (Songwe, Francis, Rossiasco, O'Neill & 
Chase, 2008, p. 3). Similarly, Mrs. Nenadi Usman erstwhile Minister of State for 
Finance and the later substantive minister for Finance alleged that governors in Nigeria 
engage in the illegal transfer of foreign exchange bought from their state allocations 
from the federation account abroad (Shilgba, 2008). The arrest of the former Governor 
of Bayelsa State and his Delta State counterpart have proved right the assertion made 
by the minister.  
 
The political assassination of formidable opponents for elective office is more 
pronounced in the region than at the centre.  The regional elites fraternisation with the 
militant groups which they played a role in its formation and financing are some of the 
distinguish features that differentiate the regional elite from the elites at the centre. Put 
differently, the battles for political office in the region is so intense and fierce because 







4.3 Political Violence in the Niger Delta of Nigeria 
 
Political violence is a politically motivated violence committed in and outside the state.  
It is an encompassing term that includes other forms of violence such as terrorism, 
revolution, riots, coup and electoral violence.  It is a violence perpetrated by both the 
state and non-state actors.  Anifowose (2011) defines political violence as: 
the use or threat of physical act carried out by an individual or 
individuals within a political system against another individual or 
individuals and /or property with the intent to cause injury or death 
to the persons and /or damage or destruction to property; whose 
objective, choice of targets or victims, surrounding circumstances, 
implementation and effects have political significance, that is, tend 
to modify the behaviour of others in the existing arrangement of 
power structure that has some consequences for the political system 
(p.4). 
 
The definition is comprehensive as it includes the different forms of political violence 
such as assassination, riots, electoral violence, etc. However, the definition fails to take 
into account the role of states in political violence, as states also do engage in political 
violence against their people. 
 
Thus, political violence is politically driven violence inflicted by both state and non-
state actors against individual (s) and it involves threat or assassination, damage to 
property, destruction of electoral materials, among others.  For the purpose of this 
study, political violence is use in its broad sense to include political assassination, 
electoral violence and oil related violence. This is because the oil related violence has 







4.3.1 Reasons for Political Violence 
 
A cursory look at the literature suggests a number of reasons for electoral violence. 
Igbuzor (2009) has attributed the causes of electoral violence to abuse of political 
power, alienation, marginalisation and exclusion. For Maslow, (1954), it is poverty 
and unemployment.  Galtung (1969) has ascribed it to the ineffectiveness of the 
security forces and the culture of impunity, corruption, poor governance and 
proliferation of arms and ammunitions. 
 
Similarly, others have attributed it to lack of security, partisanship of traditional rulers, 
abused of office by elected officials, zero-sum nature of our politics, lucrative nature 
of political office, poor handling of election petitions, lack of faith in the judiciary, 
lack of compliance with electoral law and enforcement of enabling laws; the 
partisanship of the police and other security operatives, etc. (Ugiagbe, 2010).  
Jega (cited in Okeke, 2015) has credited electoral violence to the do-or-die attitude of 
politicians to politics, inflammatory and hate speeches issued by politicians and 
unwillingness to accept electoral outcomes, the use of political thugs to achieve 
political victory, ignorance and low civic education, monetisation of the electoral 
process by politicians and lack of internal democracy in political parties. 
 
From the first research question, the role of the elite in the political-cum electoral 
violence in the Niger Delta region, several issues have been identified and they include 
elite support for violence, unemployment, underdevelopment and juicy nature of 






4.3.1. 1 Elite Support for Violence 
 
This section of the study analyses how elite encourage or support violence in the 
region. The political and non-political elite of the region played an  important role in 
the escalation of the conflict in the region through their support for the armed militia 
groups by hiring, arming, providing financial support to armed groups and hate 
speeches or incitement. These points are discuss below. 
 
4.3.1.1.1 Sponsorship and Arming of Militia Groups 
 
The elite promoted or supported violence in the region through the sponsorship of the 
armed groups by providing financial and logistics support to them.  For instance, 
Prince Tonye Princewill was a backer of militant group in Rivers State. Also, the Ijaw 
Nation Elders under the leadership of Chief Edwin Clark while on a courtesy visit to 
the late Nigerian leader Umaru Musa Yar’Adua alleged that key officials of the Rivers 
State government were cultists and that they recruited and financed the activities of 
over 103 cult gangs in the state (HRW, 2007a).  
 
In other words, elite support for violence had been identified as one of the main factors 
responsible for political and electoral violence in the region and the country in general. 
The elite of the Niger Delta extraction were believed to be the brain behind the 
electoral violence that has engulfed the region.  Some of the militant groups that are 
sponsored by the elites include the Niger Delta Vigilantes Service led by Ateke Tom, 






Most of those who responded to question on the role of the elite in the political violence 
in the region indicated that the elite promoted or supported violence in the region 
through the above-mentioned mode (sponsoring and arming) of cults and militia 
groups.  One of the interviewee 007 Youth leaders commented that “most of the 
violence you find around especially in the Niger Delta can be traced to political 
contest…when they want to contest for political position, they will use the boys and 
buy them guns and distribute to them.” (Interview at Diobu, Port-Harcourt, Rivers 
State, 1/6/16).   
 
Another interviewee 010 an Academic divulged that: 
… a kind of political value is attached to violence in the Niger Delta. 
Violence has a political value attached to it. So, from this 
perspective, we see how the elite promotes violence in the Niger 
Delta, using youth either as cult groups or as youth organisations. 
Whenever elections are approaching, we see these politicians 
equipping and arming a certain group of people as personal 
security, bodyguards and as agents of violence (Interview at 
Tombia, Port Harcourt, Rivers State, 2/6/16). 
 
These responses highlighted the primacy accorded violence in the region. The political 
gladiators did not believe in one man one- vote. They believed in using violence to 
achieve their political objectives. That was winning elections with or without the 











Likewise, interviewee 012 an Academic reiterated that: 
The elites, because they were desperate to control the machinery of 
government, used all kinds of methods. They sponsored and armed 
social movements which they used during the election to intimidate 
voters. These movements, especially the youth association and 
militia groups were sponsored by some of the governors in the 
region. For instance, Felix Tuddolor and Asari Dokubo were 
sponsored by the then Rivers State Governor Sir Peter Odili for the 
plum position of the Ijaw Youth Council.  Asari was also used by the 
governor to rig the 2003 elections in the state. Successive 
administrations in the state have used these boys to disrupt the 
public peace. Generally, the situation is the same in all the Niger 
Delta states be it Bayelsa, Delta, Akwa- Ibom and others (Interview 
at Mariri in Tarauni, LGA, Kano State, 16/7/16). 
 
By the same token, interviewee 005 Lawyer/Politician expressed the view that the elite 
sponsored electoral violence. In his words: 
They sponsor it; they finance it; they recruit the boys; they are the 
one who lead the boys. It is after, they have come into power that the 
boys become jobless and the arms that they have equipped them 
with, they now turned them to criminal uses. Those are the things 
these people gave to them to find their way into political offices and 
when they get there they abandoned some of these boys (Interview 
at Warri, Delta State, 30/5/16). 
 
This statement reiterates the point earlier mentioned that the elite promote violence 
through equipping and sponsoring of armed militias.  As it shows the elite directly or 
indirectly contributed to the violence in the region through their failure to retrieve the 
weapons given to the boys and the abandonment of these boys after they had used them 







As one interviewee 011, an Academic said the elite were the beneficiary of electoral 
violence and they financed those they used to perpetrate it. In his words: 
Regarding the roles of elite, who are the beneficiary of the electoral 
violence? It is the politicians. Why do they need electoral violence? 
Because they don’t want the people to have a say on how leaders 
are chosen as well as how governmental affair is being run. Because 
if people have a say in the way we choose our leaders, a lot of people 
that are occupying positions would have no right to occupy the 
positions. They are the ones that benefit from election not being free 
and fair and so they played a huge role. You see somebody 
perpetrating election- related violence doesn’t have money to feed 
his family, but he has access to guns of N100, 000 where did it get it 
from? How does he get the ammunition? How does he move around 
on election day? When you know as a normal person l can’t move 
around on election day because of the strong military presence. But 
he moves around on election day and when he is arrested, how does 
he gets released immediately? These are questions that point to the 
fact that there are people that support this system to work because 
they are the beneficiary of it. The question is who stands to gain? 
(Interview at Tombia, Port Harcourt, Rivers state, 3/6/16) 
 
The interviewees’ responses above brought to the fore the salient roles of the elite in 
the region’s violence, how they have contributed and prevented the perpetrators of the 
violence being prosecuted. The above responses are supported by published interviews 
in which some of the stakeholders in the conflict stressed the part they played in the 
Niger Delta conflict. For instance, Ateke Tom, leader of the Niger Delta Vigilante 
Group and one of the most dreaded militant in the Niger Delta, described how he was 
used to rigging election for the then ruling party People Democratic Party, self-styled 
largest party in the Africa continent which controlled the government at the centre and 
in the Niger Delta region.  He and his group were used by the elite to cause violence 
during the election cycles (before, during and after).  In other words, they are used by 





In Ateke’s words: 
Of course, everyone knows that I worked for the PDP in the first and 
second coming of the party in Rivers State. There is no one who does 
not know that I was used to get votes for the party . . . When the 
election was tough for the party and the areas which I conquered for 
them were many. I conquered many Kalabari towns, Ogu-bolo, 
Okrika, Nkoro, Opobo and all those places. They know; the 
government knows . . . In fact, since I started working with them 
(government), I have not had peace; it is one problem after the other 
(cited in Okonofua, 2013, p. 6). 
 
The confession above by one of the militant leader in the region shows how the ruling 
class has used the armed group to achieve their selfish political ends. This shows that 
the political office holders in the region did not receive the mandate of the people and 
this has been the tradition in the region since the commencement of the Fourth 
Republic in 1999.   
 
Corroborating this Annkio Briggs, an activist in a secondary interview maintained that 
“there have never been elections in the Niger Delta from 1999 to date.” (Briggs, 2016). 
Besides, they also armed the groups.  The extant literature has shown that the ruling 
elite apart from providing the funds which these various groups used in purchasing the 
arms and ammunition, they also in some cases purchased the arms which they 











Reiterating, a militant in a secondary interview said that: 
Let me tell you, for many years we fought someone else’s war. They 
gave us the guns and the bombs. They mark the targets and tell us 
when to attack . . . They write the messages that we send to the press 
to threaten or explain an attack. It is their war that we were fighting 
. . . All those years; we fought their war thinking that we were 
fighting for ourselves and our children (cited in Okonofua, 2013, 
p.6). 
 
Validating this claim Best and von Kemedi (2005) argue that some traditional rulers 
supplied weapons to youth groups to protect them from their rivals or opponents. 
Similarly, Duquet (2011) contends that the compensation policy of the transnational 
oil companies in which the traditional rulers were given a huge sum of money have 
resulted in more violence in the region.  As a result of this policy, traditional stool 
became lucrative and there was fierce competition for chieftaincy stool.  Rivals to the 
chieftaincy position hired youth group and provided them with SALW in order to 
secure the stool.  Politicians also recruited and provided militia group with intoxicants, 
weapon, and immunity from arrest and prosecution by the law enforcement agencies 
(WAC, Global Service, 2003; Nsirimovu, 2005).  
 
4.3.1.1.2 Hate Speeches 
 
Another way by which the elite have promoted violence in the Niger Delta is through 
hate speech or incitement of the people against one another.  In the build-up to the 
2016 re-run National Assembly and State House of Assembly elections in Rivers State 
the immediate past governor of the state, Rotimi Amaechi now Minister of Transport, 
and the incumbent governor, Nyesom Wike took caution to the winds by making 





For instance, Wike said that “All those who plan to swap result sheets, May their souls 
rest in peace. Anybody who thinks Amaechi will give them result sheets to swap 
should be ready to swap their dead bodies.” Rotimi Amaechi replied that: “Wike is so 
desperate that he can sell his mother! On the day of the re-run, I am ready for Wike, 
they should come out with their guns, and we are ready for them” (Bulwark 
Intelligence, 2016). 
 
Majority of the interviewees in the study noted that the elite have encouraged violence 
through their careless statements. According to an interviewee 001, a Traditional 
Ruler, “Our leaders through their words and deeds have contributed to violence in this 
region. They made inflammatory statements that set one ethnic group against another” 
(Interview at Taylor creek, Yenagoa, Bayelsa State, 1/05/16). 
 
Another interviewee 002, Youth commented that  
I don’t know how to classify our elected officials. Are they rulers or 
leaders? If they are leaders, they won’t be inciting the people 
against themselves. If a majority of the people is killed through their 
unguarded statements, who will they govern?  I think our leaders 
need to promote unity, instead of using their hate speeches to 
promote discord among the people (Interview at Ekeki, Yenagoa, 










One interviewee 003, Youth alluded to the need for maturity on the part of the political 
elite in relation to politics being practiced in the region. He stated that: 
We are not there yet, our leaders have to show maturity in politics 
and respect the wishes of their people. We have reached a point in 
our development that our politics should be issues-based and not 
character assassination. The elite via vulgar language and 
provocative statements have polluted our political environment, and 
this has fuelled violence among our people.  But we can’t blame our 
leaders from this part of the country when the number one citizen 
that supposed to be the father of all said that he would not treat 
everybody equally because some section of the country did not vote 
for him massively (Interview at Azikoro, Yenagoa, Bayelsa, State, 
3/5/16). 
 
This finding on elites support for violence is corroborated by the extant literature 
(HRW, 2007a; Jespersen, 2017). Human Right Watch (2007a), contends that most 
Nigerian politicians got into political office through violent means.  The group 
contended that “in place of democratic competition, the struggle for political office 
have often been waged violently in the streets by gangs of thugs recruited by politicians 
to help them seize control of power”. (HRW, 2007a, p. 2). The narrative is not different 
in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria where the stakes of politics are higher compared 
to the rest of the country because of the struggle for the control of oil wealth.  For 
instance, Soboma and his Outlaws gang were hired by PDP to rig the 2007 elections 
in Rivers state. He and other cult groups were paid between N5 million and N10 








Similarly, Asari Dokubo was reported to have confessed that the Movement for the 
Emancipation of Niger Delta was created to fight for the liberation of the people of the 
region, but along the line, it was used by the elite to intimidate their political 
opponents. Moreover, he confessed that during Odili’s administration, the boys were 
paid one hundred million naira monthly to pacify them and that the government was 
aware of the various activities of the groups and intervened when there was a crisis 
among them. Furthermore, he also confessed to having received three million naira as 
compensation from the administration when he was arrested by the police and taken 
to Area 10, Police CIB headquarter (Emmanuel, 2014). 
 
By the same token, Chief Fred Barivule Kpakol erstwhile chairman of the Gokana 
Local Government Council in Ogoni, Rivers State was the financier of a cult group 
called the Gberesaakoo Boys. The group was responsible for numerous electoral 
violence in the area and its members were on the local government payroll (CEHRD, 
2006). 
 
In a like manner, Magnus Abe was the financier of a cult group called Seresibra and 
this group was used to perpetrate electoral violence in Gokana LGA of Rivers state 
(Naagbanton, 2006). Also Sylva, established a security outfit called famutangbe (an 
Izon word meaning hit and throw away) which he used to terrorise his opponents by 
destroying their billboards. The security outfit also caused untold hardship to the 







The views expressed by the interviewees and the corroboration of these views by the 
extant literature affirmed the point that the elite played a critical role in the political 
cum electoral violence that has ravaged the region since the restoration of democratic 
order in 1999 and the reason for this is because of the control of the oil wealth of the 
region. The states in the region received 13% derivation and statutory allocation from 
the federation account, which make them the region’s allocation from the centre to be 
the highest compared to other regions or states in the federation. So, the battle for who 
control these resources among the elite of the region is warlike in which every 
contestant for the coveted office of all tiers of government in the region see it as a 
matter of life and death or do-or-die affair.   
 
These findings resonate in resource curse theory, which offers an explanation as to the 
rationale for fierce battle for positions in resource endowed states. The resource curse 
through honey pot thesis stipulates that oil is the source of a power struggle among the 
elite. The struggle for the control of oil rent makes politics in the Niger Delta to be 
characterised by violence and the theory also accounts for the neo-patrimonial nature 
of politics in the region.  This is supported by a militant, who in a published interview 
noted that: 
Let no one be deceived, it is all about oil. If there is a separation 
between political power and oil, a lot of Niger Delta politicians will 
not contest elections and there will be no militancy. Militancy is the 
child of greedy and corrupt politicians who will stop at nothing to 
make money for themselves, their families, and their friends (cited 








4.3.1.1 3 Underdevelopment  
 
The underdevelopment nature of the Niger Delta has been a contributing factor to 
electoral violence in the region. The Niger Delta region is rich in oil and gas and other 
natural resources but remains the least developed part of Nigeria (Obi, 2010).   
According to Nyiayaana, (2011), the region suffers from socio-economic 
backwardness. It lacks social amenities such as schools, hospitals, electricity, roads 
and other social amenities that make life meaningful.   
 
 Responding to the role of the elite in the underdevelopment of the region and also why 
underdevelopment is responsible for violence in the region an interview 003 Youth 
stated that: 
Agreed, we have been short-changed by the failure of the majority 
ethnic groups to develop the region, what have they done as leaders 
of this region in their own little way to lift our people from poverty 
and develop this region flowing with milk and honey? I am sure, 
your guess is as good as mine and they have done nothing. Instead, 
some of them who are in the corridor of power mismanaged the 
scarce resources meant for the human and physical development of 
the region. They pocketed or diverted resources to private use and 
they continue to blame our adversaries for the underdevelopment of 












The statement above highlighted corruption among the ruling elite of the region as a 
contributing factor to the underdevelopment of the region.  
 
Similarly, interviewee 009 Traditional Chief/ Civil Society Organisation member 
remarked that:  
We don’t have many companies around here; we don’t have many 
people who are entrepreneurship- minded. The game over here is a 
game of power and people have a wrong mindset or notion that when 
you are in power or government you can make a lot of money that 
will take care of your family and maybe your community. So, that is 
wrong mindset and is common here in the Niger Delta, they need to 
have power, they need to control resources and you don’t know that 
you can control your resource and can have power, if you, set-up 
big companies.  If four-five big people can come together to set-up 
something like what the Dangote’s had, Dantata, and Femi Otedola 
had.  But here, the big people you hear about are the former 
senators, former commissioners for this, and former governors for 
this. So, it is, unfortunately, what people see is beyond what they see. 
Everybody wants to be S.A- Special Assistant this and it becomes a 
do-or-die affairs. Here, you know, politics is like a do-or -die affairs 
(Interview at Tombia, Port Harcourt, Rivers state, 2/6/16). 
 
The above response indicated that most of the states in the region are poor despite the 
abundance of natural resources located in the region. More so, there are no efforts 
made by the economic elite to transform the civil service states to create employment 
for the teeming youth of the region. The powers that be in the states are only interested 
in how to better their pockets. Furthermore, the orientation of the people is also to get 









By the same token, interviewee 001 Traditional Ruler said that: 
The state of development of the region is also a factor, especially in 
Bayelsa where virtually there are no companies except oil multi-
national. The nature of this company is capital intensive and not 
labour intensive.  They employ less labour and besides, they claimed 
our people have no expertise in that field and so they were not 
employed while people from the majority ethnic groups were given 
jobs meant for our people.  Apart from these oil companies, there 
are no visible companies, you can see around this area. The banks 
that are operating here employ less number of staff.  I must confess, 
we are the architect of our own problems. We have indigenes from 
this area who instead of coming home to establish companies that 
will create employment for our people, they locate their business in 
Lagos and other big cities (Interview at Taylor Creek, Yenagoa, 
Bayelsa state, 1/5/16). 
 
This reaffirmed the earlier point made that the elite of the region were also responsible 
for the underdevelopment of the region. The business elite from the region failed to 
invest in the state and instead, they invested outside the region in places such as Lagos, 
Ogun and other big cities in the country.  It also highlighted why the existing 
transnational oil companies operating in the region could not employ many indigenes 
of the region and this was attributed to the nature of the technology used.  
 
An interviewee 004 Civil Servant/ Civil Liberty Organisation member, suggested the 
establishment of industries and regular supply of electricity so that the artisans and 
other unemployed people would be engaged.  In his words: 
Let’s us see to it that industries are created and stable  power supply 
is guaranteed so that those who are involved in violence because of 
lack of employment can be properly engaged and our artisans can 
also have something to do” (Interview at Bayelsa Secretariat, 






Similarly, interviewee 006 Retired Military Officer, suggested that all hands must be 
on deck in ensuring that the region is developed. He maintained that: 
The central government working in collaboration with state and 
local government in the region should see to the development of the 
region by providing social amenities and also creates an enabling 
environment for private sector participation in the development of 
the region (Interview at Warri, Delta state, 31/5/16). 
 
The interviewee suggested the collaboration and cooperation among the tiers of 
government in the provision of critical infrastructure, creating an enabling 
environment and employment for the army of youth to curb the menace of violence in 
the region. This finding from the study is consistent with the literature (Ogonor, 2003; 
Ross, 2003; UNDP, 2006; Obi, 2010; Ibaba, 2012; 2011; Watts & Ibaba, 2011; 
Nyiayaana, 2011; Okoli, 2013). These numerous studies have posited that the 
inhabitants of the oil-bearing communities suffered from a lack of social amenities, 
poverty and government neglect which, when sum-up points to the underdevelopment 
of the region.  This finding is supported by the resource curse thesis which associated 
resource endowment with myriad of social problems such as underdevelopment and 
poverty.  
 
According to UNDP (2006)  
…the Niger Delta is a region suffering from administrative neglect, 
crumbling social infrastructure and services, high unemployment, 
social deprivation, abject poverty, filth and squalor, and endemic 
conflict. Enormous possibilities for industrial development abound 
in terms of the abundance of raw materials in the region, but these 
remain unrealized. Beyond vast oil and gas deposits, the delta is 
blessed with good agricultural land, extensive forests, excellent 






The inference to be drawn from the responses of the interviewees in this study and the 
literature is that the region has the potential of being one of the most developed sections 
of the country but the failure of the elite to show commitment and pursue with vigour 
developmental programmes that will transform the region from its present state of 
underdevelopment to one of development is lacking. During the researcher fieldwork, 
the researcher observed that basic social amenities were virtually absence. For 
instance, some of the schools in all the states visited in the region were in dilapidated 
conditions and erratic power supply in a region that boast of gas.  
 
In fact, Bayelsa seems to be worst in terms of infrastructure among the four states that 
are the focus of this study. It is a civil service state where the majority of the people 
were employed by the state government. The other visible industry in the states is the 
service industry and this sector can only accommodate few people and this explains 
why most of the people are unemployed.  The elite who are supposed to design policies 
and programmes that will transform the state seem to be overwhelmed by the problem 
and lack the political will to tackle the problem headlong.   
 
4.3.1.1.4 Unemployment  
 
There is no doubt that the underdevelopment of the region partly accounted for 
unemployment and unemployment is responsible for electoral violence in the region. 
The argument is that most of the youths being used to perpetrate electoral violence do 






The traditional occupations of the people of the region are farming and fishing and due 
to oil exploration activities of the transnational oil companies, which resulted in 
environmental degradation, many of them lost their jobs and migrated to the urban 
centres looking for jobs that were unavailable.  And to keep body and souls together, 
they became a ready-made tool used by the political class during elections to harass, 
intimidate and killed political opponents.  
 
The failure of the elite of the region to provide employment for the army of youth in 
the region created an avenue for militia leaders to recruit this idle youth and placed 
them at the disposal of the elite as a tool or agent of violence in the region.  The elite 
of the region have no blueprints put in place to transform the region from its current 
least developed region in Nigeria to one of the most developed regions in the country. 
There was embargo on employment in states visited by the researcher in the course of 
his fieldwork and from the researcher observation, no commitment on the part of the 
stakeholders to develop the state either through creating an enabling environment for 
private sector participation in the setting up of industries which will provide jobs for 
the teeming youth of unemployed graduates and non-graduates.    
 
The Table 4.1 and Figure 4.1 show the rate of unemployment in the region and while 
Figure 4.1 is the pictorial representation of the Table 4.1. As the Table 4.1 shows the 
rate of unemployment in the region has been risen and fallen. The core Niger Delta 
states namely Akwa Ibom, Bayelsa, Delta and Rivers that produced 80% of the oil and 
received substantial part of the proceeds from the federation account have not fared 






Table 4. 1  
























1 Abia 14.8 11.4 9.7 7.9 13.5 25.1 11.9 14.5 22.8 11.2 
2 Akwa Ibom 12.3 14.4 14.4 14.4 15.3 18.0 11.1 34.1 27.7 18.4 
3 Bayelsa 3.5 7.1 14.0 20.9 16.0 21.9 67.4 41.5 27.4 23.9 
4 Cross-River 7.9 12.0 11.5 11.1 16.9  32.8 18.9 14.3 27.9 18.2 
5 Delta  14.9 17.1 10.8 4.5 13.8 22.9 11.5 18.4 27.9 18.2 
6 Edo 4.8 3.1 6.5 9.9 8.6 14.8 15.6 12.2 27.9 35.2 
7 Imo 19.9 22.1 19.3 16.5 21.5 28.3 17.4 20.8 28.1 26.1 
8 Ondo 16.8 7.3 6.8 6.2 6.7 6.7 6.3 14.9 28.0 12.5 
9 Rivers 6.6 15.3 11.2 7.0 25.0 66.4 12.1 27.9 27.8 22.5 
            
Source:  Compiled by the Researcher from Aiyedogbon & Oshwofasa (2012) p. 273 and National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) (2012),    





For instance, Akwa Ibom, the leading oil producing states in the region and also 
revenue has 18.4 unemployment rate in 2011 compared to Abia, Cross-River, Delta 
and Ondo with 11.2, 18.2, 18.2 and 12.5 respectively.  Bayelsa State another leading 
oil producing state in the region has the third highest unemployment rates in the region 





  Figure 4. 1 Unemployment rate in states in the Niger Delta 
   
The question to ask is why these leading oil producing states has not fared better than 
their counterparts in the zone. The reason is simply corruption and mismanagement of 
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This issue is extensively analysed in chapter five of this study. Commenting on the use 
of the unemployed youth as thugs for the perpetuation of violence, an interviewee 006, 
a retired Military Officer stated that “the bulk of the youths in the region are 
unemployed and they become tools politicians use to achieve their goals of winning 
elections.” (Interview at Warri, Delta State, 31/05/16).  While another interviewee 003 
Youth suggested the provision of employment for the army of youths from the region 
and warned of the consequences of failure to provide employment for the teeming 
youth. In his words: “They should create jobs so that the youth can be fully engaged. 
As the saying goes that an idle man is a devil’s workshop. When the youths are not 
engaged, they can become an agent of violence” (Interview at Yenagoa, Bayelsa state, 
3/5/16).  
 
The view expressed above that unemployment is a cause of electoral violence found 
support in the existing literature (Laasko, 2007; Agbonifo, 2009; Ugiagbe, 2010; 
Akpan, 2011; Frimpong, 2012; IPI, 2012; Drumond, 2015).  Drumond (2015) argues 
that the existence of an army of unemployed youth increase the likelihood of electoral 
violence and this is because that they can easily be co-opted if the enterprise increases 
their access to power and resources. Similarly, the Foundation for Partnership 
Initiatives in the Niger Delta (PIND) (2011) in its report observed that: 
Despite vast oil resources, the Delta region is characterised by 
extremely high poverty levels. 70 percent of youth in the region live 
below the poverty line. The youth (15-24 years) unemployment rate 
is 40 percent, far exceeding the national average youth 
unemployment rate of 14 percent. Youth un and under-employment 
has ultimately become both a driver of conflict and a formidable 






By the same token, the National Bureau of Statistics (cited in Ibaba, 2011, p.33) in its 
2010 reports listed three of the four states which are the focus of this study as states 
with highest unemployment rates. Akwa Ibom had 34.1 percent, Bayelsa 38.4 percent 
and Rivers state 27.9 percent, while the national average was 19.7 percent.  
 
This support from the literature underscores the important contribution of 
unemployment to political-cum electoral violence in the region which some of the 
respondents interviewed attributed to the embezzlement of funds which could have 
been used for the development of the state by the elite of the region.  
 
4.4.1.1.5 Nature of Politics 
 
The nature of the political office, which is closely linked with nature of politics in 
Nigeria (Niger Delta inclusive) is such that it is juicy or attractive. It is this attractive 
nature of political office in the region that also accounted for electoral violence in the 
region. Political office is an avenue to get rich quick and not to serve the people. It is 
because of this that the politics is zero-sum in nature. That is the winner gets everything 
and the loser gets nothing.  
 
The winner wins at the expense of the loser. It is because of this that no politician 
wants to lose an election because of huge investment he/she has incurred and by hook 
or crook he must triumph over his opponent to recoup his investment. Furthermore, 
the nature of our politics is patrimonial. This is a situation in which political office 
holders attach importance to themselves and their offices than the established rules and 






The term neo-patrimonialism was introduced into the political lexicon by Eisenstadt 
in 1973 and has become popular since the late 1980s. Neopatrimonialism is a 
combination of patrimonialism and modern state bureaucracy (as cited by Beekers & 
van Gool, 2012). For Bratton and van de Walle (1997, p.269), neo-patrimonialism 
refers to an unofficial political system based on the personalised rule and organized 
through clientelistic networks of patronage, personal loyalty, and coercion. Van de 
Walle (2007) argues that neopatrimonialism is incompatible with democracy because 
it ensures political stability of the authoritarian regime and undermines popular 
political participation. In other words, it weakens democracy.   
 
In his insightful analysis of African politics, Bayart (1993) employs two concepts to 
define the nature and functioning of African politics. The former he calls politics of 
the belly (la politique du ventre) and the second the rhizome state (l’etat rhizome). The 
former means the driving force of politics in the continent, which is materialism. That 
is to eat, to get hold of material benefits by powers one wields. This is contrary to the 
idea of politics in other climes, where politicians see themselves as public servants 
whose duty is to promote the public interest and not private interest. The latter implies 
the structures of African politics and its complex interaction between the political and 
private differentiate it from first world countries.  
 
Thus, Bayart (1993) uses the term rhizome state to discern the African state from the 
Weberian state typical of the advanced capitalist countries.  Bayart (1993) notes that 
the politics of the belly means “the social struggles which make up the quest for 
hegemony and the production of the State bear the hallmarks of a rush for spoils in 





What the statement portends is that politicians elected to serve the people use their 
offices to enrich themselves.  
 
Richard Joseph (1983) encapsulates the reality of Nigerian polity when he describes 
the misuse of the office of the state to enrich oneself as prebendalism. Though 
prebendalism and neo-patrimonialism differ, they supplement each other.  For 
example, patron-client relationship or clientelism is a relationship in which one 
benefits from a prebend which is an office of the state.  Neo-patrimonial politics is 
bureaucratic politics. In a neo-patrimonial politics, politics is a business with two 
modes of exchange, money, and connection.   
 
The states as a pie that everybody wants to bite (Medard, 1982). Thus, as the risks of 
gaining elective or political position become very high, the political gladiators engage 
in fierce battle, violence, and intimidation in their pursuit for political position. It is 
this that accounted for the warfare nature or do-or-die disposition of the political elite 
in the politics in the region.   Commenting on the nature of politics in the Niger Delta, 
interviewee 007, Youth leader noted that: 
The political positions are too juicy, a situation where an ordinary 
councillor who was lucky to have passed his school certificate 
examination earned more than a Professor who took many years of 
scholarship to attain that position. The councillor takes home pay is 
more than N500, 000 while a Prof earns barely N400, 000 per month 









Similarly, interviewee 011, Academic had this to say: 
(…) in the Niger Delta, we operate a neo-patrimonial system where 
whoever has access to a vast patronage network is seen as somebody 
to go to, somebody of timber and calibre and somebody that should 
be reckoned with by politicians because he has access to patronage 
network, that he can use for election violence (Interview at Tombia, 
Port Harcourt, Rivers state, 3/6/16). 
 
While Interviewee 003 and 007, youth and youth leader respectively suggested that 
political office should be made less attractive. If it is unattractive not many people will 
go into politics and that will reduce the fierce battle that marked our body politic and 
people with genuine interest to serve their people will be encouraged to do so.  In the 
words of the interviewee 007, Youth leader: 
The political offices should be made less attractive. If it is make less 
juicy not many people would go into politics. More so, people with 
lion heart and vision will be encouraged to venture into an arena 
that has been tainted with violence (Interview at Yenagoa, Bayelsa 
state, 3/5/16) 
 
The argument on the attractive nature of the political office is corroborated by Alemika 
(cited in Onimisi, 2015). He noted that: 
The perception of politics and political office as an investment and 
as an avenue for the acquisition of extraordinary wealth through 
corruption, which is otherwise not possible through any form of 
legitimate vocation and enterprise. As a result of this perception and 
reality, Nigerian politicians turn electioneering and elections into 
warfare in which violence and ethnic, religious and other forms of 
primordial sentiments and prejudices are employed (cited in 







4.4 Impacts of Political Violence  
 
This segment of the study analyses the impact of violence be it political-cum electoral 
in the region and these include loss of lives and property, proliferation of militia 
groups, arms proliferation and polarisation of the region 
 
4.4.1 Loss of lives and Property 
 
The violence in the Niger Delta has risen since 2003 (Odili, 2007; Hazen & Horner, 
2007) and evidence can be found in the increased in the activities of militia groups, 
and politically motivated killings, which will be examined in the following section. 
The political-cum electoral violence has devastating effects on the rights of Nigerians.  
 
Many have been deprived of their civic rights of taking part in the political process.  
Thousands of fellow countrymen and women have lost their lives due to the violent 
nature of political competition in the country and Niger Delta.  An interviewee 008/ 
CSO, noted that:  a party stalwart was beheaded and other members of his family were 
killed in Rivers State (Interview at Tombia, Port-Harcourt, Rivers State, 1/6/16). 
 
4.4.2 Proliferation of Militia Groups 
 
The tool through which the elite from the Niger Delta perpetrated political violence in 
the region is armed groups whose members were recruited and financed by them to 
harass members of the public, protect them from attacks and rig elections for them. 
For us to appreciate the role these groups played in entrenching violence in the region 
and how elite support for them have led to their proliferation, it is important to briefly 





Hazen and Horner (2007) categorised armed group in Nigeria into confraternities and 
cults, vigilante groups, ethnic militia, and criminal groups. Confraternities and cults 
shared a similarity in origin but differ in modus operandi. Confraternities operate in 
campus whereas their affiliated cults operate off-campus.  
 
Vigilante groups are established to fill a security gap due to inability or incompetence 
of the law enforcement agency to prevent crime and protect life and property. Ethnic 
militias are youth group founded with the sole purpose of protecting and defending the 
interests of their ethnic groups (Adejumobi, 2003). They are not aimed at controlling 
political power but influencing government policies. Criminal gangs are groups of 
illiterates, poor and unemployed youths who are involved in petty crimes and used as 
veranda boys by the politicians to rig elections and intimidate voters (Hazen & Horner, 
2007).  
 
There seems to be a thin-line that can be drawn among these various categorisations. 
The ethnic militias, cults, and vigilantes all roll into one. The ethnic militias group 
started as a vigilantes groups and to solidify their operations and promote oneness 
among themselves so that no one will betray the other, they constitute themselves into 
a cult where rituals and oaths taking take place and also fortify themselves through this 
process against their foes.  For example, Ateke Tom’s militia group started as a 
vigilante group and later metamorphosed into militia group “championing the cause of 
Brass people and later the Niger Delta”. It can be argued to some extent that the present 
confraternities in the Ivory Towers is widely spread in the Niger Delta and this is due 






4.4.3 Arms Proliferation  
 
The proliferation of small arms and light weapons (SALW) has also contributed to the 
violence in the region. The term SALW has different definitions but common to all the 
definitions is the point that it covers a wide spectrum of weapons, ammunition and 
their spare parts. The number of SALW in West Africa has been estimated to be 
between seven and ten million (cited in Hazen & Horner, 2007). Nigeria alone 
accounted for between one and three million of SALW (cited in Hazen & Horner, 
2007). The majority of these weapons are in the hands of the civilians population.  
 
For Onuoha (2006), SALW weapons are weapons that can be manipulated by one or 
two persons. In other words, SALW is weapons produced to military stipulations for 
use as deadly instruments of war (Thom-otuya, 2009).  The weapons are acquired 
through funds provided by politicians who patronised the armed groups as well as 
funds made available to the armed group by the oil companies for services (oil 
infrastructure protection contract) rendered by the group. These weapons are obtained 
from international weapons merchants, returnees from United Nations (UN) African 
Union (AU), and ECOWAS peace missions. Moreover, weapons are obtained from 
local manufacturers and from the law enforcement agencies and members of the armed 
forces (Malam, 2014). Politicians also distribute SALW to armed groups. For instance, 
it was reported that a deputy governor in one of the states in the Niger Delta was caught 








Consequently, the proliferation of SALW threatened Nigeria’s national security 
through increased in criminal activities in the region such as drug abuse, oil bunkering, 
hostage taking, and youth restiveness.  More so, weapons are in the hands of those that 
do not supposed to be in possession of such weapon and this has caused the death of 
many people.   
 
Corroborating the proliferation of arms in the Niger Delta, an Interviewee, 004, Civil 
Servant/CLO, noted that “violence is experienced because politicians cannot retrieve 
guns that they gave those (militants) for their political purpose. Armouries are 
everywhere in every community” (Interview at Secretariat, Yenagoa, Bayelsa State, 
4/5/2016).Similarly, an interviewee 006, a retired Military officer said that:  “Arms 
and ammunition are available in every community in the region. It is like beans, yam, 
and rice, which you buy in the market” (Interview at Warri, Delta State, 31/5/2016). 
The quoted statements above indicated that the elite fuel the conflict in the region 
through the arming and the use of the group for their political objectives.  
 
4.4.4 Polarisation of the Region/Country 
 
The elite because of their do-or-die attitude or winning at all cost syndrome pitched 
one ethnic group against the other and this has polarised the country and the region 
into ‘we’ and ‘then’ and this has greatly aggravated the political environment of the 
area.   
 
 
 More so, the failure of the elite to observe internal democracy or the party constitution 





various senatorial zones within a state and regions at the national level). Where the 
rules are disregarded, there are bound to be violent conflict. The 2011 presidential 
election in Nigeria was a classic example and the candidate of the People Democratic 
Party, who was then the incumbent president of the country violated the party zoning 
arrangement in which the office of the president of the Nigeria was rotated between 
the North and the South (; Ndujihe, 2010; Ajah, 2011) 
 
The South through Chief Olusegun Obasanjo had the first shot and completed eight 
years and the North could not complete her own because of the death of Umaru Musa 
Yar’adua. So, the North demanded to be allowed to field a candidate from the North 
under the party rotation formula to complete the remaining years of the North but the 
party fielded the sitting president from the south and this not only resulted in the 
polarisation of the country into North and South, Christian and Muslim but also 
violence that heralded the announcement of Jonathan as the winner of the 2011 
presidential elections. The violence that welcomed the announcement led to the loss 
of lives and property (ICG, 2011).  
 
In Rivers State, the same scenario played itself out in 2015 where the mainland or 
upland has been at the helm of affairs in the state since returned of democratic rule in 
1999. The riverine areas were demanding their own turn to govern the state.  But the 
dominant party in the state picked a Mainland candidate, and that caused wrangling 








According to an interviewee (007), a Youth leader stated that: 
The elite when they discovered they are losing, they played the 
ethnic card. Ha! They didn’t vote for me because l am from minority 
area. That’s why l lost. They will recruit the idle youths to fight for 
them (Interview at Diobu, Port-Harcourt, River state, 1/06/16). 
 
The quoted statement above indicated that the elite recourse to ethnic sentiment to 
mobilise the people to take to violence in order to achieve their selfish ends or goals.  
 
4.5 Reported incidences of Political-cum Electoral violence in the Niger Delta 
 
The politics of intolerance and bitterness that characterised the political contest in the 
Niger Delta rear its ugly head in several states of the region. Rivers state is the worst 
hit. The following incidents illustrate the intolerance and bitterness that typified the 
politics of the region. 
 
Rivers State saw a gory political fight between two foremost political parties in the 
state, the All Progressive Congress (APC) and Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) over 
primacy and control of governmental machinery in the state. One of the main casualties 
of the crisis was Mr Michael Okechuku Chindah, who was hit with a mace by a fellow 
member of the State House of Assembly, Chidi Lioyd, amid a fight on the floor of the 
House on July 9, 2013. Chindah   suffered severe wounds to his head that left him 
oblivious before being rushed for care in a private hospital in Port Harcourt and later 







The Save Rivers Movement (SRM) organised a Pro Amaechi rally in Port Harcourt 
and it was disrupted by some hoodlums. Similarly, Senator Magnus Abe was shot by 
some Ogoni youths who were later arrested and charged to court for illicit ownership 
of walkie-talkie, dangerous weapons and unlawful assembling (Ebiri, 2014). The 
bombing of two court buildings in Ahoada and Nigerian Bar Association secretariat 
located in the court premises (Olaniyi, & Dikewoha, 2014). These were instances of 
political intolerance that characterised the body politic of Rivers State. 
 
The residents of Rumuigbo and Rumuipirikon in Obio/Akpor Local Government Area 
of Rivers State woke up to shootings and decimation of property because of a political 
fight between the PDP and APC over the control the areas.  The root cause of the fracas 
was the denial of then governor of the state to campaign in the stronghold of the rival 
party and this degenerated into free for all fight in which properties were destroyed 
(Joab-Peterside, 2015).  
 
In the build-up to the 2015 presidential elections in Rivers state, on January 11, 2015, 
the APC secretariat in the Okrika local government area was assaulted and on January 
25, 2015, gangsters raged the venue of the APC meeting damaging vehicles, attacking 
individuals and stopping the rally from holding (The Guardian editorial, 2015, p. 16).  
Thus, in March 2015, the All Progressive Congress (APC) raised an alert claiming 
assassination of its members and supporters in the state.  The announcement expressed 
that nine of its individuals were executed in two separate occurrences along the D-Line 






Also, according to APC leader in the state, 35 of his party members were killed in the 
build-up to 2015 presidential while the PDP leadership alleged 45 of his members were 
sent to the world beyond (Stakeholder Democracy & Network (SDN, 2015). There 
were likewise interminable assaults on APC supporters in the Okrika Council Area 
where the opposition party had been victims of three bomb assaults (Abuh, 2015). 
 
Meanwhile, at Okrika, political thugs attacked gubernatorial candidate of the APC and 
his supporters. At the last count, 50 defenceless people, among them four policemen 
and journalists were hurt and a policeman murdered. Okrika is the country home of 
the then first lady of Nigeria, Dame Patience Jonathan and what makes the Okrika 
violence unique were its recurrence and the characters represented by the parties in the 
fight for the soul of the community.   
 
The poor handling of the police on this matter or incidence caught the attention of one 
of the nation’s respected newspapers The Guardian. In its editorial, the paper noted 
that:  
Before this latest spate of violence, providing security for the APC 
rally by the police had been a matter of concern for its high 
command as if it were hamstrung to carry out its constitutional duty 
of protecting lives and property. When the APC had concluded plans 
to organize a rally for early February, the Rivers State 
Commissioner of Police, Mr. Dan Bature, had even counselled for a 
change of date to enable the police provide adequate security (The 








In the Governorship and House of Assembly elections in 2015 in the state, there were 
incidents of killings, attacks on INEC officials, hijacking of election materials and 
arsons. For instance, the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) 
Registration Area Centre (RAC) in the Buguma Local Government Area and the house 
of the state’s Commissioner of Women Affairs, Mrs. Joeba West were burnt and in 
Asari-Toru LGA, seven vehicles conveying electoral materials were reportedly burnt 
(Hassan, 2015).  
 
Also, there were heavy gunshots in Rumuolumeni and Ozuoba in Obio Akpor local 
government area of the state. Soldiers were deployed to Buguma in Asari-Toru Local 
Government area following the assassination of two people by political thugs (Ndujihe 
and Kumolu, 2015). In Ozuaha community in the Ikwerre Local Government area of 
the state, thugs opened fire on a team of security personnel who were escorting INEC 
ad hoc staffs to polling units (Hassan, 2015). 
 
In the build, up to rerun elections on 10 December 2016, in Rivers State, there were 
cases of violence in the state perpetrated by cultists and militants against the law-
abiding people of Omoku, and other contiguous towns in the Ogba/Ndoni/Egbema 
Local Government Area of the state.  The security operatives were also brutalised by 
these groups. For instance, on 20 November 2016, soldiers of 34 Brigade were 
ambushed and one of them was killed.  Also, on 21 November 2016, Nigerian Security 
and Civil Defence Corps lost four of their men and their weapons carted away.  On the 
day of the re-run elections (10 December 2016), DSP Alkali Mohammed of Mobile 
Police Unit 48 was beheaded along with his orderly and their weapons and patrol 





In Delta state, the state 2011 legislative election into Patani constituency involving Mr. 
Raymos Guanah (former Commissioner for Lands, Survey, and Urban Development) 
of the Fresh Party and Basil Ganagana of the People’s Democratic Party was soiled by 
violence. The violence caused the dead of Sixtus Ganagana a brother to Basil 
Ganagana.  Also, the transitional chairman of the Patani local government council, Mr. 
Paul Atie was shot by unknown gunmen. In Ethiopie local government area, in 
November 2014, the clash between supporters of the Labour Party and Peoples 
Democratic led to the dead of scores of people and properties were destroyed (Aiwerie, 
2014).  
 
Akwa Ibom state was also not spared of the ugly incident of politically motivated 
killing in the region. In 2010, Dr. Akpan Akpanudo was killed because he sought 
election to the State House of Assembly (Effiong, 2015). In 2011, a gubernatorial 
candidate for Action Congress of Nigeria used political thugs in the state to wreak 
havoc particularly in Uyo and Ikot Ekpene.  On March 22, 2011, supporters of Action 
Congress of Nigeria and Peoples Democratic Party fought at Ikot Ekpene and two 
people lost their lives and many sustained injuries.  Consequently, this led to a reprisal 
one in Uyo, the capital city of the state in which 20 people lost their lives and 800 new 
cars and tricycles parked at the state secretariat were destroyed. A PDP stalwart in the 
state, Senator Aloysius Etok school, and properties were destroyed while he escaped 
being assassinated (Akpan, 2011). 
 
In 2014, Engr. Ukpanah was slain at his home by killers.  Mrs. Helen Esuene was 
attacked on October 5, 2014, while on a campaign tour by political thugs for venturing 





 In 2015 general elections in the state, a former deputy speaker of the State House of 
Assembly was killed by political thugs led by Chairman of Ukanafun Local 
Government, Mr. Effiom Abai (Effiong, 2015).    
 
The political situation in Bayelsa state is not different from other states in the region. 
It is not spared of political violence.  For instance, in the run-up to the 2015 general 
elections in the state, the two dominant political parties in the state, Peoples 
Democratic Party, and All Progressive Congress engaged in a fierce battle to control 
the governmental machinery of the state.  
 
The 2015 gubernatorial election in the state was tainted by violence, with accusation 
and counter-accusation from both parties as the culprit responsible for the violence. A 
number of people were killed in the violence that ravaged the state. For instance, three 
persons were killed in the Southern Ijaw Local Government Area of the State, four lost 
their lives in Nembe and one in Ekeremor.  The Southern Ijaw town of Oporoba was 
attacked by political thugs and scores of people were killed and several others injured. 
The hoodlum made away with sensitive election materials (O’Neil, Olaniyi, Odiegwu, 
& Dikewoha, 2015). 
 
At Odioma, the APC gubernatorial candidate was attacked by PDP supporters. It took 
the timely intervention of the Joint Task Force to ward off the attack and save the 
gubernatorial candidate and his entourage.  Mr Heineken Lokpobiri was attacked by 






The PDP blamed the APC for the attack in Nembe on a member the State House of 
Assembly, Princess Ingo Iwowari, who was stripped of all her possessions, including 
cash (O’Neil, Olaniyi, Odiegwu,.& Dikewoha, 2015). The governor, Seriake Dickson 
accused the Minister of Agriculture of sponsoring the attacks on his party members 
and supporters in Twon Brass, Teco in Ekeremor town and Oporoma. 
 
The reported cases of political violence discussed above brought to the fore intolerance 
and a power struggle among the political elite to win elections at all cost without regard 
for human lives. The political terrain in the region is such that an altruistic politician 
who wants to serve his people will not venture into because of his or her life. This 
created an opportunity for those whose motives are to fend for themselves and their 
immediate families. It is important to note that the control of oil proceeds is the key 
factor that explains why the elite will go to any length in order to get into political 
position and not the desire to improve the lots of the people. The elites have not 
imbibed democratic ideal or political culture whereby political contest is a seen as a 
game that is governed by the rules and the players are expected to abide by the rules. 
But the elites see the political contest as do-or- die affairs which they must win through 
unconventional means.  
 
This finding is corroborated by the elite theory. The concentration of power in the hand 
of the few and the cohesion among them, which enable them to manipulate the mass 
(militia group) and use them to pursue their own  selfish interest such as protection of 






Put differently, men by nature like power and by implication, those elites who wield 
these powers would not like to relinquish their positions because of the attractiveness 
of the office and the need to control the oil wealth. So, they can go to any length to 
retain such powers, including assassination of their formidable opponents.  
 
As the finding on political violence in the region has shown, the elites of the Niger 
Delta extraction created an environment that serves as an impetus for the youth to take 
to violence to meet their basic needs. Some of the points have already been examined 
which need not rehearse here.  It is important to note that the poor state of governance, 
disposition of elites to politics, underdevelopment, poverty, and corruption are the 
motivators that made the youth a handmade tool or vanguard or agent of violence used 
by the politicians and this drive found expression in the frustration-aggression theory.  
 
4.6 Summary  
 
The chapter has analysed the role of the elite as regard violence in the Niger Delta and 
examined the emergence and composition of elite in Nigeria. It argues that the 
Nigerian elites are a conglomeration of different segments of elites such as the military, 
economic, bureaucratic, traditional and political elite. Specifically, the chapter 
discusses the role of elites in the electoral violence in the Niger Delta and argued that 
the battles for who control the oil wealth of the region make the political contest in the 








The elites have supported violence in the region through financing, procurement of 
weapon and its distribution to the armed groups as well as fraternizing with them. The 
impacts of their roles can be seen in the proliferation of SALW and armed groups in 
the region who engaged in supremacy battle in order to continue to enjoy the patronage 
of the ruling elite in the region.  
 
The findings of the study have been corroborated by the combined theories employed 
to analyse the conflict.  The resource control and political restructuring are the focus 
of the next chapter. The chapter among others analyses the rationale for the demand 






RESOURCE CONTROL AND POLITICAL RESTRUCTURING 
 
5.1 Introduction  
 
This chapter like the preceding one is a continuation of the contribution of the elite to 
the Niger Delta conflict in the areas of agitation for resource control and political 
restructuring of Nigeria.  It analyses issues such as resource control/ fiscal federalism, 
revenue allocation and political restructuring of the polity. The chapter sheds more 
light on these germane issues. What constitutes resource control and the rationale 
behind it? Moreover, the chapter zeroes on the fiscal federalism/revenue allocation 
which is a component of resource control. It addresses the research question number 
two which centres on the rationale for resource control and political restructuring of 
the polity.  
 
5.2 Resource Control  
 
The term resource control has attracted different interpretations among scholars, 
politicians, activists and policy analysts. As Ako (2011) rightly noted: “the quest for 
resource control by the people of Niger Delta lies at the heart of the violence in the 
region”.(p.42)  For Aghalino (2006) resource control has been a recurrent decimal in 
the history of the Niger Delta of Nigeria and attributed this to the historical importance 





Naanen (2015) defines resource control from four perspectives, politicians, militants, 
ordinary ‘Deltans, and non-Deltans’. For the politicians from Niger Delta region, 
resource control means personal enjoyment of the benefits of oil at the expense of most 
people they represent.   Whereas, the militants see it as a way of recovering through 
armed struggle the petroleum resources that has been supposedly taken by the 
country’s power elite through political manipulation and those outside the region view 
it as refusing other parts of the federation the benefits of federalism by insisting on the 
control and enjoyment of a natural resource which should be the patrimony of all 
Nigerians. And to the average Niger Deltans, it means environmental degradation, 
poverty, and hunger amid plenty. For Ako (2011, p.42), resource control refers to the 
“desire that the region be left to manage its natural resources, particularly its oil and 
pay taxes and or royalties to the federal government”.   
 
5.2.1 Types of Resource Control 
 
Following Ako (2012, 2011) resource control can be categorised into three absolute 
resource control, principal resource control and increased derivation and these are 
discussed below: 
 
 5.2.1.1 Absolute Resource Control 
 
It is a resource control in which all the resources of the region are owned and controlled 
by the people of the region. This kind of resource control is included in the Kaiama 
Declaration, which is contained in paragraph 5 of the Declaration and its states that 
“every region should control its resources 100 per cent of which it will allocate funds 





Similarly, Roberts and Oladeji (2005) defined resource control as the total takeover of 
the resources situated in the oil bearing states by the people of the state.  For Ifedayo 
(cited in Atoyebi, Lawal, Adekunjo, & Ibrahim, 2013) resource control entails the 
access of communities and state governments to natural resources situated within their 
frontiers and the liberty to develop and utilize these resources without allusion from 
the central government.  
 
 5.2.1.2 Principal Resource Control 
 
This is a type of control in which the oil-bearing communities play a key role or 
participate actively in exploration, exploitation, marketing and sales of the products 
(Douglas, 2001; Henryik, 2009; Sagay, 2011).  For instance, Douglas (2001) sees 
resource control as a “compelling desire to regain ownership, control, use and 
management of resources for the primary benefit of the first owner (the communities 
and people) on whose land the resources originate.” (cited in Ako, 2011, p.42)  
 
For Sagay (2011), resource control means “a direct and decisive role in the exploration 
for, the exploitation and disposal of, including sales of the harvested resources.” He 
identified three components of resource control as  
The power and right of a Community or State to raise funds by way 
of tax on persons, matters, services and materials within its territory. 
The exclusive right to the ownership and control of resources, both 
natural and created within its territory. The right to customs duties 
on goods destined for its territory and excise duties on goods 







The seventeen states chief executives (governors) of the Southern part of Nigeria in 
their communique at the end of their summit in Benin, Edo state, define resource 
control “as the practice of true federalism and natural law in which the federating units 
express their rights to primarily control the natural resources within their borders and 
make agreed contribution towards the maintenance of common services of the 
government at the centre.” (cited Dafinone, 2001, p. 1) Adesopo and Asaju (2004), 
define resource control as the right of the Niger Delta to take possession and manage 
the revenue accruing from oil and other natural resources in accordance with the tenets 
of true federalism. 
 
Equally, Henryik (2009) defines resource control as the control and management of 
resources by the state or local government where the resources are found, under the 
guidance of the central government and then pay agreed percentage to the central 
government. 
 
5.2.1.3 Increased Revenue 
 
Resource control from the perspective of increased revenue involves a rise in the 
present derivation percentage from 13% to 25% as demanded by the elite of the region 
in the 2005 National Constitutional Reform Conference.  Atoyebi et al (2013) see 
resource control as the way and manner the government revenue is distributed among 
the different tiers of government namely the federal, state and local governments. Ya’u 
(2001) defines resource control as “the substantive powers for the community to 
collect monetary and other benefits accruing from the exploitation and use of resources 






In the light of the above definitions, resource control entails ownership, control, 
management of a natural resource by a community and payment of agreed percentage 
of the proceeds of the natural resources by the owners (community/state) to the central 
government for the overall running of its assigned duties by the constitution.  
 
In response to the question, what is resource control? Majority of the interviewees 
defined it from the principal resource control perspective and expressed the views that 
resource control meant the control and management of the resources by the oil-bearing 
communities and the payment of a certain percentage of the revenue from the resources 
to the central government.   
 
Commenting on this issue, one of the interviewees 005, Lawyer/ Politician noted that: 
… If we are to operate the federal system of government properly so 
called, the states should be allowed to manage whatever resources 
that are derived from within their own geographical territories 
(Interview in Warri, Delta State, 30/05/16). 
 
Another interviewee 011, Academic said that: 
 We have people saying the land belongs to us. It is our land and 
why should we have access to the land and not have access to the 
tables and dining chairs.  In a nutshell, I think the struggle for 
resource control is more of a campaign for equitable distribution of 
wealth, not just equality, you can’t just say you are distributing 








One of the interviewees commented that the owners of the resource should receive a 
greater percentage from the proceeds of the resources and should also own and 
managed the resources as well as pay taxes to the centre.  
In the words of the interviewee 007, a Youth leader  
Resource Control entails that the owners of the oil wealth should 
have a greater percentage of it. They should own and issue licences 
to prospective oil companies and the region will pay taxes to the 
central government as it is done in other places (Interview at Diobu, 
Port-Harcourt, Rivers State, 1/6/16). 
 
Interviewee’s 007, Youth Leader definition of resource control falls into both principal 
and increased revenue categorisation of resource control. The different 
conceptualisation or interpretations of resource control have led to a misunderstanding 
of the concept and the demands of the region. Is it total control and management of 
resources by the oil-producing communities or states?  Is it increased in oil allocation 
formula? There seems to be no agreements among the elite of the region on this issue. 
While some section of the elite are demanding absolute resource control.  Others are 
calling for an upward review of the current revenue allocation formula. 
 
5.2.2 Rationale for Resource Control 
 
Several reasons have been advanced for agitation for resource control and they include 
among others, environmental degradation, lack of infrastructure, poverty, and 
unemployment, poor corporate social responsibility and domination by the major 






Ako (2011) attributes the demand for resource control to perceive political and 
economic marginalisation of the people of the region by the majority ethnic group 
leaders at the helms of affairs in Nigeria.   
 
Omoweh (cited in Dibua, 2005), contends that the denial by succeeding 
administrations in the country to increase the level of participation of the oil-bearing 
communities over their natural resources as well as the environmental and social 
impacts of oil exploration necessitated the need for resource control. Corroborating 
this position Baba (2014), argues that government neglect of environmental 
management in the Niger Delta accounted for the demand for resource control and 
violence in the country. For Otitigbe and Otitigbe (2015), the demand for resource 
control is to encourage the practice of fiscal federalism as the most effective means of 
liberating Nigerians from the result of authoritarianism and misrule.  It is important at 
this juncture to examine some of the reasons advanced in the extant literature for 
resource control. 
 
5.2.2.1 Environmental Degradation 
 
Environmental degradation as highlighted above is one of the reasons advanced for the 
demand for resource control. The environment of the Niger Delta has been debased 
due to oil spillage, gas flaring and other activities such as oil exploration and 
exploitation by the transnational oil companies.  The inhabitants of the Niger Delta are 
concern about the environmental degradation of their region because it is their source 
of living. They depend on the environment and rivers for subsistence, socio-cultural 
survival, food and shelter.  Thus, a conflict of interest exists between the indigenes of 





Consequently, the people have no access to land where they can farm, they can fish 
because the rivers have been polluted and the fishes destroyed in the process. This 
created frustration and anger among the people and they not only demanded for the 
control of their resources, but also employed violence means to show their displeasure 
(Duru, 2005; Aaron, 2006; Abidde, 2009; Amnesty International, 2009; Babatunde, 
2010; Akhakpe, 2012; Oshwofasa, Anuta & Aiyedogbon, 2012;  Aworawo, 2013; 
Ebegbulem,  Ekpe,  & Adejumo, 2013; Akinbami,  & Abiona, 2014; Akpan, 2014).     
Duru (2005) notes that:  
…several years of exploration and hazards of spillage and gas 
flaring which accompany it have degraded their environment and 
left the communities desolate. Farming and fishing, the major 
occupations of these mostly riverine minorities have been decimated 
(cited in Nwogwugwu & Kupoluyi, 2015, p.23). 
 
The above view is in line with those expressed by most of those interviewed.  In 
response to a question about the reasons for resource control, an interviewee 005, 
Legal Practitioner/ Politician said that: 
If you go to the areas where oil is drilled, you will be shocked at the 
extent of neglect. You will be shocked at the sub-human level of 
existence that obtained in some of these areas. It is sub-human that 
is just the truth. And for one to think that the resource you are 
harvesting from this place or at the backyard of this region is what 
is sustaining the nation and for the people whose environments have 
been degraded, the people who have suffered so much in terms of 
ecological degradation and others, they have nothing to show for it. 










Likewise, interviewee 007, Youth leader, affirmed that: 
The problem has to do with the environmental degradation of the 
place. If you go to the place now, no good source of water. Before 
now, the people depend on water from streams, rain, and all others. 
Because of the activities of oil companies, you cannot drink those 
waters. So, all those things are having negative effects on their 
health.  The environment of the place has been so destroyed that 
aquatic life is no more in that place. Because the primary occupation 
of the people of the Niger Delta is fishing, but as we are speaking 
now, you can’t even go there that you want to carry out fishing 
because the chemical they use in the exploration and all those things 
have destroyed the fishes there and no fish is there. So, the people 
cannot go there and say they want to go and fish (Interview at Diobu, 
Port-Harcourt, Rivers State, 01/6/16). 
 
Re-echoing the views expressed by previous interviewees, an interviewee 011, 
Academic, noted that: 
There is a community in Delta state called Beji community, just 
adjoining that community is NNPC Warri refinery. When it rains in 
that community, everything there, if you put your cloth outside, turns 
black and when you breathe in the air, you know that you are 
breathing in something that is injurious to your health. In some other 
instances, we have a situation where pipelines bearing oil for 
MNOC and jointly owned by the FG, leaked and caused oil spills 
that destroy the  whole eco-system-  destroy water, destroy the  land; 
you cannot farm on the land, you cannot drink water (Interview at 
Tombia, Port-Harcourt, Rivers State, 3/6/16). 
 
Validating the impacts of oil exploration on the environment as the reason for the 
demand for resource control, a prominent traditional ruler in Ethiope Local 
Government Area, Rear Admiral Mike Onah (Rtd) in a secondary interview noted that 
“Oil production has destroyed the oil communities eco-system. It has adversely 







The quoted statements buttressed the importance of environmental factor in the 
agitation for resource control in the region. As the responses have shown, the oil 
exploration activities of the multi-national oil companies have a devastating effect on 
the health, occupation and sources of water for drinking.  For instance, an interviewee 
007, a Youth leader, using Olobiri where oil was first struck in commercial quantity in 
1956, as a point of reference noted that the town lacked portable water and the former 
sources of water for the people such as streams, rain and well had been contaminated 
by the oil exploration activities of the multi-national oil companies. 
 
Moreover, the oil exploration activities of the TNOC have also affected the traditional 
occupation of the people such as fishing and farming.  The researcher during his visit 
to Taylor Creeks had first-hand knowledge of the devastating effect of oil spillage. The 
researcher together with his host, the traditional rulers and other prominent chiefs in 
the town visited the scene of the oil spillage where an expanse of land was destroyed 
by oil spillage. Farming activities cannot take place on the land again because the soil 
fertility has been destroyed. The failure of the government to take a decisive step on 
the reckless destruction of the environment of the region by the transnational oil 
companies served as an impetus for the oil-bearing communities to demand for the 
control and management of their resources to put an end to the TNOC destruction of 









The issue of who should be held responsible for environmental pollution of the region 
has been a subject of controversy. The international oil companies attributed the oil 
spills to sabotage. These are spills caused by militia groups attacks on oil infrastructure 
for economic gains while the oil -bearing communities blamed the multi-national oil 
companies for the spillage. They maintained that equipment failure and production 
processes caused oil spillages and gas flaring (Ibaba, 2011).  But the Nigerian National 
Petroleum Corporation data shows the opposite. The Table 5.1 shows the oil spill 






















Table 5. 1  
Oil Spill Incidences 2006-2015 




1 2006 3,674 9 3,683 99.75 0.25 
2 2007 3,244 20 3,264 99.39 0.61 
3 2008 2,285 33 2,318 98.56 1.44 
4 2009 1,453 27 1,480 98.18 1.82 
5 2010    836 22 858 97.44 2.56 
6 2011 2,768 19 2,787 99.32 0.68 
7 2012 2,230 26 2,256 98.85 1.15 
8 2013 3,505 65 3570 98.18 1.82 
9 2014 3,700 32 3,732 99.14 0.86 
10 2015 2,783 49 2,832 98.27 1.73 
TOTAL 26,478 302 26,780 98.71 1.29 
 







In contrast to the dominant explanation that environmental degradation of the region 
was caused mostly by the recklessness of the multi-national oil companies by operating 
below international standard, non-replacement of old pipes, etc.  The table 5.1 above 
shows that the oil spillages which the respondents and literature attributed mostly to 
the activities of the oil companies are mostly caused by sabotage.  
 
As the table 5.1 above shows, in total incidences of 26, 780 that spanned 10 years, 26, 
478 (98.71%) of them were caused by sabotage while 302 (1.29%) were caused by 
rupture.  Nevertheless, the multi-national oil companies should be held responsible for 
the pollution of the region. 
 
5.2.2.2 Lack of Social Amenities or Infrastructural facilities 
 
Another reason adduced for resource control is lack of infrastructural facilities in the 
oil -bearing communities. The argument is that successive administrations in the 
country have neglected the region where bulk of resources of the nation is derived 
from. The oil-bearing communities lack basic amenities like road, hospitals, 
electricity, schools.  
 
The inhabitants of the region accused the central government of using their resources 
to develop other regions. Duru (cited in Nwogwugwu & Kupoluyi, 2015) has attributed 
the reasons for resource control to lack of social amenities in the region.  In his words 
the “territories have continuously lacked basic infrastructure and amenities like 
electricity, roads, schools, hospitals, portable water (cited in Nwogwugwu & 





Similarly, Egbe (2012) argues that the paucity in social amenities and harsh socio-
economic conditions have fuelled alienation among the people of the region and 
accounted for the agitation for resource control.  
 
Most of the interviewees were of the views that the region lacked infrastructure or 
social amenities. They argued that where some of these facilities exist, they were 
inadequate and not functioning or working.   
 
An interviewee 002, a Youth divulged that:     
Our regions have been neglected by the central government over the 
years.  There are no social amenities provided by the government 
and where they exist, they are not enough (Interview in Yenagoa, 
Bayelsa State, 03/5/16). 
 
In the same vein, an interviewee 006, retired Military Officer noted that: 
 I travelled to a place in Benin areas through river to commission a 
project…  And what I saw along the river bank was nothing to write 
home about. Some of the villages… have no accessible roads. The 
government didn’t reach them in any way.  If you look at what is 
happening in Abuja today and see the type of development that has 
taken place, you would marvel that Abuja of yesterday has 












Corroborating the views expressed by the interviewees, Joseph Evah in a published 
interview averred that: 
Our people in the Niger Delta live in abject neglect. Our angry youth 
who are now involved in this renewed militancy want Niger-Delta 
region to be developed-they want the oil-rich region to look like 
Dubai, New York, Paris and host of other beautiful cities across the 
world. Although as elders, we have been advising them to shun 
violence and embrace dialogue in channelling their grievances to the 
appropriate authorities. Most of these youth have been to Lagos, 
Abuja, Kano and other cities, and having realised that most of the 
development you have in these places were carried out with the 
proceeds from sale of crude oil from the Niger- Delta, they become 
angry that the region which produce this wealth has been neglected 
(Evah, 2016). 
 
The finding from this study’s interviews and supported by published interview on lack 
of social amenities or infrastructure in the region are consistent with the existing 
literature. Studies  by Babatunde (2010), Emmanuel, Olayiwola, and Babatunde  
(2009) and Wali  (2008) all pointed towards that direction and called on government 
to enhance the living condition of the populace of the region through provision of 
social amenities, poverty alleviation and above all good governance.  
 
The findings on causes for agitation for resource control are corroborated by 
frustration-aggression theory.  The complaint of the people of the Niger Delta region 
over environmental degradation, lack of social amenities and the disarticulation of the 
local economy are well captured by the theory. The theory enables us to understand 
that when people yearning is not met, there is the tendency that this may cause 
frustration and aggressive behaviour (violence) by the people. Niger Deltans were 
short-changed by both the Nigerian state (neglect of the region) and the multi-national 





enjoying the oil wealth accounted for the frustration and aggressive behaviour of the 
people towards both the Nigerian state and the multi-national oil companies by 
attacking oil infrastructure and kidnapping of oil workers. 
 
On the contrary, minority of those interviewed argued that the protest for resource 
control by the elite of the region was a political publicity stunt which was essentially 
aimed at gaining the support of the people to make up for their lack of developmental 
initiatives or programme on how to move the region forward.   
 
Responding to a question on elite’ agitation for resource control an interviewee 010, 
an Academic, stated that: 
…it is used as a political gimmick to gain support from their 
constituent. If you look at the two major proponents of resource 
control Alamieyeseigha and Ibori. They were the first civilian 
governors elected in 1999 and they were involved in corruption in 
their states.  They were loved and adored by the people of the region 
and awarded titles, the President General of Izon nation given to 
Alamieyeseigha and apostle of resource control to Ibori because of 
their dogged fight for the resource control.  But as we can see, it 
turned out they pursued the demand to enrich themselves and not 
the people they claimed they were fighting for. Besides, they lack the 
requisite knowledge and managerial skills needed to take their 
states to the next level (Interview at Tombia, Port-Harcourt, Rivers 
State, 2/6/16). 
 
This finding corroborates the position of Ako (2011) who argues that the regional elite 
of the region have used resource control as a weapon to legitimise their leadership and 
facilitate access to political power and increased oil revenue. The political class or elite 
pursue vigorously the issue of resource control, even when they know it is not 
achievable or how to go about it to bring about the much-needed development to the 





The finding is validated by the elite theory and it assumes that elites are inevitable and 
desirable in a society.  The elites make or mar a society by their actions or deeds and 
as the finding has shown the elites have used the call for resource control to enhance 
their position among their people.  
 
Similarly, Ikelegbe (2011) contends that the failure of the elite to generate much 
needed development in terms of infrastructure, employment and improvement in the 
living standard of the people heightened their anger and pushed them not only to 
agitate for resource ownership but also violence.   
 
Although, the campaign has not led to the abrogation of obnoxious decree and act such 
as the Decree 51 of 1969 and Land Use Act of 1978 which vested ownership of oil 
resources at the central government. Besides, the people of the region are still excluded 
in the participation in the oil sector of the economy.  But the agitation has brought to 
the front burner the need to tackle the problem facing the region and to restructure the 
polity.  
 
On the positive note, the resource control protest by the elite of the region has led to 
unity among the different classes of elite in the region in their quest for an increase of 
the 13 percent derivation formula, establishment of the Niger Delta Development 
Commission which is mandated to cater for the socio-economic development of the 
region. The agitation has also led to improvement in the corporate social responsibility 
by the transnational oil companies.  For example, the Shell Petroleum Development 





Chevron and SPDC are encouraging agriculture in the region (Ako, 2011; Ikelegbe, 
2011). 
 
5.3 Federalism and Federal Practice in Nigeria 
 
 The term federalism has no generally accepted definitions, and this is due to several 
varieties of political arrangements to which the term has been used (Elazar, 1976). In 
the same vein, Smith, (1995) sees the difficulty in defining the term federalism from 
the angle that it has been subjected to different meanings, applied to different 
situational contexts and identifying its defining features can be as controversial as 
evaluating them.  In a like manner, Awa (1976) posits that early writers on federalism 
interchangeably used such terms as federal, confederacy, federation and confederation 
but that these terms are not the same in their contemporary usage.  
 
Notwithstanding the problems over its definition, nearly every students of federalism 
accepts that it is a political arrangement in which there is constitutional division of 
powers between the central government and the component units, each having 
autonomous power on certain matters on which it is not subordinate to the other 
(Wheare, 1967).  Similarly, Friendrich (1968) defines federalism as a process whereby 
the central and regional governments are limited to their spheres and within those 
spheres should be independent of the other. By the same token, Hicks (1978, p. 4) sees 
“federalism as a polity operating a constitution which works at two levels of 
government as a nation and as a collection of related but self -standing units.” 
 
From the foregoing definitions, federalism is a political system in which there is 





the component units in a manner that each is independent of the other in their 
constitutionally assigned powers or areas of jurisdiction.  In Nigerian federation, 
powers are shared between the centre and the component units. The constitution 
assigned to the central government items such as defence, currency, external affairs, 
mining, etc. These items are under the exclusive list.  While both levels of government 
can legislate under concurrent list and items under this list include: agriculture, 
education, health.  
 
The constitution stipulates that in the event of the conflict between the federal law and 
state over items under the concurrent list, the federal law supersedes or prevail over 
the state law. The residual list is exclusively for the state and an example of item under 
this list is local government.   
 
5.3. 1 Nigerian Federalism and its Defects 
 
This section of the study analyses the responses of the participants in the study to the 
defect of Nigerian federalism. Nigeria is the oldest federal state on the African 
continent and the fifth largest federation in the world after United States, Russia, India 
and Brazil. Nigeria introduced two key novelties in federalist thought and practice and 
they are federal character and three -tier federation (Sklar, 2004).  
 
Federal character is a constitutional requirement which stipulates that in the 
composition of government of the federation or state the various states in the federation 
must be represented and in the case of the state, the various segment of the state must 
be represented at the state as well as at the local government (Adeosun, 2011; Ugoh & 





institution in the country, employment, appointment, registration of political parties 
and location of industries.  Nevertheless, the practice of federalism in Nigeria has been 
a subject of disputes among Nigerians particularly those from the southern part of the 
country who were demanding its restructuring. 
 
In response to the current practice of Nigerian federalism which necessitated the calls 
for its reform, the majority of the participants noted that it concentrated too much 
power at the centre and suggested returning to the practice of federalism of the First 
Republic when the federating units had greater autonomy both political and financial 
autonomy which enable them to develop their regions.  An interviewee 005, Lawyer/ 
Politician noted that: 
Well, we are supposed to be in a federation, but the type of 
federalism, we are practicing as far as l know does not find any 
expression in any of the federation we are conversant with. What we 
have here in this country by my own understanding is like a unitary 
system of government. It is because we spent so many years under 
the military regimes and if you have an army- the national army 
there is a command structure that can never be wished away. The 
head of state is the most senior officer in the army. If the HOS gives 
a command, the military governor say Delta state, who is a colonel 
as the governor and at the federal level, you have a general; he 
would not say no, he must comply and carry out the directive of his 
C-in-C (commander-in- chief).  In my own opinion, this is what 
accounts for the type of federalism that we have (Interview at Warri, 
Delta State, 30/5/16). 
 
Likewise, an interviewee 003, Youth remarked that:  
 The current federal structure is suffocating, is too centralised and 
the component units are merely pawns on a chess board of the 
federal government who manipulates them the way it wishes. Let’s 
take issue of local government creation and tenure during 
Obasanjo’s regime. Many states created new local governments, but 
the federal government did not recognise them, and allocations were 





they reversed back to the status quo except Lagos that refused to 
back down and was denied allocation throughout Obasanjo’s reign. 
But Lagos could do that because she has a good internally generated 
revenue (IGR) (Interview Yenagoa, Bayelsa State, 3/5/16). 
 
The two statements above buttress the point that Nigeria is only federal in name and 
not in practice because it failed to adhere to the principle and practice of federal system 
where the federating units are autonomous both financially and administratively in 
their areas of jurisdiction.  
 
Other interviewees noted with nostalgia the practice of federalism in the First Republic 
and suggested the return to the practice of that era.  As an interviewee 006, a Military 
Officer (Retired) said: 
 We should return to the good old days when regional governments 
controlled substantial amount of resources and with good 
leadership they were able to make a giant stride in their various 
regions and uplift the socio-economic condition of their people. I am 
a living witness to this because my community was under the then 
Western Regional Government headed by Chief Obafemi Awolowo 
and I enjoyed free education programme introduced by his 




Another interviewee 003, Youth supported the federal system of government operated 
during the First Republic. “ … I am in total support of the practice of federalism of 
that era when the regions had autonomy and also resources which they used to 
advance the course of their people” (Interview in Yenagoa, Bayelsa State, 3/5/16). 
The finding shows that Nigerian federalism was defective because of many decades of 





of federal practice in Nigeria and this has continued under the present democratic 
dispensation.  Put differently, the Nigeria brand of federalism concentrated powers at 
the centre, thereby rendering the federating units powerless. The central government 
controls and manages the resources of the country and dole out little to the federating 
units which are insufficient for them to discharge their constitutional assigned 
responsibilities.  
 
This finding supports the positions of  Ibaba (2005),  Orobator, Ifowodo and Edosa 
(2005), Osaghae, Ikelegbe, Olarinmoye and  Okhonmina, (2007),  Omotosho (2010),  
Ebegbulem (2011),  Ibekwe and Ewoh (2012), Abegunde (2013), Ajayi  (2013), 
Aworawo (2013), Awotayo, Sakiru, Ilelah, and Olutokunbo (2013),  Esikot and  Akpan 
(2013), Ikunga and Wilson (2013) and Aaron (2015).  These scholars and several 
others have pointed out the deficiencies in the Nigeria federal system and this has led 
to calls for it reforms and conflict in the region.   
 
A renowned Nigerian Political Scientist, Elaigwu (cited in Nwaorgu, 2013) confirming 
the impact of military rule on the operation of federalism in Nigeria commented that: 
In the military hierarchy of authority, the Head of the Federal 
Military Government appoints all state governors who are 
responsible to him.  This neglects the traditional principle of 
federalism and fits into Apter’s model of mobilization with 
hierarchical chain of command and minimum accountability to the 
people (Nwaorgu, 2013, pp.120-121). 
 
Other scholars liken the practice of Nigerian federalism to a lion chasing an antelope 
and squeezing out life from it (the lion in this case refer to the federal government 





on the defective nature of Nigerian federalism, International Crisis Group (2006, p.2), 
in its report noted that “Nigeria’s federal system and politics are deeply flawed, 
contributing to rising violence that threatens to destabilize one of Africa’s leading 
countries.”   Awotayo, Sakiru, Ilelah, and Olutokunbo, (2013) stated that: 
 The Federal Government power is too sprawling that it legislates on 
an issue that should ordinarily be on the residual list. It ventured into 
what it does not have business to do. The federal government having 
amassed virtually all power to it makes it have one axe to grind with 
the state governments (p.104). 
 
Similarly, Aaron (2015) identifies the pathologies of the current federal system in the 
country as concentration of powers at the centre, unhealthy economic dependence by 
states on the federal government that supervises the distribution of resources produced 
from oil belt region of the country.  
 
 
Nigeria's federalism has become over centralised with power residing at the central 
government.  For instance, the exclusive list contains sixty-eight items (six more than 
the 1979 Constitution) which includes citizenship, defence, policing, external affairs, 
immigration, mining, nuclear energy and regulation of political parties, among others 
(Constitution, 1999).  
 
The findings on the displeasure expressed by the elites of the region with the current 
federal system are corroborated by the elite and resource curse theories. The  resource 
curse theory argues that agitation for a fair share of the resources always come from 
the region where the natural resources are situated and the inevitability and desirability 





by the elites in the call for resource control. Therefore, the two theories complement 
each other in the understanding of the agitation by the people where the resources are 
located and the actions or behaviour of the elites in terms of resource governance. That 
is, how the resources are shared among the component units of the states are critical in 
understanding the conflict in the Niger Delta.  
 
5.3.2 Fiscal Federalism  
 
Fiscal federalism refers to allocation of taxation and expenditure powers among levels 
of government in a federation. Ozon-Eson (2005) defines fiscal federalism as the 
division of public sector functions and finances among different levels of government.   
It is one of the cardinal principles of federal system and also source of conflict between 
government at the centre and the component units. A discussion on fiscal federalism 
cannot be divorced from the analysis of revenue allocation.   
The Table 5.2 shows the allocation of duties assigned to the three tiers of government, 
federal, state and local governments. 
 
 Table 5. 2  
Distribution of Expenditure responsibilities among Federal, State and Local 
Governments 
 
Level of government Expenditure responsibilities 
Federal Only Defence 
 Foreign Affairs 
 International trade including export marking 
 Currency, banking, borrowing, exchange control 
 Use of water resources 






 Aviation, railways, postal service 
 Police and other security services 
 Regulation of labour, interstate commerce, 
telecommunications, immigration 
 Mines and minerals, nuclear energy, citizenship and 
naturalisation rights 
 Social security, insurance, national statistical system 
(census, births, death, etc.). 
 Guidelines and basis for minimum education 
 Business registration 
 Price control 
Federal-State (Shared) Health, Social welfare 
 Education (post-primary/technology) 
 Culture 
 Antiquities 
 Monuments, archives 
 Statistics, stamp duties 
 Commerce, industry 
 Electricity (generation, transmission, distribution) 
 Research surveys 
State only Residual power, i.e. subject neither assigned to federal nor 
local government level 
Local government Economic planning and development 
 Health services 
 Land use 
 Control and regulation of advertisements, pets, small 
business 
 Markets, public conveniences  
 Social welfare, sewage and refuse disposal, registration of 
births, deaths and marriages 
 Primary, adult and vocational education 
 Development of agriculture and natural resources. 
 






The Table 5.2 shows the constitutional assigned duties to the various levels of 
government. As the table reveals more responsibilities are assigned to the central 
government than the two levels of government and this is why the Nigerian federation 
is centralised.   Some of the responsibilities of the general government include defence, 
foreign affairs, currency, police, and mines. The federal and states shared 
responsibilities in areas such as health, education, culture, commerce, electricity, etc.  
 
Duties that are not assigned to either federal or state are referred to as residual and they 
belong to the states. Example is local government, the elections into local government 
councils are the duty of the states. The Table 5.3 also shows the responsibilities of 
local governments and these include: land use, public convenience, health services, 
and market.  A cursory evaluation of these responsibilities clearly favoured the central 
government and the clamour by the states is that some of these responsibilities should 
be given to the states.  
The Table 5.3 below also shows taxes jurisdiction allotted to different levels of 
government. 
 
Table 5. 3  




Import duties Federal Federal Federation 
Account 






Export duties Federal Federal  Federation 
Account 
Mining rents & royalty Federal  Federal Federation 
Account 
Petroleum profit tax Federal  Federal Federation 
Account 
Capital gain tax Federal  Federal Federation 
Account 
Personal Income tax (other than 
listed in 8) 
Federal State State 
Personal Income tax: armed 
&police forces, external affairs 
officers, non-residents, residents 
of the federal capital territory 
Federal Federal Federal 
Value added tax (Sales tax before 
1994) 
Federal Federal/State Federal/State 
Company tax Federal Federal Federation 
Account 
Stamp duties Federal State State 
Gift tax Federal state state 
Property tax and ratings State State/Local  State/Local 
Licenses and fees Local Local Local 
Motor park dues Local Local Local 
Motor vehicle State Local Local 
Capital transfer tax Federal State State 
Pools betting and other betting 
taxes 
State State State 
Entertainment tax State State State 
Land registration and survey fees State State State 
Market and trading license and 
fees 
State Local Local 
    
 






The Table 5.3 above shows that federal government controls bulk of the taxes. This 
federal domination of the taxes has attracted demands by states for re-adjustment. As 
the Table 5.3, has shown, there have been no fundamental changes in the tax types 
since attainment of independence in 1960.  
 
This implies that the tax types have remained virtually the same while change had 
occurred in the right to the income. For example, prior to 1959, regional governments 
had rights to 100 percent mining rights and royalties but with production and 
exportation of oil in 1958, and based on Raisman Commission suggestions, in 1959, 
this was distributed as follows: mineral producing region (50%), Federal (20%) and 
Distributable Pool Account, DPA, (30%). Moreover, sales tax to which states until 
now had 100 per cent right was replaced by value added tax (VAT) in 1994 (Salami, 
2011). 
 
 5.3. 3.1 Revenue Allocation 
 
 Revenue allocation is the sharing of revenue accruing to the government of a 
federation between or among different tiers of government. Salami (2011) defines 
revenue allocation as the re-distribution of fiscal capacity between the various levels 
of government or the disposition of fiscal responsibilities between tiers of government. 
Similarly, Mai-Lafia (2010), Akeem (2011) and Ikeji, (2011) define revenue allocation 
as the allotment of generally collected revenue among various levels of government in 






Revenue allocation is a thorny issue in a federation because of the dispute over the 
appropriate formula and basis of allocation among the component units. Ugoh, Ukpere 
and Ashiwhobel (2012) contend that in most federating states, the constituent units 
always have disputes with the general government over financial issue and this issue 
bordered on securing enough resources to discharge its constitutional assigned 
functions. 
 
In Nigeria, this issue has polarised the country. There are groups who opposed the 
present percentage allocated to oil producing states because it affected the amount of 
resources they received from the federation account and therefore they demanded its 
abolition. The opponents are from the northern part of the country and they attributed 
the underdevelopment of the region to present revenue allocation formula.   
For instance,  one of the scion of the north, erstwhile governor of Central Bank of 
Nigeria (CBN) and now the Emir of Kano, Sanusi Lamido Sanusi (Mohammad Sanusi 
II), asserted that the low financial allocation to the north was responsible for  the 
underdevelopment of the region and the activities of Boko Haram (cited in Adegbami, 
2013).   
 
Similarly, the immediate past governor of Niger state Dr Babangida Aliyu attributed  
the state of development of the region (North) to poor allocation of revenue receipt 
from the federation account and called for the abolition of 13 per cent derivation and 
more allocation to the region (cited in Adegbami, 2013).  Another Northern scion, Dr 
Junaid Mohammed argued that the current revenue allocation cannot promote peace 
because of its lop-sidedness. In his words “look at the revenue allocation formula and 





country, not just in Nigeria, which already they say is an artificial creation” 
(Mohammed, 2012). 
 
The South-South geo-political responded to the call for the scrapping of 13 per cent 
derivation and increase in revenue allocation to the north. A Niger Delta campaigner, 
Alhaji Mujahid Dokubo-Asari, asserts that:  
 …very soon, we in the Niger Delta shall commence what we call 
operation occupy Niger Delta resources; once that starts, we shall 
lead a protest to the president with a warning that no dime of our oil 
money should henceforth, be sent to the north which has all these 
years, criminally manipulated the Nigerian state to the extent of 
claiming more population than the south, a situation that has resulted 
in the parasitic accumulation of our resources to their desolate local 
government areas which are mere structural entities without human 
beings (cited in Adegbami, 2013, p.142). 
 
Similarly, reacting to northern call for abolition of the 13% derivation to the oil 
producing states in the Niger Delta, a renowned Nigeria constitutional lawyer, who 
incidentally is from the Niger Delta region, Professor Itse Sagay remarked that: 
I have been following the debate like others; unfortunately, those 
who speak on behalf of the Niger Delta on the issue have failed to 
hit the nail on the head. They should be bold enough to ask their 
northern colleagues, where the nation’s revenue comes from- 
instead of caressing the issue rather cautiously. The northern part of 
this country does not contribute anything to the national purse. If the 
area that produces the resources has just a token of 13 percent, the 
remaining 87 percent is gift to the entire nation, particularly the 
North that has nothing to show for its existence. The South-East and 
South-West brings minor but the South-South contributes 91 
percent. The posture of the northern governors is the height of 
ingratitude and insult on the people of the oil-producing areas 
because they would have been bankrupt if not for the revenue that 
has been accruing to them from the proceeds of oil and gas. You will 
observe that because of the long stay of the north in power at the 





disadvantage of the south; today, you have all juicy oil blocs in the 
hands of the north (cited in Adegbami, 2013, p. 143).         
 
In his own response to the issue, Dr Fredrick Fasehun, founder of Odu’a People 
Congress, stated that: 
 At that time, we had the groundnut pyramid; we had cocoa pyramid, 
palm oil, and those who owned the commodities enjoyed 50 per cent 
derivation. Why have we changed that figure? At some point, the 
figure went as low as three per cent. That was not fair. That is why 
some of us started agitating for a national conference to reorder and 
restructure the country, to make it a truly federal state, where there 
will also be fiscal federalism (cited in Adegbami, 2013, p.143). 
 
The above comments by various personalities from the North and South of the country 
gave credence to the contentious nature of revenue allocation and its polarisation of 
the country along north and south divides. It also acts as an impetus for the Niger Delta 
elite to demand for the reform of the system. 
5.3.3.1.1 Principles of Revenue Allocation 
 
Several principles are being used in the disbursement of revenue among the federating 
units in Nigeria and some of these principles are briefly discussed below. 
 
i. Need:  The development of a state is influenced by the resources it can 
generate. The state requires financial and other resources to maintain existing 
facilities and develop new ones. Therefore, a state with more needs should be 
allocated more resources than others. 
ii. Even Development:  In any federation, there is disparity in terms of 





and development are spread among the federating units by sacrificing 
efficiency in the form of reduced overall growth. 
iii. Independent Revenue:  It states that each tier of government should be able to 
raise and keep some of its revenue for its own use. In Nigeria, most of the states 
rely on statutory allocation from the federation account and their internally 
generated revenues (IGRs) are very poor. This accounted for why some of the 
states are not viable.  
iv. Equality of State:  states are not equally endowed.  Some are blessed with 
numerous natural and human resources, but others are not. Some are developed 
and others are developing.  Therefore, the principle stipulates that revenue 
should be shared equally. 
v. Absorptive Capacity: It states that funds should be given to those states that 
can judiciously make use of them. 
 
vi. Population: This principle states that state with more population should attract 
more resources irrespective of their contribution to the general purse.  
vii. Derivation: It stipulates that state from which bulk of the revenue is derived 
from should receive more revenue than other states that contribute less to the 
general purse (FGN, 1999; Edevbie, 2000). 
 
The Table 5.4 summarises the various Fiscal Commissions set up in the country to find 
appropriate formula for the sharing of revenue between the central government and the 







Table 5. 4  
Revenue Allocation Commissions and their Recommendations 
Commission  Recommended 
criteria 
Other Basic Features of 
Recommendations 
Phillipson, 1946  
 
  
i) derivation.  
ii) even progress  
  
Balance after meeting central 
Government’s budgetary need allocated 
to regions  
  
Hicks- 
Philipson, 1951  
 
i) derivation.  
ii) fiscal autonomy  
iii) Needs, and  
iv) National interest  
  
Proportion of specified duties and taxes 
allocated to regions on the basis of 
derivation, special grant capitalization, 
education and police  
  
Chick, 1951  
  
i)Derivation  
ii) fiscal autonomy  
  
Bulk of revenues from import duties and 
excise to the regions on the basis of 
consumption and derivation  
  
Raisman, 1958  
  
i)derivation  
ii) Fiscal autonomy.  
iii) Balance 
development 
 iv) Need  
  
Proportion of specified revenues 
distributed on the basis of derivation. 
creation of distributable pool account 
(DPA) with fixed regional proportional 
shares: North 40%, west 31%, east 24%, 
and Southern Cameroun 5%.  
 
Binns, 1964  
 
Same as above plus 
financial comparability  
 
Composition of DPA relative share 
slightly altered, North 42%, East 30%, 
West 20% and Mid-West 8%  
 
Dina 1968  
 
i)Even development  




 Special grant account introduced, 
recommended the establishment of 











Decree No. 13 
of 1970  
 
 i)population 50%  
ii) Equality of states 
50%  
 
Export duties states reduced from 100% 
to 60%.  
  
Decree No. 9 of 
1971  
  
Same as above  
 
 Transferred rents and royalties of 
offshore petroleum mines from the states 
to the federal government.  
 
Decree No. 6 of 
1975  
 
 Same as above  
 
Onshore mining rents and royalties to 
states reduced from 45% to 20%. 
Remaining 80% to the DPA. Import 
duties on motor spirit and tobacco to be 
paid 100% into the DPA. 50 0f excise 
duties to be retained by the federal 
Government, 100% to DPA.  
   
Decree No. 15 
of 1976  
  
Same as above  
  
Regional proportion share of DPA split 
among the 12 new states, 6 Northern 
states receive 7% each, East and Western 
states share in accordance with relative 
population  
 
Aboyade, 1977  
 
i)Equality of access 
25%. 
 ii) National minimum 
standard 22% ii) 
Absorption Capacity 
20%  
iv) Independent revenue 
18%  
Replaced DPA with federation account. 
Fixed proportional share ot of this 
account between the federal 57%, states 







v) Fiscal efficiency 
15%  
  
Okigbo  Same as above It suggested 53 % to federal government, 
30% and 10% to state and local 
government respectively and 7% as 
special fund to be distributed among 
Federal Capital Territory, mineral 
producing areas, derivation revenue 
equalisation and ecological problems.  
 
1981 Act  
 
 Same as above  
 
Federation account to be shared: federal 
Government 55%, State Government 
30.5%, Local Government 10%, special 




 Decree No. 49 
of 1989  
 
Same as above  
 
Federation account to be shared: federal 
Government 55%, State Government 
32.5%, Local Government 10%, special 






   Same as above  
 
Equality of states 40%. Population 30%. 
Social development effort 10%. Tax 
effort 10%. Land mass%.  
 
Decree No. 49 
of 1989  
 
 i)Equality of states 
40%. 
 ii) Population 30%  
iii) Internal revenue 
effort 10% 
 iv) Land mass 10% 
Federation account to be shared: federal 
Government 47%, State Government 
10%, Local Government 15%, special 






 v) Social Development 
factor 10%  
 
Decree No. 3 of 
January 1992  
 
 Same as above  
 
Federation account to be shared: federal 
Government 48.5%, State Government 
24%, Local Government 20%, special 




Same as above  
 
Federation account to be shared: federal 
Government 48.5%, State Government 
24%, Local Government 20%, special 
fund 7%  
 
 




 Table 5. 5  
 Federal-State Shares of Proceeds from Distributable Pool Account/Federation 
Year 
 
Producing state (Region). 
Percent (%) 
Distribution Pool/ Federation 
Account Percent (%) 
1960-69 50 50 
1969-71 45 55 
1971-75 45 (minus offshore) 55(plus offshore) 
1975-79 20 (minus offshore) 80(plus offshore) 
1979-81 - 100 
1982-92 1.5 98.5 
1992-99 3 97 
1999-date 13 87 
  







A cursory examination of table 5.5 above shows that derivation has been the basis of 
allocation of revenue when it was first recommended in 1946 but it was removed in 
the 70s as one of the principles of distribution of revenue.  The Table 5.5 above sheds 
more light on the percentage allocated to derivation and how this has been declining 
over the years.  As Table 5.5 above shows that from 1960-1969, the regions received 
50% of revenue on products got from the regions. That is 50% derivation. This 
declined to 20% excluding offshore by 1979.  Between 1979 and 1981, there was 
nothing in form derivation for the oil-producing states. However, in 1992, 1.5% was 
set-aside as derivation for the oil- bearing states, this was increased to 3% between 
1992 and 1999 and from 1999 to date 13%.  
 
 
It is important to note that the present revenue allocation among the tiers of 
government which is stated below is a fallout of the Supreme Court nullification of the 
proposed revenue allocation recommended by the Revenue Mobilisation, Allocation 
and Fiscal Commission (RMAFC). During the Obasanjo’s presidency, the RMAFC 
submitted to the National Assembly a revenue sharing formula of 41.3% to the Federal 
Government, 31% to the States and 16% to the Local Governments. The Commission 
further suggested 11.7% as Special Funds. The Special Funds soon became a subject 
of litigation and the Supreme Court of Nigeria nullified it.   
 
In nullifying the Fund, the Supreme Court pointed out that under the present legislation 
on revenue allocation, it is illegal to make provision for Special Funds in drawing up 
a revenue allocation formula. The judgment of the Supreme Court created a vacuum 





distinct revenue allocation of 56 percent to the Federal Government, 24.72 % to the 
States and 20.60% to the Local Governments (Akuruju, 2015; Suberu, 2004). The 
states opposed the large allocation to the Federal Government, making the latter to cut 
its figure to the current revenue allocation in operation today which is stated below: 
 Federal Government 52.68 percent 
 State Government 26.72 percent 
 Local Government 20.60 per cent (Akuruju, 2015). 
 
5.3.2.2.1   Spearheading the Basis and Review of Revenue Allocation Formula 
 
An examination of revenue allocation issue in Nigeria shows that no acceptable 
formula was agreed upon by both the centre and the component units and this 
accounted for instability in the fiscal system. The elite from the Niger Delta were upset 
by the failure of successive administrations in the country to attach more weight to 
derivation or upward review of the derivation principle. At the 2005 constitutional 
conference they demanded an upward review of the derivation to 25%, in the first 
instance, which was expected to be increased to 50% after five years and eventually 
100% at some time in the future (Odubajo, 2011).  
 
The elite from Northern part of the country vehemently opposed the demands by the 
elite from the Niger Delta. The elite from the north felt that much has been conceded 
to the region and as a result the delegates from the region (Niger Delta) staged a 
walkout of the conference.   However, the 2005 conference recommended increase in 






Similarly, the 2014 conference recommended that government should set-up a 
technical committee to determine the appropriate percentage on derivation and other 
issues such as special intervention funds and issues of reconstruction and rehabilitation 
of areas ravaged by insurgency (The Premium Times, 2014). As at the time the report 
was submitted to the Jonathan administration, the country was already preparing for 
2015 General Election and electioneering campaign was on and the issue of 
implementation of the report became a campaign issue. In other words, the 
implementation of the 2014 National Dialogue was politicised.   
 
Thus, the recommendations of the conference were not implemented. The present 
administration which succeeded the Jonathan administration after the defeat of the 
latter in the 2015 General Election remarked that the report of the conference has been 
confined to the archives. In the words of President Buhari: 
I advised against the issue of National Conference. You would recall 
that ASUU was on strike then for almost nine months. The teachers 
in the tertiary institutions were on strike for more than a year, yet 
that government had about N9billion to organise that meeting 
(National Conference) and some (members) were complaining that 
they hadn’t even been paid. I never liked the priority of that 
government on that particular issue, because it meant that what the 
National Assembly could have handled was handed to the 
Conference, while the more important job of keeping our children in 
schools was abandoned.  That is why I haven’t even bothered to read 
it or ask for a briefing on it and I want it to go into the so-called 
archives (Umoru & Nwabughiogu, 2016). 
 
Responding to the role the elite played in the struggle for the increased in the revenue 
allocation formula. The majority of those that took part in this study gave kudos to 





allocation and insisting that derivation should be the basis of allocation.  An interview 
002, a Youth divulged that: 
We must thank our leaders, notably Attah, Ibori, Alamieyeseigha 
and others who stood their ground at the risk of their lives to insist 
that the powers that be at that time must implement the 13% 
derivation principle and at any available opportunity they had, 
vigorously sensitize the people on the need to demand for equity in 
the allocation of revenue (Interview in Yenagoa, Bayelsa State, 
3/5/16). 
 
Likewise, another interview 003, Youth stated that: 
 The leaders from this region deserved our praise. They have done 
wonderfully well in some areas and have performed woefully in 
others. The have shown commitment to the struggle by working 
together as one to fight for what belongs to us all and take the 
federal government to task on the need to address the myriads of 
problems confronting the region and also find an amicable solution 
to the inequity in revenue distribution to the Niger Delta region. 
However, they still have a lot to do if we are to achieve our goal of 
self-determination (Interview in Yenagoa, Bayelsa State, 3/5/16). 
 
The statements above highlighted the positive contributions of the elite of the region 
to efforts to attract more funds for the development of the region and the unity of 
purpose displayed by the elite despite their differences in ethnic, religious and political 
affiliations. They were able to unite and speak with one voice and champion the 
problem of the region. 
 
In response to another question on current revenue allocation formula and principle, 
all those interviewed for this study agreed that there was need for the present revenue 
allocation to be reviewed so that more resources would be allocated to the states. They 
accused the major ethnic groups of changing the rule of the game when oil became the 





groundnut and cotton, rubber and palm oil were the livewire of the nation’s economy 
derivation was applied.   
 
Commenting on this, one of the interviewee 005 Lawyer/ Politician noted that: 
The oil producing communities bear the brunt of oil exploration 
activities and the compensation given to them is a paltry 13 % per 
cent derivation.  That’s unjust! When groundnut and cotton were 
produced in the North, cocoa and rubber in the West, palm oil and 
kernel in the East, the region of origin enjoyed a substantial return 
on these products. For example, 50 per cent was the derivation but 
when oil became the major foreign exchange earner, this principle 
was downplayed. It was reduced to zero per cent, later one per cent, 
later three and now 13 per cent.  And even the 13 per cent has not 
trickled down to the oil-bearing communities (Interview at Warri, 
Delta State, 30/5/16). 
 
Another interviewee 003 Youth disclosed that:  
You see, the 13 per cent derivation allocated to the oil producing 
states is not commensurate with what the nation is benefiting from 
the region.  Prior to oil being the major exchange earner for this 
country, the derivation for those regions producing the major cash 
crops at that time was 50 per cent.  But today, it is 13 per cent and 
our people have been calling for an upward review, so that we can 
have more resources for the development of our region (Interview 
in Yenagoa, Bayelsa State, 3/5/16).  
 
The above quotes brought to the fore the effect of oil activities on the oil-bearing 
communities, the meagre compensation paid by the transnational oil companies to the 
oil producing communities and the inequity in the distribution of proceeds of oil 
derived from the region. The statement also revealed the inconsistence in government 
policy as regards the principle of derivation and the inability of government to ensure 






This finding resonate in the works of scholars such as Mbanefoh and Egwaikhide 
(1998), Obi (1998), Ibodje, (2008), Ehwarieme (2011), Ibaba (2011), Roberts (2013) 
and many others.  
 
 According to Mbanefoh and Egwaikhide (1998), at independence, derivation was 50 
percent but commencing from 1970, it was gradually reduced and by 1984, the 
derivation share of revenue allocation was 1.5 percent. This was a manoeuvre to 
transfer development funds out of the region.  
 
Similarly, Roberts (2013), contended that derivation was the basis of disbursement of 
revenue in the mid-70s but with the ascendancy of oil the intellectuals of the majority 
ethnic groups considered it as disproportionately favouring the minority oil producing 
states and hence de-emphasising its use in allocation of revenue. The Aboyade 
Technical Committee and Okigbo Commission both in their reports opposed the 
continued use of derivation in revenue allocation. This injustice prompted the elite of 
the region particularly the governors of the region to demand for the control of their 
resources and restructuring of the country (Roberts, 2013). 
 
5.4 Political Restructuring 
 
This segment of the study examines the agitation for political restructuring of the polity 
and this stems from the defective federal structure and the manipulation of the system 
by the dominant majority ethnic groups. This and many other issues are discussed in 






5.4.1 Centralisation of Power and Hegemony by Majority Ethnic Groups 
 
The dominant narrative on political restructuring in Nigeria is that the country is poorly 
structured. That is, there is concentration of powers at the centre to the detriment of 
the component units.  
The structural defects in the Nigerian federal system has been attributed to long years 
of military rule which was dominated by the majority ethnic group particularly the 
north (see Table 5. 6) which used its position to advance the interest of the group and 
denied the rest of the federation especially the region that produced the golden eggs 
the fruit of its labour in terms of resources for its development.  The table 5.6 below 
shows the list of the Nigerian past and present leaders, their states, geo-political zones 
and the duration in office. 
 
Table 5. 6  
Nigerian Past and Present Leaders Since 1960 








1 Tafawa Balewa Civilian Bauchi North-East 1960-1966 
2 J.T.U. Aguiyi 
Ironsi 
Military Abia South-East 1966 












Military Ogun South-West 1976-1979 
6 Shehu Shagari Civilian Sokoto North-West 1979-1983 
7 Muhammadu 
Buhari 
Military Katsina North-West 1984-1985 
8 Ibrahim 
Babangida 
Military Niger North -
Central 
1984-1993 













Civilian Ogun South-West 1999-2007 








Civilian Katsina North-West 2015-to 
date 
 
Source: Compiled by the Author 
 
The table 5.6  above shows that majority of those who have piloted the ship of 
Nigeria’s nation were from the Northern part of the country and the other parts of the 
country especially the minorities from the Niger Delta who before 2010-2015 had no 






The objection of the elite from the region as the analysis in the preceding sections and 
subsections have shown which we need not repeat here is that derivation which was a 
major pillar in revenue allocation of resource in the 1950s- late 60s had been 
downplayed in revenue allocation and because of this, the region has less resource for 
its development. They also objected to their continue marginalisation in national 
politics. Thus, the current federal system is defective as it concentrates too much power 
and resources at the centre.   
 
 Most of the interviewees called for the restructuring of the polity. That is, devolution 
of powers from the centre to the component units. They argued that the central 
government should devolve some of its current powers in the exclusive list to the 
component units. Besides, there were those who supported the return to the federal 
practice and structure of the First Republic and others who wanted the practice of 
federalism of that era. One of the interviewee 005 Lawyer/ Politician disclosed that:  
 As it is now, the component units cannot discharge their 
responsibility, they have to go cap-in- hand to the central 
government for bail out in order to pay salaries of their workers.  If 
you can recall, the federal government has bailed out these states 
on two separate occasions. This cannot continue, something drastic, 
need to be done. Thus, the need for restructuring. The central 
government should devolve some of its power to the constituent 
units. I am not in support of self-determination as being canvassed 
by some groups in the region.  What I am in support is the type of 
federalism we operated in the first republic where the component 
units enjoyed enormous autonomy (Interview at Warri, Delta State, 
30/5/16). 
 
The quoted response shows the need for financial autonomy for the component units 





protest for the reform of the federation. As the above quotation has shown the 
constituent units are in financial difficulties or problems which necessitated them 
appealing to the central government to assist them in order to pay their staff.   
 
 
This non-viability of the state because of centralisation of resources led to the renewal 
agitation to the return of the practice of federalism of the First Republic in Nigeria. An 
Interviewee 002, Youth said that: 
I think we are long overdue for that; the present federal set-up is not 
the best for the development of our country. It makes some 
component units to be lazy and feed on the rest of others who are 
productive.  All the states in Nigeria are endowed with one resources 
or the other, just as we in this region are blessed with oil and gas, 
in other states of the federation, there are places where oil has been 
discovered like Lagos, Kogi, Chad Basin, and others have solid 
minerals which have not been explored. I think we should be allowed 
to take control of our resources and manage them for the betterment 
of our people and pay taxes to the government.  That is what I call 
an economic component of the restructuring. The political aspect of 
this restructuring is that the present states of the federation should 
be restructured into about twenty states based on ethnic 
nationalities and similarity in culture by so doing the new states or 
region or whatever you call them can have a new lease of life and 
be able to discharge their responsibilities to their people (Interview 
in Yenagoa, Bayelsa State, 3/05/16). 
 
The quote above highlighted the demerits of the current political system or structure 
which makes it imperative to change or restructure it and also a clarion call to other 
states of the federation to exploit their abundant resources found in their domains.  In 
addition, a new federation or political arrangement that would be based on ethnic 
nationalities was advocated. This contrasts with present territorial federation.  
 





I won’t support the idea of going back to the region. Though I am in 
total support of the practice of federalism of that era when the 
regions had autonomy and also resources which they used to 
advance the course of their people. The present political 
restructuring should tend towards that type of federalism (Interview 
in Yenagoa, Bayelsa State, 3/5/16). 
 
The above statement reaffirmed the views expressed by previous participants on the 
restructuring of the polity in line with the practice of federalism of the First Republic 
but differed on the structure of the federation.  
 
In the same vein, Chief Edwin Clark in a published interview advocated for fiscal 
federalism for the federating units as part of the restructuring of the polity. In his 
words: 
Restructuring is not a new issue, it has been around for a long time, 
even at the conference in Britain in the 50s. What is restructuring? 
We are asking for fiscal federalism, where a region takes 50 percent 
of what it produces while the remaining 50 percent will be shared 
with the federal. This was what happened with the cocoa money that 
came to Obafemi Awolowo in abundance as he took half of it, same 
with the money from the groundnut pyramid which came to Ahmadu 
Bello, who took half of it. We can’t have a country where there is so 
much discrimination, so much imbalance, so much irregularity. 
What we are saying is that let’s have a federation like the American 
system. America has 50 states today, we have 36 and all states may 
not be equal like we have in Nigeria (Clark, 2016). 
 
The comment further established the demands of the people of the region for equitable 
revenue sharing and a political arrangement like the older federation that would grant 
the federating units financial autonomy.  This is reiterated in Joseph Evah’s statement 
stated below: 
What the people of Niger Delta are fighting is our system which 





federal structure. We need to practice true federalism. Unless we are 
deceiving ourselves, the present federalism which we are operating 




Supporting the views expressed by the interviewees and secondary interviews, 
Arowosegbe (2006) maintains that the clamour for restructuring was to reduce the 
excessive over bearing powers of the central government through the merger of 
existing states into bigger ones. Similarly, the Pro-National Conference (PRONACO) 
cited in Odoshimokhe (2013) recommended that power should be devolved to units to 
prevent over centralisation of power at the centre. Besides, the country should be 
reconstituted into 18 nationality based regions. The federating units should be based 
on unique identities and cultural contiguity and be vested with the power to create 
state, provinces and local governments. 
 
 Thom-otuya (2013) called for proper delineation of powers between the centre and 
the federating units. The central government powers should be limited to defence, 
currency, foreign affairs, etc. Akinyemi (2001) advocated for the return to the golden 
era of Nigerian federalism which he termed period of competitive federalism. This was 
when each region had its own constitution, its own coat-of-arms, and its agent-general 
in London.  
 
In addition, each region allowed its local government authorities to have its own local 
police force. Furthermore, the regions controlled the revenue derived from their 





(2015) called for the merger of the present thirty-six states into six regions with 
autonomy granted to them and a federation of two tiers (federal and region) as against 
the present three tiers of government namely federal, state and local governments. 
 
 
5.5 Summary  
 
This chapter has analysed the meaning of resource control and from the analysis, there 
are different meaning of the term. There are three types of resource control namely: 
absolute, principal and increased revenue allocation and some of the reasons for the 
clamour for resource control are among others, environmental degradation, lack of 
social amenities, inequity in the distribution of proceeds from the oil wealth, lack of 
participation in oil and gas sector.   
 
This demand for resource control has led to improvement in MNOC corporate social 
responsibility, more attention is now given to the region through the various 
intervention agencies set-up by the federal government. Nevertheless, the demands 
have been a publicity stunt by the elite aimed at gaining support from the people of 
region and to cover up for their lack of initiatives and policies that could transform the 
region from her present state of underdevelopment to one of the most developed part 
of Nigeria.  
 
The issue of political restructuring of the polity is also examined and a recurring 
decimal in the discussion is the defective nature of the current federal set-up which has 
necessitated the call for its reform.  The argument is that the current federal system is 





units will be financially autonomous to discharge their constitutionally assigned 
responsibilities. These demands have been supported by all the theories used for the 
study.  
 
The rationale behind the agitation for resource control and political restructuring have 
been supported by the frustration-aggression theory while resource curse theory  
makes us to understand that the inhabitant of a place where resources are located would 
always demand for a better deal. The elite theory assumptions about the inevitability 
and desirability of  the elite in a society and because the decisions or action they take 
make or mar society, their role in the Niger Delta imbroglio cannot be overlooked and 
this has been clearly demonstrated in the study.  
 
As the curtain draws on this chapter, the next chapter examines resource management 
by the elites, which is one of the controversial issues as opinions are divided as to the 
level of transparency and accountability in the management of resources by the Niger 







ELITE AND THE MANAGEMENT OF OIL-WEALTH 
 
 
6.1 Introduction  
 
This chapter is a follow-up to the previous ones and examines the role of the elite in 
the economy sphere. It addresses research question number four which states that: how 
transparent and accountable are the elite of Niger Delta in the management of oil 
proceeds of the region? Thus, the chapter centres on elite management or 
mismanagement of the resources of the country and that of the Niger Delta. In other 
words, this chapter examines thoroughly how the proceeds from oil wealth and other 
revenues accrue to both the country and the region  have been managed by the elite 
both at the centre and the region where the ‘black gold’ is located but emphasis will 
be more on the regional elite from the Niger Delta region.    It is important to note that 
this chapter will focus essentially on corruption. Though, there are different types of 
corruption such as petty, grand, systemic, bureaucratic and political.  The chapter 
focuses on political corruption by the elites at both centre and the region. To examine 
this, the researcher will look at what the situation is at the centre and zeroes on the 
region. As earlier pointed out, attention will be more on the regional elite. The next 






6.2 Elite and Corruption in the Nigeria 
 
Scholars have defined political corruption in various way. Khan (1996, p. 12) defines 
political corruption as a “behaviour that deviates from the formal rules of conduct 
governing the actions of someone in a position of public authority because of private-
regarding motives such as wealth, power, or status.”  Similarly, political corruption 
refers to the “use of public power to advance the private again while subverting 
political process or while damaging, subverting or eroding what is distinct to the 
political sphere” (Navot, 2015, p. 2).  
 
Political corruption also refers to any conduct that departs from a recognised rule with 
regards to public trust and it entails the theft of public confidence by both elected and 
non-elected officer holders (Mohammed, 2013).  Therefore, political corruption may 
be defined as the abuse of office by public servants both elected and nominated for 
private gain. It entails misappropriation, diversion of funds, mismanagement and 
embezzlement of public funds.  
 
Tijani (2008) argues that whatever Nigeria has or has not become, it is due primarily 
to the deeds and or misdeeds of its leaders. This implies that the poor state of 
development of the country and other myriads of problems confronting the country 
can be laid squarely at the door step of the leaders. In other words, deficit in leadership 
in terms of commitment, selflessness and political will to take the bull by the horn are 
lacking in Nigerian leaders and that have been responsible for the situation in which 
the country finds itself.  Achebe (1983), corroborates this assertion by saying that 
Nigeria major problem is leadership. Therefore, the Niger Delta region also faced 





Hence, the elite of Niger Delta extraction are responsible for the problem confronting 
the region because of their misplaced priority or their failure to prioritise the needs of 
their people but instead they compounded the problems of the region through corrupt 
practices such as misappropriation of fund, which deprived the region the needed 
resources for its development (Ogbeidi, 2012; Suleiman, 2013).   But before examining 
the issue of corruption at the micro level, it is important to look at it from the macro 
level.  
 
Nigeria has consistently been rated as one of the most corrupt nation by the 
Transparency International (see table 6.1 for details). As the table below shows for 
three consecutive years, Nigeria occupies 136th position (2014-2016) scoring 27, 26 
and 28 in 2014, 2015 and 2016 respectively and thus making her one of the most 
corrupt nation in the world.  
 
This is not a cheering news for Nigeria at all, as it makes the nation a laughing stock 
in the comity of nations. Despite the negative prominent position occupies by Nigeria 
on the Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index (CPI) over the years, 
it is difficult to obtain information showing the actual level of corruption in the 
country.  But what is certain is that corruption has dealt a great blow to both Nigeria 










Table 6. 1  
Nigeria's Corruption Perception Index 2005-2016 
S/No Year Score  
 
Rank Number of 
Country 
1 2005 1.9 152 158 
2 2006 2.2 142 163 
3 2007 2.2 147 179 
4 2008 2.7 121 180 
5 2009 2.5 130 180 
6 2010 2.4 134 178 
7 2011 2.4 143 183 
8 2012 31 139 176 
9 2013 30 144 177 
















It poses a threat to the development of Niger Delta and the country at large; it has 
robbed the country and the Niger Delta region huge sums of money (Babalola, 2014). 
The Nigerian novelist Chinua Achebe (1983) of blessed memory, noted that as much 
as 60% of the country’s wealth was eaten by corruption and this was enough to 
“paralyse Nigeria in every sinew and every limb” (Achebe, 1983, p.43). Corruption 
has also increased the cost of administration in the country and thereby making 
                                                          
1 The 2005- 2011 reports of the ranking of countries were based on 10 points and 
countries with less than 5 points were considered to have serious corruption problem. 
From 2012 to date, it is based on 100 points ranking and below 50 points indicate 






governance to be expensive and this is the true positions of all levels of governments 
in the country. The analysis that follows shows how the country and the region of our 
study find themselves in their present predicaments. 
 
6.2.1 Misuse of Oil Revenue or Income 
 
Primitive accumulation of capital by the country’s elite has been responsible for the 
state of development of the country and the genesis of this dates to colonial times, 
when the warrant chiefs appointed by the British colonial administrators used their 
position to collect illegal tax and gifts from the people. After independence in 1960, 
corruption became endemic, because of longing for power by the political elite (Alabi, 
2010). In the last sixty years, Nigeria generated over US$600 as revenue from oil and 
yet all critical infrastructure are in state of decay (Obi, 2010). 
 
Resources have been diverted, misappropriated, embezzled and in most cases outright 
stolen.   According to Economic and Financial Crime Commission, the Nigerian elite 
have mismanaged US$400 billion in oil revenue in the last forty-five years (cited in 
Iyare, 2008). Similarly, the Telegraph of London maintained that the looting amounted 
to a sum equivalent to 300 years of British aid to African continent (cited in Iyare, 
2008).  
 
 By the same token, former czar of Economic and Financial Crime Commission 
(EFCC), Nuhu Ribadu, contended that the amount is six times the funds used for the 
rebuilding of Europe at the end of the Second World War under the Marshal Plan.  The 
implication is that money that would have been used for provision of social amenities 





As an American billionaire named Soroa noted: 
Resources belong to the people but are run by leaders who don’t put 
the people’s welfare ahead of their own, thereby giving rise to 
resource curse. It is a problem of many countries that are rich in 
natural resources (The Guardian, 2008, p.4). 
 
6.2.2 Major Cases of Corruption in Nigeria: An Overview 
 
This sub-section of the study analyses regime by regime account of corruption and the 
personalities involved and the means through which it was perpetrated. Since 1960 
when the country became independence, successive administrations whether civilian 
or military had cases of corruption to contend with.  Prior to independence notable 
politicians like Dr Nnamdi Azikiwe and Chief Obafemi Awolowo were indicted by 
the commissions set-up to consider their activities in their respective regions ( Akude, 
2007). 
 
The Justice Sutton Commission blamed Dr Nnamdi Azikiwe for investing state funds 
in the African Continental Bank in which he was a shareholder and because of this he 
transferred all his rights in the bank to the Eastern Regional Government. Likewise, 
Justice Coker Commission charged Chief Obafemi Awolowo for diverting public 
funds to the tune of €7,200.00 pounds from the Western regional government coffers 
to his private firm, the National Investment and Property Corporation. The Western 
Regional Government subsequently took over all the belongings of the firm (Akude, 
2007).  
 
One of the reasons for the collapse of the First Republic was corruption and the 





administration was toppled because of corruption that characterised his administration. 
Of the twelve governors that served in his administration ten of them were found guilty 
of enriching themselves (Osaghae, 2011).     
 
The Second Republic administration of Alhaji Shehu Shagari was dubbed the most 
corrupt regime in Nigeria (ICG, 2006).  It lacked accountability and was marred by 
cases of kick-back or bribery (a form of corruption in which public official receives 
gratification from prospective client). Majority of the governors in the Second 
Republic were jailed by the Special Military Tribunal established by the Buhari 
administration to try corrupt public official. Majority of these governors were 
sentenced to between twenty-five and hundred years imprisonment (Ganiyu, Rasak & 
Taiwo, 2014; Ogege, 2014).   
 
The military government of Olusegun Obasanjo left N2.8 billion Naira in foreign 
reserve and additional N40.5 billion was brought forth by the Shagari administration, 
but by the time the military toppled his government in 1983, Nigeria was indebted to 
the tune of N10.21 billion (Akude, 2007). Corruption was one of the reasons adduced 
for his overthrown.  
 
The Babangida’s administration institutionalised corruption in the country.  The 
governors that served under Gowon and dismissed by late General Murtala 
Mohammed regime for corruption were reinstated to their ranks and their properties 
returned to them. The administration could not account for US$12.4 billion oil windfall 





Maduagwu (cited in Ijewereme, 2015) highlighted cases of corruption that marked the 
Babangida administration to include:  
 The US$2 billion Gulf war windfall in 1991 
 The 30% of oil revenue diverted to frivolous uses throughout his administration 
 The huge extra budgetary spending.  For instance, in 1989 N15.3 billion was 
spent; in 1990 N23.4; in 1991- N35 billion, 1992- N44.2 billion and in 1993 
(August) N59 billion.  
 The sum of US$ 200 million from Aluminium Smelter project was embezzled.  
 The wastage of N400 million on his wife pet programme called Better Life for 
Rural  Women project. 
 The massive corruption at the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation 
(NNPC). For  example, US$101 million for the purchase of strategic storage 
facilities  
 
From the foregoing cases highlighted above and several others, the Babangida’s 
administration institutionalised corruption in Nigeria (Naswem, 2015; Abati, 2008). In 
the words of Abati (2008) “his administration not only institutionalised corruption, it 
is certainly one of the legacies it passed on to future administrations.” 
 
 General Sani Abacha was one of the most corrupt leaders in Nigeria.  He was said to 
have been involved in direct withdrawal of funds from the Central Banks and other 
ministries (Adebayo, 2013). According to Guest (cited in Agbiboa & Maiangwa, 2012, 
p.118), “He used to send trucks round to the central bank with orders that they be filled 
with banknotes.”  After his demise, it was reported that he stole over US$6 billion and 





Nigeria (Adebajo, 2008).  The Table 6.2 below shows detail magnitude of looting 
during Abacha’s administration.   
 
Table 6. 2  
Looting of the Nigerian Treasury under the Abacha's Regime 1993 
Bank Account Name Balance (CR) 
Barclays Bank Plc 
(London) 
Levy Account - 
Barclays Bank Plc 
(London) 
Ship Acquisition and Ship 
Building Fund 
US$5,648,410,55 
Barclays Bank Plc 
(London) 
Rent Account B£, 1, 447,14255 
Barclays Bank Plc 
(London) 
London Office Current Account B£, 288,946,14 
Union Bank Plc 
(London) 
Levy Account US$17,271,783,47 
Midland Bank Plc 
(London) 
Call Deposit Account B£ 166,949,31 
Midland Bank Plc 
(London) 
Fixed Deposit Account B£ 435,657,47 
First Bank Plc (London) Levy Account DM 360,500,17 
FSB Int. Bank Levy Account Non-checking US$1,396,688,28 
UBA Plc (New York) Private Account US$2,367,123,03 
FSB Int. Bank Income Account US$7,342,818,60 
UBA Plc (New York) Levy Account US$14,888,714,54 
 
 Source: Adopted from Ojukwu and Shopeju (2010, p. 20)  
 
An evaluation of corrupt practices under the Abacha administration showed that the 





prospective oil companies, siphoning of funds meant for the repair of refineries, among 
others.  
 
The General Abdulsalam Abubakar that succeeded Abacha was not saint. Put 
differently, the administration was also characterised by corrupt practices. The 
Christopher Kolade Panel set-up by the Obasanjo’s administration to review licenses, 
contract and appointments made under the Abdulsalam regime found out that 4,072 
contracts cost Nigeria N635.62 billion as against the N88 billion budgeted for them in 
the 1998 budget.  Also, the Kolade revealed the depletion of the foreign reserve from 
US$7.6 billion as at 1998 to US$ 3.8 billion by May 1999 (Ijewereme, 2015).  The 
Abdulsalam’s administration was monumental in terms of corruption as the statistics 
above have shown.  
 
The Obasanjo’s administration that succeeded the Abdulsalam regime was also marred 
by corruption.  According to Human Right Watch (2007), Nigeria lost an average of 
US$4 billion to US$8 billion every year to corruption under the eight years of 
Obasanjo’s presidency. For example, during the administration of former president 
Olusegun Obasanjo (1999-2007), the federal government received a total sum of N7.4 
trillion for the eight years he was in charge and nothing on the ground to show how 
these massive amounts of resources was expended.  
 
 
The administration spent N1.9 trillion on power sector and yet electricity remained 





show for this huge investment on power sector as well as other sector to which huge 
amount of money was invested. (cited in Iyare, 2008). 
 
Alhaji Umaru Yar’Adua succeeded Obasanjo and under him (Yar’Adua) the fight 
against corruption died down with the change of leadership of the Economic and 
Financial Crime Commission.  The body language of the late president showed he was 
not keen in the fight against corruption and the replacement of then Chairman of the 
EFCC and the attempt by the administration to remove the power of prosecution from 
the two anti-graft agencies by putting them under the office of the Attorney General 
of the Federation (AGF) were all indication that the fight against corruption died down 
during the administration.  The removal of power of prosecution from these agencies 
(ICPC and EFCC) means that they had to seek approval of the AGF before prosecuting 
any public officers (Faboyede, Mukoro, Oyewo & Akande, 2015; Enweremadu, 2010).  
 
After Yar’Adua passed away, Jonathan took over and was later elected the president 
in 2011. The Jonathan’s administration was characterised by massive corruption in the 
polity.  For instance, in the oil sector, an investigation conducted by the National 
Assembly as part of its oversight function showed that fuel subsidies rose from N346.7 
billion in 2008 to N1.7 trillion in 2011.  Also, the former Governor of the Central Bank 
of Nigeria, blew the whistle that the Ministry of Petroleum Resources and the Nigerian 
National Oil Corporation (NNPC) did not remit into the coffer of government a sum 
of US$20 billion being crude oil earning (Owen &Usman, 2015). 
 
Besides, the US$2.2 billion fund meant for the purchase of arms for Nigerian soldiers 





The amount is sufficient to fund the 2016 budgets of Yobe, Ekiti, Edo, Sokoto, Ebonyi 
and Kebbi (Jimoh, 2016).  
 
In line with the presidential directive that the names of those involved in the looting 
of the treasury under the administration of Jonathan be published. Alhaji Lai 
Mohammed, the Honourable Minister of Information released an interim report 
showing how much cash has been retrieved from the corrupt public officials. The total 
cash sum of N78, 325,354,631,095.43, US$185, 119,584.61; £3,508,355.46; and £11, 
250 were retrieved from the corrupt officials between May 29, 2015 and May 25, 2016. 
Also, recovered under item forfeiture to the government were cash and assets and these 
are: N126, 563,481,095.43; US$9,090,243,920.15; £2,484,447.55 and £303,399.17. 
Expected cash to be returned to the country from different countries abroad totalled: 
US$321,316,726.1; £6,900,000 and £11,826.11 (Jimoh, 2016).   
 
In a response to the issue of corruption or mismanagement of resources accrued to the 
nation an Interviewees 008 a Member of a Civil Society Organisation noted that: 
“That’s the same problem in Nigeria, everybody fending for himself and that of his 
family. That’s why you would see people embezzling billions of dollars for children 
yet unborn while others don’t even have a dollar.” (Interview at Tombia, Port-
Harcourt, Rivers State, 1/6/16). 
 
 
Another Interviewee 009 a Chief/CSO remarked that: “When at the federal, it starts 





to be there, people from the grassroots see this, it gives a wrong orientation.” 
(Interview at Tombia, Port-Harcourt, Rivers State, 2/6/16). 
 
The quotes above show the endemic nature of corruption in Nigeria and this cut across 
all levels of government and strata of Nigerian society. It exemplifies the greedy nature 
of elite who cornered state resources for their immediate family and those yet unborn.  
The budget padding which was alluded to mean the inclusion of items not in the 
original estimates approved by the Federal Executive Council for the consideration 
and approval by the National Assembly.  The following section examines cases of 
corruption in the Niger Delta.  
 
6.2.3 Regional Elite and Corruption in the Niger Delta  
 
This sub-section of the study discusses cases of corruption committed by the ruling 
elite of the Niger Delta extraction and the mode through which it was perpetrated.  The 
issue of how the elite of the Niger Delta have managed or mismanaged the resources 
of the region has attracted heated debate among scholars, public policy analysts and 
members of the public.   
 
It is imperative at this juncture to examine what the situation like in the Niger Delta 
region and particularly in those states that are the focus of this study. As the saying 
goes “as the he goat eats yam, the younger ones follow its footstep” (Ojukwu & 







6.2.3.1 Reasons for Corruption 
 
This segment analyses factors responsible for corruption in the region and identified 
among others, weak institutions, cultural and greediness as reasons for corruption 
among the elite in the region.  
 
6.2.3.1.1 Weak Institution 
 
One of the reasons for corruption in the region and the country at large is weak 
institution. Corruption thrives when legal and political institutions are weak.  In 
Nigeria (Niger Delta inclusive), there are so many inducements in the public realm 
that leave public servants with wide unobstructed powers to create opportunities for 
excessive enrichment or use the unrestricted powers at their disposal to manoeuvre the 
system (Moyosore, 2015;  Jacob, 2013).  The allocation of large portion of the budget 
to general administration and security vote by ruling elite of the Niger Delta are modes 
through which corruption have been committed 
 
6.2.3.1.2 Societal Factors 
 
Furthermore, societal or cultural factor encourages corruption.  The traditional culture 
has adopted the concept of “big man” characterised by flamboyances wealth and 
several clients.  The term “big man” means a person with many dependants to look 
after, own properties including fleet of cars and all of other things commensurate with 
his position.  
 
This accounts for why public official engaged in corruption (Moyosore, 2015; Jacob, 





and religious institutions by award of traditional titles and deacons by religious groups 
and the celebration of corrupt ex-convicts by the society are indication of societal 
encouragement of corruption. For instance, when James Ibori, erstwhile governor of 
Delta State was released from prison after completion of his sentence, he was 




 Greediness is another reason for corruption. It is greediness that makes the ruling elite 
of region to embezzle funds meant for the development of the region. This has been 
demonstrated by the likes of Ibori, Igbinedion and Alamieyeseigha, who enriched 
themselves through public funds (Mike, 2015; Enweremadu, 2009).   
 
Commenting on the greediness of the elite of Niger Delta extraction, an interviewee 
010, Academic stated that “what is meant for everybody was siphoned by few people 
and this is responsible for the spate of violence in the region (Interview at Tombia, 
Port-Harcourt, Rivers State, 2/6/16).  The statement clearly showed that the oil wealth 
which would have been used for the development of all was cornered by few influential 
in the society. 
 
6.2.1.2 Transparency and Accountability  
 
 Transparency and accountability are vital to promotion of good governance in any 
society. Similarly, Cheema (2005) asserts that transparency and accountability are 
essential to governance as they protect transparent management of country’s resources. 





information to members of the public who needed such information and for 
government to be up and doing in providing necessary information to public about 
government policies and decisions. Put differently, transparency means the process by 
which both elected and non-elected public servants ensure that the public have access 
to information concerning government activities. While accountability requires a 
public servant to be responsible and responsive to the aspiration of the people.  
 
The importance of accountability in government, business cannot be over emphasized.  
It ensures that public servants, both elected and appointed as well as civil servants are 
answerable to the people for their actions or deeds. The lack of transparency and 
accountability in the management of funds of the region accounted for all forms of 
corruptions in the region.   
 
The two Tables below 6.3 and 6.4 show statutory allocations to the states in the Niger 
Delta. For instance, table 6.3 shows the amount of monies that South- South geo-
political zone which is the economy power house of Nigeria because of its oil and gas 
received from the federation account.   
Table 6. 3  






Component states Amount Received % share of 
revenue 
1 North-East Adamawa, Bauchi, 
Borno, Gombe, Taraba 
and Gombe 





2 North-West Jigawa, Kano, Kaduna, 





Benue, Kog, Kwara, 
Nassarawa, Niger and 
Plateau  
N235,656,837,808.96 13.04% 
4 South-East Abia, Anambra, 
Ebonyi, Enugu and Imo 
N194,806,421,319.68 10.78% 
5 South-West Ekiti, Lagos, Oyo, 
Ondo, Ogun and Osun 
N323,640,887,606.67 17.91% 
6 South-South Akwa-Ibom, Bayelsa, 
Cross-River, Delta, 
Edo and Rivers 
N495,706,518,048.64 27.44% 
 TOTAL  N1,806,703,895,518.54 100 
 
Source: Compiled and calculated by the researcher from FAAC monthly allocation to 
 States for the year May 2015-June 2016.  
 
 
As the table shows, the amount allocated to the South-South geopolitical zone 
constituted 27.44% of the total amount of N1, 806,703,895,518.54.  While the South 
West and North-West came second and third with 17.91% and 17.81% respectively. 
 
 
The question to ask is has the ruling elite been able to use these resources efficiently 
and effectively in the improvement of the lives of the people of the region and the 
answer to this question is no, going by the responses of those that took part in this 
study and the observation made by researcher during the fieldwork to sites of the study 






The  failure of the elite to use these resources (statutory allocation in table 6.3 and 6.4) 
in an effective and efficient manner is a typical case of resource curse thesis which 
states that countries with abundance natural resources have slower growth compared 
with those without abundance natural resource and are also associated with vices such 
as corruption, instability and so on (Auty, 1993; Blattman & Miguel, 2010; Collier & 
Hoeffler, 2004; Cotet & Tsui, 2013; Humphreys, 2005; Le Billion, 2001; Lei & 
Michaels, 2013; Miguel and Satyanath, 2011;   Sach &Warner, 1995, 1997, 2001; De 
Soysa, 2000, 2002; Ross, 2004, 2006; Wegenast, 2013).  
 
The notion of resource curse is closely linked to poor resource management and one 
of the mechanisms through which resource curse occurs is relevant to this study. Roll 
(2011) contends that there are three mechanisms through which the resource curse 






As earlier indicated, the second mechanism is apt to this section of the study. Since the 
introduction of 13 per cent derivation principle in 2000, there has been a massive 
inflow of resources in the form of transfer from the central government to the Niger 
Delta states (see tables 6.3 and 6.4).  But this proceeds from oil wealth was not well 






Table 6. 4  
 



































































































































































































Source: Compiled and calculated by the researcher from Federation Account Allocation Committee (FAAC) monthly revenue allocation 





In response to the question on transparency and accountability of the elite in the 
management of the resources. The participants were divided on this. Some were of the 
views that the elite of the region should not be singled out for this as the issue of 
transparency and accountability in the management of resources were not peculiar to 
Niger Delta alone. Others agreed that the elite were not transparent and accountable in the 
management of the resources of the region.  Below are the responses of some of those 
who expressed the view that the elite of the Niger Delta extraction should not be singled 
out as the only one who mismanaged the resources of their region. An Interviewee 001 a 
Traditional ruler noted that: 
The central, state and local governments are all guilty of this offence. 
For instance, under the Obasanjo billions of naira was sunk into the 
power sector but nothing tangible on the ground to show for the 
investment made in the sector (Interview at Taylor Creeks, Yenagoa, 
Bayelsa State, 1/05/16). 
 
In a like manner, an interviewee 003, a Youth divulged that: 
The issue of resource mismanagement is not peculiar to this region 
alone and so we must not see elite from other regions as saint. I think, 
it is a Nigeria problem. If Nigerian leaders, both past and present have 
utilised our resources very well, we should have been among the top 











Another Interviewee 012 Academic, speaking in a high tone that showed he was emotional 
noted that: 
I think the issue of transparency and accountability in the management 
of the resources is not unique to the Niger Delta alone.  People have 
always asked what elite from this part of the region do with the resource 
that accrue to the region from the federation account. We should also 
ask them what they have done with their own.  It is an insult, for them 
to ask us that kind of question (Interview at Mariri, Tarauni, Kano, 
16/7/16). 
 
This assertion was reaffirmed by Chief Edwin Clark, a prominent indigene from the 
region. He queried why the rest of the country should tell them to hold their leaders 
accountable for the rent that the region has received since the birth of this present 
democratic dispensation in 1999. He asserted that: 
Why this question of saying that the south-south are corrupt? They use 
the money; they don’t use the money. Let’s me say this; if the south-
south governors are receiving eight billion or seven billion naira, 
nobody outside the south-south has the right to ask them to account for 
what they spent the money for. Similarly, the man who is receiving one 
billion in Yobe or wherever he is, we’ve not asked him to account for 
the money he collected from our own area. (Clark, 2016). 
 
On the other hand, other interviewees in this study believed that the elite of the Niger 
Delta extraction have case to answers in the way they have expended the resources of the 
region. The quotes below buttress this view point.   As one Interviewee 003, a Youth said: 
The elite of this area have not done well in the way and manner they handle the resource 





For instance, in this state (Bayelsa) we don’t have access to state financial statement 
detailing how resources are raised and expended (Interview at Yenagoa, Bayelsa State, 
3/05/16) 
 
Another Interviewee 002, a Youth was of the view that the elites were not transparent and 
accountable in the management of the resources of the region. In his words: 
 When you … hear the amount the states receive as a statutory 
allocation from the federation account, you begin to ask yourself what 
they have done with the money. Go around the city of Yenagoa and see 
things for yourself. There are no amenities provided by the various 
governments who are assigned by the constitution to provide certain 
services to their people in their areas of jurisdiction and they all receive 
huge amount of money monthly from the centre.  It is very sad that if we 
at the state and local government levels cannot justify the 13 % 
derivation and statutory allocation given to us by way of using it to uplift 
the living condition of our people, then we have no moral right to accuse 
the centre of wrong doings.   We must tell us ourselves the plain truth, 
our leaders at various tiers of government are unaccountable and 
transparent in the management of resources accruing to the states. We 
need to make our leaders be accountable to us (Interview in Yenagoa, 
Bayelsa State, 03/5/16). 
 
Also, commenting on the lack of transparency and accountability in the management of 
the resources of the region, an Interviewee 004 a Senior Civil Servant/ CLO in the state 
revealed that: 
When leaderships do not account for the money that they are getting 
from the national or both national, there is no accountability; there is 
no proper transparency; they are only on speech making and a kind of 
window dressing. Then what do you expect? We are doing 
accountability; the accountability cannot be verified by an independent 






The statements above are clear indication that the elite of the region have not utilised the 
resources that have accrued to the region for its development. They lamented that the 
various levels of government in the region have failed to perform and admonished the 
people of the region not to blame others for their woes but their leaders.   Concurring with 
the position that the elite of the Niger Delta lacked transparency and accountability, the 
current Minister of State in the Ministry of Petroleum Dr Kachikwu noted that:  
…the amount of money that has been out into the Niger Delta over the 
last 10 years, in papers it is over US$40 billion. These have come from 
NDDC; it has come from derivation; it has come from oil companies’ 
investments. Over US$40 billion, but as I go to the creek, I see no single 
infrastructure that you can point to, to say this is the result for these 
investments. So, what it means is that we must begin to do some soul 
searching ourselves: where did all this money go to? (Ofikhenua, 2016) 
 
The finding from this study is consistent with extant literature. As Table 6.4 above has 
shown, a considerable sum of money has been received by the four states that are the focus 
of this study from the federation account and this money has not been properly accounted 
for or utilised for the development of the region.  Akwa Ibom tops the pack with a total 
gross revenue of N2.048 trillion, closely followed by Rivers with N1.992 trillion, Delta 










With this cash flow, one would have thought that the elite would use them wisely to 
improve the welfare of their people but that was not the case. Corroborating this view 
point, Joseph Amberkederim of the South-South Elements Progressives Union in an 
interview with, Daily Independent newspaper asserted that:  
The amount of money that has accrued to the South-South governors in 
the past nine years is enough, more than enough to transform the Niger 
Delta... If monies are being used judiciously and religiously, the monies 
that have come to the governors of the South-South today, we would 
not have the problems we are having in the Niger Delta. Do you know 
what one billion naira can do in a community? What are these people 
asking for anyway? Roads, water, electricity, school buildings and 
furniture for these schools...The corruption among the governors in the 
South-South is enormous, the stealing is enormous... (cited in 
Ogundiya, 2011, p.78). 
 
Similarly, Enweremadu (2008) noted that:  
These officials have, despite substantial inflow of resources to their 
region, failed to pursue policies and programmes that would improve 
the lives of their people. They chose to misappropriate and divert 
whatever funds are available, to their own personal pockets instead. 
Governor Alamieyeseigha, who is believed to have diverted close to 1 
billion dollars in office, has furthermore filtered away most of the $2.5 
billion he collected as Bayelsa state’s share of Nigeria’s oil rents on 
white- elephant projects (p.11). 
 
The above quotes further confirmed our earlier finding that the region has received huge 
amount of money from the general purse which the leaders have mismanaged or 
embezzled instead of using it for the provision of social amenities for the people. This 
finding corroborates the views of Ibaba, Ukaga, and Ukiwo (2012), who argued that the 





This finding is supported by resource curse theory which attributes the over-reliance of 
government on oil rents rather than taxation from the people for the running of state 
affairs. The states in the Niger Delta region relied on the statutory grant and 13% 
derivation allocation from the centre rather than taxation from the indigents. This ensures 
that the elites have enough resources which they can use anyhow they wish without being 
queried by the people.  Put differently, the elites are not dutiful bound to account for their 
actions to the people because the people are not the sources of the resources used to run 
the state affairs.  Also,   the poor governance in the region exemplified by poor service 
delivery, corruption, and rising debt profile are all supported by resource curse theory. 
 
6.2.1.2.1 Underdevelopment  
 
As it has been analysed in the preceding section above that the elite have not been prudent 
in the management of the resources of the region and this has contributed to the violence 
in the region because money meant for development of the region has been diverted for 
private purpose and this has further resulted in the underdevelopment of the region.   
 
It has been noted that in oil wealth states, oil never leaves a place the way it finds it. Oil 
not only shapes the contours of the economy, society, polity but also the environment of 








Several studies have attributed the state of development of the Niger Delta to oil 
exploration activities of the multinational oil companies (Ibeanu, 2005; Watts, 2008). 
According to Ibeanu (2005), the discovery and subsequent exploitation of oil has created 
three paradoxes namely: the paradox of plenty which means the tendency of oil wealth to 
create poverty; the paradox of security which entails the tendency for national security to 
undermine the security of the individual or nationals of oil resource nation like Nigeria 
and lastly, the paradox of development which refers to  the supposed  development efforts 
of oil resource nation such as Nigeria to generate underdevelopment.  It is disheartening 
to note that despite the region’s contribution of major share to the national purse, the 
region wallops in poverty, squalor and penury.   
 
Onuoha (2010) argues that there is high prevalence of poverty in the region with over 70 
percent of the rural dwellers living at subsistence level. Also, 73 percent of the people lack 
access to potable water; 94 percent of the people lack access to telephones and primary 
school enrolment rate below 40 per cent (Ibeanu, 2006). Obi (2010) argues that the Niger 
Delta is the least developed region in Nigeria.  
 
However, this study found that part of the reasons for the state of underdevelopment of 
the region is the mismanagement of funds and lack of commitment on the part of the ruling 
elite to development of the region. The budgetary allocations to social sectors which are 







In 2008-2011, Akwa Ibom allocated N244 billion to general administration which was 
higher than housing, health and education. A sum of N18 billion was allotted to security 
votes. While Bayelsa state earmarked N69 billion for general administration, which 
ranked next to works and transport, but higher than health, education, housing, agriculture, 
rural development and water supply (Niger Delta Citizens and Budget Platform, 2010; 
2013).  
 
There was not much difference in other Niger Delta states. For instance, in Delta state, in 
2009-2010, the total sum earmarked for general administration was N39.7 billion, while 
in the year under review, allocation to both health and education were N15.9 billion and 
N23.9 respectively (Niger Delta Citizens and Budget Platform, 2010; 2013; 2014).  
 
 In River State, for instance, in 2010-2013, the total amount earmarked for health and 
agriculture was N49.2 and N181.6 billion respectively. While the general administration 
in the same period attracted N26.2 billion. The total amount assigned to security votes for 
four years (2008, 2009, 2010 and 2013) was N41.5 billion (Niger Delta Citizens and 
Budget Platform, 2010; 2013; 2014).  
 
As the sector allocation of the above states have shown the critical social sector, education 
health and rural development attracted little or low allocation.  States are build based on 
its human resources and any serious leader would attach important to this sector. 






The schools in most of the states visited by the researcher were in dilapidated conditions, 
inadequate teachers, schools environment not conducive for learning.  Commenting on 
the contribution of the elite to the underdevelopment of the region. An interviewee 010, 
an Academic stated that the elite are culpable for the state of underdevelopment of the 
region. In his words: 
They played a prominent role in the underdevelopment of the region. 
Firstly, when contracts are awarded to tarred road or electrify 
community, they abandoned the projects. Well, but in many cases, they 
tried to do the project but using inferior materials. They do it half way; 
they don’t complete the project (Interview at Tombia, Port-Harcourt, 
Rivers State, 2/6/16). 
 
The remark above highlighted how the elite contributed to the underdevelopment of the 
region through the phenomenon of abandon projects that are found all over the states in 
the region and reason for the state of those already executed projects. The researcher can 
testify to this as cases of abandoned and collapsed projects dotted the towns and cities 
visited by the researcher in the course of fieldwork.   
 
There is no doubt that the region lacks basic amenities such as electricity, roads, schools, 
potable water, etc. In most of the communities visited by the researcher in the region, there 
is virtually lack of government presence in the communities.  For instance, at Taylor 
Creeks visited by this researcher and several other communities in Rivers and Delta as 
well as other riverine areas in the region, there is no visible government presence.  That is 
lack of provision of social amenities by the states and local governments in the region. 






The researcher was told by a community leader in one of communities that a culvert 
project that was embarked upon by Shell, which was uncompleted resulted in the death of 
a promising member of the community who was running home to inform his parent of his 
performance in an examination and fell into this uncompleted project which led to its 
untimely death.   
 
The submission by Babalola (2014) that successive leaders from the area are responsible 
for the underdevelopment of the region further confirm the findings of this study that the 
elite cannot be exonerated from the happening in the region because of their failure to 
wisely use the resources of the region.  As Babalola (2014) rightly notes:  
The abundance of oil rents seems to make corruption almost inevitable 
in Nigeria, particularly in the Niger Delta region where politicians have 
converted the region’s share of national revenue into their main source 
of wealth. With corruption firmly entrenched in public life, oil wealth 
becomes incapable of transforming the area. This translates to mean that 
successive leadership in the Niger Delta region is more culpable in the 
underdevelopment of the region. Nigerian political elite can hardly 
survive in an environment where corrupt practices are forbidden (p. 
126). 
 
In a like manner, former Nigerian President, Chief Olusegun Obasanjo, noted that “not 
much impact has been made on the lives and living standards of most ordinary people of 
the Niger Delta.” (Peel, 2010, p.19) He blamed the local elite of the region for their failure 
to bring development to the region. The images below capture deplorable state of 







Figure 6. 1 Pupils of Annang Primary School, Ukpom-Abak, Akwa Ibom State. 
Source:   Ufot (2017).  
 
As the Figure 6.1 shows the pupils learning in an unconducive environment. There are no 
desk and chairs and the classroom and the surrounding environment are unclean. This a 










Figure 6. 2 Kolokuma/Opokuma and Mbiama sections of the East-West road in Bayelsa 
         State 









Figure 6. 3 Deplorable Enerhen Junction Road in Warri, Delta State 
 
Source: Omonigho, (2017).  
 
 
Figure 6. 4 Classrooms Girlds Model School, Enwreni, Delta State.  
 








Figure 6. 5 A Dilapidated school in Rivers State 
 




As the figures above show the state of infrastructure in the region is in a deplorable 
condition and many have wondered what the political elites in the region have been doing 
with the resources accrued to the states that they could not address these problems. As 
some analysts have pointed out that corruption amongst elites accounts for this state of 













Another effect of lack of transparency and accountability in the management of fund is 
the pervasive poverty confronting the people of the region.  Poverty can be described as 
not being able to meet one’s necessity of life such as food, clothing and shelter. According 
to World Bank poverty means pronounced deprivation in well-being (WDR, 2001).  
Ali-Akpajiak and Pyke (2003) see poverty as a pestilence troubling people all over the 
world and is one of the indicator of underdevelopment. By the same token, Aigbokhan 
(2000) describes poverty as the inability to achieve a certain minimal standard of living. 
 
The situation in the Niger Delta oil bearing communities fit the above definition or 
description of poverty. Poverty also motivates people to engage in violence because of 
their economic needs. Extreme poverty and unemployment make the youth to be potential 
recruiters by both militia organisation and the politicians who patronised them (Abdu, 
Cochran, Genet, Ihejirika, Olorunmola & Shyne 2014).  
 
As Abdu et.al (2014) rightly noted that poverty is a grievance when added with inequality 
as evidenced in the Niger Delta when the poor knows that the oil wealth is enriching their 
leaders while they (poor) are not benefiting from the oil wealth.  
 
The unemployed youths are vulnerable to join cult groups or being used by the politicians 
to perpetuate violence.  According to one of the respondents in this study, the political 
class failed to make prudent use of the national cake thereby created underdevelopment, 





Though oil exploration activities of the TNOC also contributed to this but the regional 
elite represented by the various states chief executives have not come up with a blue- print 
that could transform their various states into economic hub of Nigeria. It appears that the 
measures or steps taken by successive leaders or elite further impoverished the people. 
The states in the region are well blessed with abundant natural resources apart from oil 
and gases which remain untapped or not explored for the development of the region.  
There is abundance of rubber in the state and none of the political leaders as well as the 
captain of industries that are indigenes or from the region deemed it fit to establish agro- 
allied industries that will utilise rubber or palm oil that are abundant in the region and 
thereby create employment and save foreign exchange which would have been used in the 
importation of these products.  
 
Moreover, if most of the youths are gainfully employed, poverty and crimes will reduce 
and many positive things will fall in place. But that is not the priority of the elite as the 
example of Delta shows.  In Delta state under, the immediate past administration of 
Uduaghan, he pursued policy that lacked encouragement of investors, for instance, the 
business environment was hostile, tax policy was unfriendly, the state lacked 
infrastructural amenities and more importantly security problem which the administration 
could not addressed. Accordingly, many oil companies relocated to friendly states outside 








The Delta State beyond Oil which is a policy aimed at diversifying the economy of the 
state was a project existing on paper only and it turned out to be another avenue of 
siphoning the resources of the state (Gbemre, 2015).  According to Gbemre (2015), the 
sixteen years of democratic rule in the state was “a dynasty of corruption of the highest 
order and impunity, electoral fraud of unimaginable proportions and self-perpetuating 
government of a ruling cabal of the PDP” 
 
6.2.1.3 Forms of Political Corruption among Selected Ruling Elite in the Niger Delta 
 
The section examines the phenomenon of corruption among some selected ruling elite of 
the region and modes through which is perpetrated.  The analysis is done on state-by-state 
basis.   
 
6.2.1.3.1 Akwa Ibom 
 
Akwa Ibom is one of the states in the Niger Delta and is the leading oil producing states 
in the region. It was created in 1987 as one of the two states created by the then military 
administration of General Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida. Since the return to civil rule in 
1999, the state has been ruled by three governors namely Obong Victor Attah, Godswill 
Akpabio and Udom Gabriel Emmanuel.  The searchlight will be beamed on Godswill 
Akpabio’s administration and the reason for this is that, he was the only former chief 
executive of the state being investigated by the anti-graft agencies (Premium Times, 






Godswill Akpabio governed Akwa-Ibom for eight years from 2007-2015 and the total 
revenue accumulations to the state totalling over three trillion Naira (Awak, 2015). He 
was alleged to have squandered the resources that accrued to the state (National Infinity, 
August 6, 2015). An examination of the corrupt practices of the administration centred on 
misappropriation of fund, white elephant projects, and security vote. 
 
(a) Misappropriation of Funds 
This implies out-right stealing of public funds in a person’s custody.  This is one of the 
channels through which corruption has been committed by the immediate administration 
of the Godswill Akpabio.  The erstwhile governor of the state was accused of embezzling 
state fund amounting to over N108 billion (Breaking News International, August 8, 2016).  
 
Misappropriation as indicated is an avenue through which resources was siphoned. For 
instance, in 2011, his administration allocated N195 million naira to purchase buses to 
transport children home. The same project attracted the sum of N200 million in both the 
2011 and 2012 budgets respectively. Unfortunately, not a bus was purchased (National 
Infinity, August 6, 2015).  Also, in 2010 and 2011, N2.5 billion and N2.0 billion 
respectively were allocated for the construction of Science Park in Uyo the state capital 
but nothing at the proposed site (National Infinity, August 6, 2015).  In 2012, over N100 
billion was earmarked in the budget for the establishment of industry in the 31 Local 
Governments that make up of the state and no industry built in any of the local of the local 






In a respond to the utilisation of the resources of the region, an interview 001, a Traditional 
ruler, maintained that the situation in the region was that of “misappropriation and 
misplaced priority. There are cases where the elite from the Niger Delta states have 
pocketed the resources of the region.”(Interview at Taylor Creeks, 1/5/16).  
 
Similarly another interviewee 007, a Youth leader noted that “They are using it to do other 
things that are not relevant. They use it to buy houses in London, United States, Dubai. 
They went to Dubai to celebrate wedding, birthday and others.”(Interview at Diobu, 
1/6/16). 
 
The above comments indicated corrupt practices among the ruling elite of the region. It 
showed that the state resources have been misused by the elite on frivolous things that 
were beneficial and personal to them. 
 
An elite from the state who headed federal government parastatals set-up for the 
development of the region was also involved in the mismanagement of the funds. For 
example, Ambassador Sam Edem unlawfully spent N800 million belonging to the NDDC 
on sorcery. The said money was given to a sorcerer named Mathew Sonoma to secure his 
service to getting favourable contracts from the immediate past governor of Akwa-Ibom 
state, Godswill Akpabio and also to make some sacrifices in order for him to retain his 







Confirming the corrupt practices by public servants from the state manning federal 
agencies. An interviewee 001, Traditional said that “even my brothers who headed some 
of the parastatals of the federal government established for developing this region are not 
left out in these social vices called corruption.” (Interview at Taylor Creek, Bayelsa State, 
1/5/16). 
 
The quoted statement above indicated that corruptions are also rife among federal 





The white elephants projects are gigantic projects that attract huge budgetary allocation 
but have little impact on the lives of the people.  The Akpabio’s administration was noted 
for such projects and these projects were uncompleted and the money budgeted for them 
had gone down the drain. For instance, Akwa Ibom invested in a multibillion electronic 
library project described as the first of its kind in Sub-Saharan Africa when the workers 
in the state were owed several months salaries and unemployment was at alarming rate in 









The library remained non-functional after its commission and others like Tropicana 
Entertainment Centre and Specialist Hospital were uncompleted. Commenting on 
corruption among the elite in the region, an interviewee, 001, a Traditional ruler averred 
that:  
They (elite) stole the resources meant for the development of the state. 
For instance, the immediate past governor of one of the states in the 
region embarked on elephant projects that are not beneficial to the 
common man on the street. The stadium and acclaimed world class 
hospital are not meant for the poor and when the governor had an 
accident, he didn’t go to the hospital (Interview at Creek Taylor, 
Bayelsa State, 1/5/16). 
 
The statement above stressed huge investment made by the governor on projects that were 
not valuable to the mass of the people and lack of confidence in the professional 
competence and medical facilities in the country.  As the respondent indicated, the 
governor had to travel abroad for medical treatment. This is an indictment on the governor 
for not patronising the hospital. 
 
(c) Security Vote  
Security vote is a concept that has gained notoriety in Nigerian governance system.  It 
means “funds unconstitutionally appropriated by government at all levels in Nigeria for 
the purpose of enhancing national security.” (Kumolu, 2013).  It has also been defined as 
“misappropriation and stealing of public funds under the guise of enhancing state 







From the foregoing definitions, security vote entails fund set aside by the president, 
governors and local government chairmen for the objective of improving security at 
different levels of government. Security vote has been abused by different heads at the 
various levels of government.  It has become a conduit-pipe through which resources are 
siphoned by elected officials and also to perpetuate themselves in office (Egbo, Nwakoby, 
Onwumere & Uche, 2012). 
 
During his administration, the sum of N1.8 billion was set aside monthly for security vote 
and it was not used for the improvement of the security of the state. Instead, the fund was 
employed to intimidate his political opponents (Erahbor, 2010).  For example, under him 
the state witnessed an unprecedented high-profile kidnappings and unresolved 
assassinations. Majority of the victims were critics of the former governor (Udo, 2015). 
This shows that the essence of setting aside certain percentage of the budget as security 
has not been accomplished. 
 
6.2.1.3.2 Bayelsa State 
 
Bayelsa State is also one of the oil producing states in the region and was created on 
October 1, 1996, by General Sani Abacha.  Indeed, Olobiri where oil was first discovered 
in commercial quantity in 1956 is located in the state. Unfortunately, it is the least 
developed states in the region and since the present civilian democratic dispensation, the 
state has been ruled by six governors out of which three were in acting capacity and three 





Jonathan., Timipre Sylva and Seriake Dickson.  This section of the study analyses 
mismanagement of the state resources by past and present administration. 
 
(a) Misappropriation of Funds 
Alamieyeseigha was the first civilian governor of Bayelsa and he administered the state 
from 1999 - 2005. He was notorious for embezzling the resources of the state. According 
to Odiegwu (2012), he mismanaged N660.45 billion of the state resources which he used 
to acquire properties in and outside Nigeria. For instances, Chelsea hotel in Abuja, Nigeria 
houses in London, California and South Africa and an oil refinery in Ecuador.  
 
It is important to note that some of these properties have been seized and some handed 
over to Bayelsa state government (Atonko, 2016). In 2005, he was detained in London for 
money laundering and at the time of his apprehension, the Metropolitan police found 
£1million pound in cash in his London house.  
 
Tamipreye Sylva who ruled the state between 2007 and 2011 and also contested for the 
same position in 2015, looted the State’s treasury amounted to N627 million (US$4.18 
million) and used it to acquire properties in Abuja (Thisday, 2012).   
 
One of the way through which misappropriation of funds have been committed was 
siphoned of funds meant for projects. For instance, the construction of three Senatorial 
Model Secondary Schools, resource were earmarked for this same project for three 





In 2010, N2.0 billion was budgeted for the project; in 2011, N1.4 billion and in 2012, N2 
billion. In the three zones where the schools were to be located, it was only in Yenagoa 
that the work was at 80% stage while in the two other zones Sagbama and Nembe, work 
had not begun. (Niger Delta Citizens and Budget Platform, 2012).  
 
Another project which money was earmarked for and later abandoned was the Bayelsa 
State rice training and seed multiplication centre, a sum of N150million was set-aside for 
the project in 2012 but it has been abandoned.  There are numerous of such abandoned 
projects spread across the state. For instance, the Airport project which three different 
governors embarked upon at different sites and none of which was completed by any of 
them.  
 
Most of the interviewees in this study expressed the view that the elite misappropriated 
the resources of the state.  One of the interviewees, 001, Traditional ruler remarked that 
“There are cases where states have misappropriated their resources. They embezzled 
resources meant for the development of the state “(Interview at Taylor Creeks, Yenagoa, 
Bayelsa State, 1/05/16).  
 
As the response above indicated the issue of misappropriation of resources is common to 
all states in the region and the state chief executives reckless financial abused were 
unchecked by their respective legislatures that have the oversight functions to look into 
the activities of governmental departments.  In some states in the region, the legislative 





Indeed, they are partners in crime. Besides, the central government allowed the component 
units to enjoy their autonomy to the fullest by not interfering or monitoring what they do 
with their resource. 
 
(b) Projects 
Bayelsa like other states in the region has white elephants projects spread across the state 
and abandoned or uncompleted. For instance, the five-star Skyscraper Tower Hotel in the 
state which was commenced during the administration of Alamieyeseigha has not been 
completed.  The state airport project is another white elephants project which as indicated 
above was the brainchild of Alamieyeseigha and was located in his country Amassoma 
but Tamipreye Sylva relocated it to Zarama.  
 
After huge amount of resources have been expended on this new site, the Dickson’s 
administration relocated it back to the original site (Amassoma) for cost effectiveness 
(Pondei, 2015). This is waste of resources in a state where basic amenities like portable 
water, road, schools and health facilities are lacking.  Commenting on the white elephants 
projects in the state,  
 
An interviewee 001, Traditional ruler noted that “ (…) In almost all the states in the 
region, the governors embarked on white elephants projects that are not beneficial to 








Likewise, interviewee 012, an Academics disclosed that: 
Majority of the states chief executives embarked on white elephant 
projects that are beneficial to them because of the “kick- back and kick- 
front” that would accrue to them from such contract and not projects 
that would benefit the majority of the people of the state (interview at 
Mariri, Tarauni, Kano State, 16/7/16)  
 
The statements above highlighted the how and why these projects identified as elephants 
are executed. As the statements above indicated, the projects were not meant to serve the 
interest of the generality of the people but the few and more importantly, they serve as 
conduit-pipe through which corruption is committed.   
 
  (c) Security Vote 
There is no available record on amount earmarked for security vote in the state and this 
point to the fact that security vote is characterised by secrecy, lack of transparency and 
accountability. But if what is obtainable in the states in the region is anything to go by, 
then Bayelsa will also earmark a large portion of its revenue to security vote. This is 
because it is a window through which corruption is perpetrated.  
 
In 2012, the Economic and Financial Crime Commission (EFCC) beamed its searchlight 
on the state because of different fraud and siphoning of public funds by state officials. The 
Commission filed charges against the state Commissioner of Finance, the Accountant-
General , Director of Finance, among others, for theft of N2 billion belonging to the state 





The Commissioner of Finance in his defence said the N500 million was part of the security 
vote spent on security in the Niger Delta (cited in Egbo, Nwakoby, Onwumere & Uche, 
2012). 
 
6.2.1.3.3 Delta State 
 
Delta state was carved out of Bendel State in 1991 and is the third highest crude oil 
producing states after Akwa Ibom and Rivers States. The state has been one of the epic 
centres of violence in the because of poor governance.  Since the return to democratic 
order in 1999, the state has been governed by three governors, one of which was James 
Ibori. 
 
(a) Misappropriation of Funds 
As already indicated misappropriation of fund takes the forms of looting, embezzlement 
of public funds among others.  James Ibori, former Governor of Delta State (1999– 2007) 
was arrested in December 2007 by Economic and Financial Crime Commission for money 
laundering, abuse of office and theft of public funds.  In 2012, the Southwark Crown 
Court, London found him guilty of stealing US$250 million from Delta state he 
administered for eight years and sentenced to thirteen years imprisonment and his assets 
were frozen (Adebayo, 2013; Agbiboa & Maiangwa, 2012; Kew & Phillips, 2013; 







Uduaghan, Ibori cousin and immediate past governor of the state was alleged to have 
misappropriated N9 billion excess crude funds released to the state in 2012 and N48.6 
billion Delta State Oil Producing Area Development Commission funds (This Day March 
27, 2014). This was part of allocation accrued to the state in respect of 13% derivation 
between May 2015 and November 2016 and meant for the development of oil producing 
communities.  
 
A Minister representing the state at the centre Orubebe famous for his attempts at 
disrupting the 2015 presidential election collation, was arraigned before a court in Abuja. 
He was accused by the Independent Corrupt Practices and related offences Commission 
for perjury, corruption and diversion of the sum of 2 billion naira meant for the dualization 
of Part IV of the East-West Road (Nwabufo, 2016). Responding to question on 
misappropriation or mismanagement of the resources of the region by ruling elite, an 
interview 006, retired Military Officer lamented that: 
Those we entrusted our commonwealth are not taking diligent care of 
it. Rather, they are using it for their own personal purpose while the 
generality of the people is suffering. I weep for this state and the 
country. If thing continues like this, what will become the fate of yet 












(b) Projects  
Delta State has its own fair share of white elephants projects which are dotted all over the 
states. The Uduaghan’s administration upgrading of Osubi airport in the state gulped 
N37.5 billion and N7.4 was expended on demolition of a hill in Asaba airport in order to 
allow large planes to land in the airport (Godspower, 2012).   This is a case of misplaced 
priority in a state where basic infrastructures are lacking For instance, Warri and its 
environs lack basic amenities such as roads and portable water.  
 
 (c) Security Vote  
Delta State has one of the highest vote for security in the country. The state’s security vote 
is N2 billion monthly (N24 billion annually) (Sahara Reports, 2013).Yet, the state remains 
the den for kidnapping, thuggery and armed robberies.  The inhabitants of the city cannot 
move freely because of hoodlums who harassed and robbed them of their belongings.   
 
6.2.1.3.4 Rivers State 
 
Rivers State is the oldest state in the region and was created in 1966. It is the second 
highest earner from the federation account because of its second position in terms of oil 










(a) Mismanagement of Funds 
Dr. Peter Odili, administered the state from 1999-2007 and was accused of diversion of 
state fund totalling N100 billion (cited in Babalola, 2014). Similarly, Human Right Watch 
(2007) accused his administration of pervasive corruption and mismanagement.  
He bought two private jets, a helicopter and numerous private properties of his own (Kew, 
& Phillips, 2013).   
 
Rotimi Amaechi, was alleged of theft amounting to N100 billion (cited in Agbiboa & 
Maiangwa, 2012). The Justice George Omereji Commission of Inquiry set-up by his 
successor Nyesom Wike to consider how US$39.2 million for the Justice Adolphus 
Karibi- Whyte Special Hospital was paid to contractor without execution of the contract, 
the withdrawal of N96 billion from the State Reserve Funds and other related matters, 
indicted him for diverting N53billion belonging to the state (The Paradigm, 2015). 
 
(b) Projects 
In Rivers state, the state embarked on the construction of the third stadium in the capital 
city Port-Harcourt while the older ones were neither maintained nor put to effective use.  
These types of projects were avenue for government officials to steal public resources or 
funds as the example of Rivers state where two major flyovers in the state collapsed eight 
years after construction as contractors and state officials colluded to approve shady 








(c) Security Vote  
 Rivers State has a monthly security vote of N1.5 billion and second highest vote in the 
country. Like other states in the region, it is the epic centre of violence where cult groups 
unleashed terror on the defenceless people of the state. In one of such cult war, sixteen 
people were killed (Onoyume, 2016). This has prompted people to call for the scrapping 
of security vote.   
 
An interviewee 007, Youth leader said that: 
I don’t see the usefulness of the security vote when the life and property 
of the people are endangered by hoodlums masquerading as freedom 
fighters. I think it should be abolished or scrapped as our leaders use it 
to siphon our hard earned resources (Interview at Diobu, Port-
Harcourt, Rivers State, 01/6/16).  
 
The findings from the foregoing analysis of the four states showed that corruption has 
been the order of the day among the elite in the region and this has been perpetrated 
through contract inflation, misappropriation of funds and security vote. These findings are 
consistent with the existing literature (Osaghae, 2015; Babalola, 2014; Adebayo, 2013; 
Suleiman, 2013; Jegede, Joshua, & Olorunyomi, 2012; Saka, 2011a; Ibaba & Ikelegbe, 
2010; Otite, 2009; Enweremadu, 2008; Alao, 2007; Human Right Watch, 2007).  
 
Osaghae (2015) argued that the few ruling elite from the Niger Delta have monopolised 






By the same token, Babalola (2014) contended that corruption has become a sub-culture 
among the regional elite and that it played a major role in the underdevelopment of the 
region. 
 
In a like manner, Enweremadu (2008), in his insightful analysis of the Bayelsa state budget 
under Alamieyeseigha showed how budgets were systematically structured to enrich the 
ruling elite by concentrating enormous expenditures on over-priced white elephant 
projects with no relevance to the masses but which offered opportunities for kick-backs 
paid by contractors whereas important social services presenting less opportunities for 
corrupt enrichment were underfunded. 
 
Alao (2007), maintained that the ruling elite across the continent were insincere in the 
management of the resources of their respective countries and buttressed his argument 
with the arrest of one of the governors of the Niger Delta region for an offence related to 
money laundering. In his words:  
…the elite in power across Africa have been dishonest in their 
management of the natural resources of their countries. While for a 
long-time evidence of fiscal recklessness and corrupt management of 
natural resources by the political elite have been largely anecdotal, there 
is now evidence to back up many of these claims. The arrest of an 
elected governor of one of Nigeria’s oil-producing states, Diepreye 
Alamieyeseigha, for money laundering shows that there are clear cases 
of fraud and mismanagement of revenues coming from natural 







From the above analysis, the ruling elite of the region have mismanaged the resources that 
accrued to the region and are not ready to commit political suicide by taking sides of the 
people in terms of improving their living standard by pursuing populist programmes that 
would benefit the majority of the people of the region. These examples of state executives 
or ruling elite of the region spending the resources of their various states on frivolous 
things as well as embezzling them have far greater consequences on the development of 
the state and violence that have raged the region.  
 
The pervasive corruption among the elite and coupled with the decline in revenue from 
the federation account led to rising debt profile of these states.  The states borrow to 
finance their budgets and also meet their financial obligations to their people in terms of 
payment of worker salaries and emolument and other financial commitments.  According 
to Debt Management Office, the external debt of Akwa-Ibom state was $59.7million as of 
June 30, 2013, while the domestic debt stood at N81.7 million as at 2014 making her the 
most indebted state in the country  
 
Between 2008 and 2013 the debt profile of Rivers state rose from $32.3 million to $42.6 
million in 2013 (Niger Delta citizens and budget platform, 2015).  As at December 2015, 
the domestic debt of the Akwa Ibom state stood at N147.575 billion, Bayelsa, Delta and 
Rivers amounted to N103.374 billion, N320.605 billion and N134.966 billion respectively 








Table 6. 5  
Domestic Debt of Nine States in the Niger Delta 2015  
              
S/No State  Debt Stock  
1 Akwa Ibom 147,575,744,158.56 
2 Bayelsa 103,374,234,640.82 
3 Delta 320,605,705,560.12 
4 Rivers 134,966,595,276.76 
5 Abia 33,530,526,404.80 
6 Edo 46,289,079,475.93 
7 Imo 71,743,513,593.94 
8 Cross Rivers 115,522,252,057.76 
9 Ondo 26,647,789,528.58 
               
              Source: Adapted from Debt Management Office of Nigeria’s Total Domestic 
 
    Debt of the 36 states and the FCT, as at December 31, 2015. 
 
 
As table 6.5 above indicates most indebted states are states with the lion's share from the 
federation account and these states are Akwa-Ibom, Delta, Rivers and Bayelsa States. 
Bayelsa State is the least indebted of the four states that are the focus of our study while 







The findings are validated by a resource curse theory which states that resource endowed 
countries are associated with social vices such as corruption and mismanagement of 
resources. The experiences of the Niger Delta validated this assertion. The elite theory 
complements the resource curse theory by explaining further the role of the elites in the 
governance of this resource and as the experience of the Niger Delta has indicated, they 
have used these resources on projects that are of no benefit to the generality of the people. 
The resultant violence which has ravaged the region due to the failure of governance 





The chapter examines the role of the elite in relations to how they have managed the 
resources accrued to the nation and the region.  The chapter begins by examining historical 
account of corruption in the country and the regime by regime account of the personalities 
involved. This has shown that the mismanagement of the resources of the nation which 
take the form of corruption is not restricted to the national elites alone at the centre but 
similar thing was experienced among the elite in the Niger Delta region. The elite, 
therefore, mismanage resources from statutory allocation, 13% derivation and allocation 
to the intervention agencies saddled with the development of the region through NDDC, 







The findings are supported by the combined theories employed to analyse the conflict.  
For instance, resource curse links resource abundant to poor governance, while the 
governance issue around the resources are better explained by the elite theory and the 
frustration-aggression theory highlights the motive behind the violence.  The chapter 
submits that the failure of the elite to judiciously use these resources for the development 
of the region has contributed in no small measures to the violence still rocking the region.  
 
The positive contribution of the elites of an effort to address the Niger Delta conflict is 
the subject of the next chapter and it discusses a quite number of issues among which are 
the strategy of managing the conflict, the various ad hoc committee established to tackle 











As the earlier chapters, have shown the oil -rich Niger Delta has been the epic centre of 
violence in Nigeria and the Technical Committee on Niger Delta recommends the amnesty 
programme with a view to restore peace to the embattled region. This chapter examines 
the role the elites have played in the execution of PAP.  Besides, the chapter examines the 
amnesty programme and discusses, among others, the strategies and various committees 
set up to tackle the Niger Delta conflict, the strengths and weaknesses of the amnesty 
programme is also examined. The chapter addresses the research question number four 







7.2. Strategy of Managing the Niger Delta Conflict 
 
This section of the study analyses the strategies used in addressing the conflict. The 
conflict management strategies adopted by successive governments in Nigeria are 
force or military and institutional. This involves the use of the military apparatus of 
the state to suppress militant activities in the region. The latter is agencies established 
to address the development needs of the region.  
 
7.2.1 The Military Option  
 
Some scholars have argued that the effectiveness or otherwise of managing conflict 
depends on the perception of the causes of the conflict (Okoh, 2005). The various 
stakeholders in the Niger Delta conflict have their own perceptions of the causes and 
this influenced the strategies adopted in addressing the problem.  For example, the oil 
bearing communities see the conflict from the point view of the injustices that centred 
on skewed resource distribution, political marginalisation, and environmental 
degradation and strategies used were, among others, blockade and disruption of oil 
company’s operation, sabotage and political action (Okoh, 2005). These strategies 
adopted by the oil-bearing communities have resulted in conflict and insecurity in the 
region. 
 
The oil companies another stakeholder in the region viewed the conflict from poverty 
perspective and the strategy adopted is poverty alleviation through provision of basic 






 The Nigerian state sees the Niger Delta imbroglio as an act of disobedience in the 
country. The agitators were seen as criminals who hindered the free flow of oil, caused 
huge loss of the revenue to the government due to their bunkering and destruction of 
oil infrastructure and also threaten national security.  For instance, at the height of 
militant activities in 2006, the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta 
(MEND) attacked Shell pipelines near Warri and also killed fourteen soldiers and two 
civilians (Ukiwo, 2007). In 2016, another group called the Niger Delta Avengers 
destroyed numerous oil infrastructure and gas pipelines (Adeosun et.al, 2016). And 
this informed the military strategy adopted by the government to curb the menace of 
the group.  
 
The primary responsibility of government is to protect the lives and property of the 
law-abiding citizens as no responsible government will allow criminals to take laws 
into their hands, all in the name of demanding for their rights. Hence, the military 
strategy involves the deployment of members of the armed forces or the Joint Task 
Force (a combined troops of the air force, army, navy and mobile police) assigned to 
curb the menace of the militants through the patrol of the waterways and also guarding 
the critical oil facilities against attack by the militants.   
 
The military (JTF) was deployed to Odioma on the order of Chief DSP 
Alamieyeseigha, Bayelsa State governor, to arrest hoodlums who killed eleven people 
in the Obioku community on February 3, 2005 (Saka, 2011b).  Following the order 
issued by the then Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, President Olusegun 





its fight against insurgency in the region. Other places where the military were 
deployed included Agge in Bayelsa State in 2008. 
 
In 2009, the Military Joint Task Force launched a major military offensive against 
militants in Oporoza traditional headquarters of Gbaramatu kingdom. The number of 
personnel deployed for this mission was 3,000 and conventional warfare tactics which 
included land, sea and aerial bombardment were used. This bombardment was 
extended to other communities in the kingdom such as Okerenkoko, Kurutie, 
Kokodiagbene and Kunukuma (Saka, 2011b; Dode, 2012). At the end of the attack, no 
single militant was arrested. 
 
Following incessant attacks on oil pipelines by the Niger Delta Avengers, the president 
directed that they should be crushed. Consequently, the military invaded the 
Gbaramatu Kingdom on May 28, 2016 in search of Government Ekpemupolo (Naija 
News Beat, 2016). Like the previous invasion, the militants were nowhere to be seen. 
It was the innocent peoples’ that were on the receiving end. As the saying goes, when 
two elephants fight, it is the grass that suffered.  
 
7.2.1.1 Implications of the Use of Military Force 
 
This segment of the study analyses the implication of the use of military force as a 
strategy to address the Niger Delta conflict. The implications are among others, 
escalation of the crisis, loss of lives and property, and militarisation of the region 






7.2.1.1.1 Escalation of Violence 
 
The use of military force has worsen the violence in the region. As the federal 
government increased its military presence and intensified its effort in the search for 
the militants who were destroying the national assets, the militants responded with 
continued attacks on installations thereby aggravating the already tensed situation or 
atmosphere (Ajodo- Adebanjoko, 2017). 
 
7.2.1.1.2 Loss of life and Property 
 
There were cases of maiming, raping and killing and setting ablaze houses of some 
community members in the region by the military (Okoh, 2005; Oluwaniyi, 2011; 
Aghalino, 2012). For instance, when the military invaded Odioma in 2005, scores of 
people lost their lives , many people were declared missing and 78 houses were 
destroyed (Saka, 2011b).  The military invasions of Gbaramatu Kingdom in Warri 
South Local Government Area of Delta State in 2009 and 2016 led to the destruction 
of lives and property including the palace of the paramount ruler of the kingdom. In 
addition, over twenty thousands of people were trapped in the forest. The 2016 siege 
on the kingdom also resulted in the displacement of people and a complete shutdown 
of socio-economic life of the people (Amaize & Brisibe, 2016).  
 
7.2.1.1.3 Militarisation of the Region 
 
The use of military force has led to the militarisation of the region. Militants are more 
determined and courageous to take members of the JTF headlong. This has also 





such as advocacy, writing of petitions to violence means through the bombing of oil 
installations, kidnapping and engaging the military in a low intensity war.  
As the analysis has shown, the use of force only aggravated the crisis. It was the failure 
of the military option in addressing the conflict that necessitated the late Nigeria leader 
Umaru Musa Yar’adua to dialogue with the militants, which led to the proclamation 
of amnesty by the president for the militants. 
 
7.2.2 The Institutional or Developmental Agency 
 
The second strategy employed in addressing Niger Delta conflict is the institutional or 
development agencies. This strategy involves institutions established by successive 
administrations in the country to address the developmental needs of the region and 
such institutions include such as Niger Development Board, Oil Mineral Producing 
Areas Development Commission (OMPADEC), the Niger Delta Development 
Commission (NDDC) and the Ministry of Niger Delta Affairs (MNDA).  
 
But these various institutions have failed due to underfunding and corruption 
perpetrated by officials that headed these institutions (Uyigue & Agho, 2007; Ikelegbe, 
2010;   Oviasuyi  & Uwadiae 2010; Paki, 2011; Okumagba & Okereka, 2012; Jack-
Akhigbe & Okouwa 2013;  Osah & Alao, 2014).  It is important to note that these 
various intervention agencies established by the central government to administer the 
funds disbursed to develop the region were headed by the elite of the region and this 
has affirmed the allegation by the federal government that the regional elite cannot be 







However, the elite of the Niger Delta extraction contended that the federal government 
always handpicked people they knew would dance to their tune or serve their interest. 
They claimed government discredited the elite from the region to create the impression 
that the oil producing communities are at war with themselves (Alao, 2007). 
 
An extensive discussion of these developments or intervention agencies has been 
documented in the literature, which we need not labour over here. However, the 
consensus among scholars is that the commissions and other extra- ministerial 
agencies have failed to address the core problems of the region (Odeyemi, 2015).  
 
7.3 An Overview of Ad hoc Committees Reports on the Niger Delta Conflict 
 
Prior to the Technical Committee on Niger Delta, there were various ad hoc 
committees established in the past to study the Niger Delta conflict.  This section of 
the study examines these ad hoc committees and their recommendations. 
 
7.3.1 Sir Henry Willinks Commission 
 
Sir Henry Willink’s Commission of 1957 examined the grievances of minority 
nationalities in the country for separate region. The Commission undertook the tour of 
the country and held public hearings over a period of six months. Willink’s 
Commission recommendation in respect of the Niger Delta was that a board should be 
established to take care of the development needs of the region due to its peculiar 
nature (cited in TCND, 2008; Elaigwu, 2005). The peculiar nature implies the difficult 
terrain of the area. An extensive discussion of the Commission has been done in 





7.3.2 The Belgore Committee 1992 
 
Following the riot against fuel shortage in Nigeria in 1992, the Babangida’s 
government set-up a Judicial of Commission of Inquiry. The eight member 
commission was headed by Justice Alfa Belgore, then Justice of the Supreme Court 
and was given a month to submit its report.   
 
The terms of reference of the commission were to identify the root causes of incessant 
communal discontent and violence in the oil-bearing communities and suggest ways 
of improving existing measures taken by government to address the conflict. 
 
The Committee received memoranda from various oil-bearing communities and after 
due consideration of them, it recommended among others, a thirty year development 
plan for the development of the oil producing communities; the dualisation of the East-
West road and the construction of  the East-West rail line to link Calabar and Lagos ( 
TCND, 2008).    
 
The report of the Committee was not implemented by the Babangida’s administration 
and this was due to non-commitment of the administration to Niger Delta and also the 
prevailing political quagmire at the time which led to the stepping aside of the self-









7.3.3 The Don Etiebet Committee 1994 
 
The late General Sani Abacha on assumption of office as military ruler of Nigeria in 
1993, was concerned about the increasing apprehensions in oil producing communities 
and urged by Ogoni uprising set up an Inter-Ministerial Fact-Finding team led by Chief 
Don Etiebet, then Minister of Petroleum with Chiefs Alex Ibru (then Minister of 
Internal Affairs) Melford Okilo (Minister of Commerce and Tourism). Others were 
Group Managing Director (GMD), Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC), 
Group Executive Director (GED) National Petroleum Investment Management 
Services (NAPIMS), Director of Petroleum Resources, Chairman Oil Mineral 
Producing Areas Development Commission (OMPADEC) and Chief Executive 
officers of oil companies operating in the country.  
 
The Committee was to ascertain the causes of oil producing communities grievances, 
assess the level of development on the ground and suggests to government how to 
tackle the problems. The Committee toured the area and received oral presentation and 
one hundred and thirty-six memoranda. 
 
Based on the findings on the tour of the oil producing areas, the committee 
recommended among others, the implementation of the Belgore report involving the 
Niger Delta; provision of social amenities such as basic health, education and 
generator for generation of electricity pending when they would be connected to the 
national grid; a master plan for the development of oil producing areas; comprehensive 
study of coastal areas to address problem of erosions; the decentralisation of 
OMPADEC operational structure; the setting-up of petroleum products distribution  





processing zones to stimulate industrial development and growth in oil-bearing 
communities (TCND, 2008). 
 
Like previous committee reports before it, this report was not implemented by the 
government.  Rather than doused tension in the region, the government executed Ken 
Saro-Wiwa and eight others Ogoni on November 10, 1995 (Adebanjoko & Ojua, 2013; 
Esikot & Akpan, 2013; Okoli, 2013). 
 
7.3.4 The Popoola Committee 1998 
 
The persistent agitations by the people of Niger Delta in the period after the death of 
Abacha made his successor, General Abdulsalam Abubakar to set up a 22-member 
Presidential Committee on Development Options for the Niger Delta.  The Committee 
was headed by Major-General Oladayo Popoola, then General Officer Commanding 
82 Division of the Nigerian Army. Other members of the committee were the military 
administrators of oil producing states, Ministers of Water Resources, Power and Steel, 
Education, Health, Works and Housing, Secretary to Government of the Federation, 
Principal Staff officer to Commander-in-Chief, representatives of the Oil Mineral 
Areas Development Commission, Project Implementation and Monitoring Committee 
(PIMCO) and many others (TCND, 2008). 
 
The Committee was to study the proposal of the Programme Implementation and 
Monitoring Committee (PIMCO) on the sustainable development of the region; verify 
projects undertaken by OMPADEC; ascertain projects executed in relation to water 





as to what government should do before and after Abubakar’s administration (TCND, 
2008). The Committee for 22 days toured the oil producing states, received and 
reviewed memoranda from the public and interest groups such as state governments, 
opinion leaders, non-governmental organisations and oil companies. In addition, the 
Committee engaged in direct interaction with all of them.  
 
Based on its findings, the committee suggested among others,  the setting up of an 
expert committee to review and consolidate existing law relating to oil with a view to 
ensure prompt payment of compensation to oil producing communities by the 
transnational oil companies; prosecution of human rights violation arising from oil 
exploration activities and ensuring that corporate practice is in accordance with 
international standard; establishment of petrol station in five oil-bearing states in 
collaboration with the private sector; federal government should increase its presence 
in Bayelsa State; oil companies should recruit their junior and unskilled staff  in the 
communities where they operated. 
 
7.3.5 The Ogomudia Committee 2001 
 
The incessant destruction of critical oil installations and kidnapping in the Niger Delta 
necessitated Chief Olusegun Obasanjo to set up a 23-member Special Security 
Committee on Oil Producing Areas in November, 2001. This Committee was led by 








The committee terms of reference were among others, to identify blunders in the 
protection of oil infrastructure and recommend appropriate measures to safeguard oil 
facilities; investigates cases of oil bunkering and pipelines vandalisation; assess the 
role of oil companies and other stakeholders in relation to community relations and 
control of criminal acts in the oil-bearing states; to find out major interests and 
beneficiaries supporting the breakdown of normal operations in the oil industry; 
recommend long term measures and strategies in safeguarding Nigeria’s oil resources. 
 
The Committee, based on the first hand information received in  the tour of the nine 
oil producing states and on-the-spot assessment of the oil-bearing communities 
suggested among others, the maintenance of oil pipelines to meet international 
standard; securing operational facilities of the Nigerian Armed Forces and the Police 
in  the oil producing states; the Niger Delta Development Commission should be well 
funded and the people should participate fully in the development of projects design 
for them; the use of military force in resolving conflict in the region should be 
discouraged; the 13% derivation should be increased to a minimum of 50%; the federal 
government should commence immediately the East-West road; the establishment of 
marine transportation system for all the oil producing communities; all tiers of 
government should take up the responsibility of developing oil-bearing communities 
instead of the oil companies; the Federal Government  should review laws that were 
the sources of disagreement with the region and such laws included the Petroleum Act 








7.3.6 The Presidential Panel on National Security 2003 
 
The Presidential Panel on National Security was borne out of the security challenges 
confronting the country in the post-military era. The Committee was headed by 
foremost Nigerian historian, Professor Tekena Tamuno. 
 
The Committee findings in relations to Niger Delta showed that insecurity in the region 
expressed in the forms of petition and agitation date back to the First Republic; the 
restiveness expressed by the oil-bearing communities was due to the destruction of 
their means of living; the oil companies on their own volition and under pressure of 
the oil producing areas were forced to pay compensation for polluting the environment 
and also provided social services. 
 
Based on its findings, the committee suggested among others, that oil companies 
maintained environmental standard comparable to what was obtainable in their 
countries; implementation of national youth policy in order to address socio-economic 
problems that made the youth to take-up arms against the state; polluters of the 
environment should be sanctioned heavily. 
 
7.3.7 The Niger Delta Master Plan 
 
The Niger Delta Master Plan which was published in 2004 was the brainchild of the 
Niger Delta Development Commission and it examined the challenges of development 
and what plans and strategies to be devised.  
It was 15 year development plan and provisions were made for monitoring, evaluation 





of key stakeholders (TCND, 2008). The Plan categorised the solution to Niger Delta 
conflict into five broad areas namely: economic growth, natural environment, physical 
infrastructure, human and community needs and human and institutional resources.   
 
In the areas of economic development and growth, the Plan recommended the 
establishment of Rural Development Service in each state to develop local 
infrastructure which would accelerate the diversification of local economy; each state 
should execute a provable project in a community or cluster of community. 
 
In the area of environment, the Plan suggested among others, a review of current law 
and policies in order to strengthening them and also reduced the effect of oil 
exploration on the environment to the minimum; credible and transparent 
compensation system should be put in place for those affected by oil exploration. 
 
The Plan’s human and institutional development recommendations centred on 
provision of better education to all at all levels and establishment of entrepreneurial 
skill that are ingredient for productive employment. Others recommendations were re-
professionalisation of the civil service through training, re-training, seminar and 
workshop; fighting corruption in high places through collaboration with civil society 









7.3.8 The Presidential Council on the Social and Economic Development of the     
 Coastal States 
 
In 2006, Chief Olusegun Obasanjo in his quest to find lasting solution to  the worsening 
security challenges in the Niger Delta set up the Presidential Council on the Social and 
Economic Development of the Coastal States of the Niger Delta. 
 
The Council made up of representatives from Bayelsa, Rivers and Delta, was charged 
to engage and seek for solutions to the problems in the Region. In March 2007, the 
Council met and reviewed the security challenges in the region and based on that made 
some of these recommendations: 
 
The granting of amnesty to the militants to encourage them to come out of the creeks; 
provision of employment to the youth in order to channel their energies to productive 
use; economic empowerment for the people of the region so as to enable them 
participate fully in oil and gas sector; use of the militants for surveillance on oil 
infrastructure in the creeks; provision of good governance by  all tiers of government; 
government funding of youth initiatives for peace in the region (TCND, 2008). 
 
7.3.9 The Peace and Conflict Resolution Committee  
 
The Peace and Conflict Resolution Committee established by the late Nigeria leader, 
Umaru Musa Yar’Adua. The 20-member committee was chaired by Senator David 







It liaised with relevant stakeholders on issues aimed at addressing violence in the 
region.  Meanwhile, the federal government directed affected states in the region to 
replicate this committee in their states. The committee toured various parts of the 
region to solicit for support and co-operation of the militants to accomplish its goals. 
Members of the committee could reach the militants because of outstanding 
relationship existing among some members of the committee and the militants.  
 
The committee got stoppage of hostilities pledge by militants in Ondo and a 
commitment to join the peace process by Boyloaf fighters (ICG, 2007; Ukiwo & 
Ebiede, 2012).However, the committee comprised people of questionable character 
and did not reflect the government’s stated goal of addressing the conflict (ICG, 2007). 
According to Udens Eradiri (cited in ICG, 2007) erstwhile scribe of Ijaw Youth 
Congress (IYC) noted that:  
They are people who have been involved at various levels in 
sponsoring hostage-taking, yet these persons are those used as 
members of the committee. The committee is evil. It is a committee 
that will continue to perpetuate hostage-taking in the region, and 
encourage violence in order to have something [to do] (cited in ICG, 
2007, p.4). 
 
Following the federal government directive that Peace and Conflict Resolution 
Committee be set-up in the states affected by the militancy, the Sylva’s administration 
in Bayelsa state established an 8-Man Peace and Conflict Resolution Committee under 
the Chairmanship of Chief Jephtah Foingha, a businessman and politician from 
Nembe. He owned an oil services company and his reputed of ensuring that those 





Nembe axis. This was because of his influence among the local militia members in the 
area.   
 
The secretary of the committee was Mr Selepere Ben, the younger brother to a warlord, 
Victor Ebikabowei (AKA Boyloaf).  Also, Chief Timipia Tiwei Orunimighe a member 
of the committee had ties with the militants in the state. With such calibre of members, 
it was easy for the committee to gain access to the warlords in the state. Subsequently, 
the committee ended hostilities in the state and a formal agreement signed between the 
Bayelsa State Government and the militants on December 7, 2007 (ICG, 2007). 
 
7.3.10 The Technical Committee on Niger Delta 
 
In 2008, the Federal Government proposed a peace submit on the Niger Delta that 
would include all the major stakeholders in the region. A renowned Nigeria scholar, 
administrator and former Foreign Affairs Minister, Professor Ibrahim Gambari, was 
appointed to head the proposed summit. But the people of the region rejected his 
appointment because of his antecedence.  As Nigeria’s permanent representative to 
United Nations under the maximum military ruler, General Sani Abacha, he defended 
the execution of Ken Saro-Wiwa and his kinsmen and called the Movement for the 
Survival of Ogoni People a gang of criminals (Obi & Rustad, 2011). 
 
The state governors and prominent elite from the region in their discussion with the 
then vice-president, Dr Goodluck Jonathan, expressed the view that what the region 
needed was not another talk shop but suggestions that would lead to actions geared 






 Obi and Rustad (2011) noted that the Niger Delta leaders suggested to the central 
government through the vice-president the following:  
…. to set up a body to appraise the various reports that have been 
submitted on the way forward for the Niger Delta, from the Willink 
Commission of 1958 to 2007 and let the body come out with the 
things to be done or not done from the different reports and then, the 
larger house like the stakeholders gathered, could be called to fine-
tune and ratify the final report (cited in Obi & Rustad, 2011, p. 201). 
 
Based on the suggestions of the elite from the Niger Delta, the federal government set 
up the Technical Committee.  The Technical Committee on Niger Delta also known 
as Mitee Committee comprised 45 members, all Niger Deltans under the chairmanship 
of Ledum Mitee and inaugurated in September 2008.    
Its terms of reference were: 
To collate, review and distil the various reports, suggestions and 
recommendations on the Niger Delta from the Willink Commission 
Report (1958) to the present, and give a summary of the 
recommendations necessary for government action. To appraise the 
summary recommendations and present a detailed short, medium 
and long term suggestion to the challenges in the Niger Delta. To 
make and present to Government any other recommendations that 
will help the Federal Government achieve sustainable development, 
peace, human and environmental security in the Niger Delta region 
(TCND, 2008, p.VI). 
 
The committee suggested an increased in the derivation from the current 13% to 25% 
and a gradual increase to 50%; setting up of Disarmament, Demobilisation and 
Reintegration Commission, which would be responsible for addressing issues of arms 
and militancy; granting of amnesty to the militants; completion and dualisation of East-
West road; ensuring good governance at all levels of government; ending of gas flaring 





7.4 The Presidential Amnesty Programme 
 
The Presidential Amnesty Programme as the name implies is an amnesty programme 
granted by the late Umaru Yar’adua’s administration to militants who took up arms 
against the state.  Prior to the Presidential Amnesty Programme (PAP), states like 
Rivers, Bayelsa and Delta had one time, or the other launched disarmament 
programme.  
 
In Delta State between 1997 and 1999, the state government initiated a disarmament 
programme aimed at promoting peace among the several ethnic nationalities such as 
Ijaw, Uhrobo and Itsekiri in the state were at one another throats. Short term loan, cash, 
employment, training and jobs were provided in exchange for the militants weapons 
(Aghedo, 2013).  
 
In 2004, during Dr Peter Odili’s administration, cult groups in the state engaged in 
supremacy battle and this led to the breakdown of law and order. Between October 
2003 and October 2004, the Asari’s Niger Delta Peoples’ Volunteer Force and Tom’s 
Niger Delta Vigilante engaged in a fierce battle for the control of oil bunkering routes.  
The battles were fought in Buguma, Bukuma, Tombia, and Ogbakiri because of their 
proximity to profitable bunkering routes in Cawthorne Channel. The duel was later 
extended to the Port–Harcourt and this dislocated the socio-economic activities of the 








To restore peace to the state, the government launched a disarmament programme. The 
programme was arm-buy-back, and the government paid N250,000 each for over 3,000 
old guns surrendered by the militants, even though the price of a new gun was 
N125,000 (Aghedo, 2013).   However, the programme was not well executed, and this 
led to an upsurge in violence in the state.  The militants were promised 4,000 jobs, yet 
training was provided for 2,000 youths most of them could not get jobs after complete 
their training (Aghedo, 2013). 
 
In 2007, Bayelsa also signed a peace accord with the main militants in the state by 
granting them amnesty. It was a cash for peace arrangement and the militants were 
paid off rather than being attacked by the Joint Task Force. The accord hit the rock 
because it was politicised (Nwajiaku-Dahou, 2012; Aghedo, 2013).  
 
The Federal Government Presidential Amnesty Programme was based on the 
Technical Committee on Niger Delta Report and the Presidential Panel on Amnesty 
and Disarmament of Militants in the Niger Delta. The latter panel was inaugurated on 
May 5, 2009 to implement the recommendation of the Technical Committee on Niger 
Delta regarding the granting of amnesty to the militants.  
 
After the Panel recommendations were approved by both the Federal Executive 
Council and the National Council of States, the then president Umaru Yar’Adua 
proclaimed a 60-day amnesty on 24 June, 2009 under which all the militants in the 





The aims of the amnesty were “to contribute to security stabilisation in the Niger Delta 
through the DDR programme as a precondition for medium and long term 
development.” (cited in Ushie, 2013, p.31).  
 
7.4.1 Components and Phases of the Presidential Amnesty Programme 
 
This segment of the study examines the components and phases of PAP. The 
Presidential Amnesty Programme has three components and they are disarmament, 
demobilisation and rehabilitation.  The table 6.1 below shows the components of the 
PAP stated above and the various activities involved in each component and its 
duration. 
 
Table 7. 1  
Structure of Presidential Amnesty Programme for Niger Delta       
Disarmament Demobilisation/Rehabilitation Reintegration 
Duration: 6 August to 
4 October, 2009 
Duration: 6 to 12 months Duration: up to 5 years 
Collections of arms, 
ammunition, 
explosives 
Ex-militants report to camp Knowledge and skill 
acquisition 
Biometrics Verification and documentation Financial 
empowerment 
  Placement 
programmes 
  Microcredits 
 Transformational training Education 








 Counselling Conflict resolution 
framework/ 
mechanism 
 Career guidance Monitoring and 
evaluation 
 Wellness assessment  Exit from amnesty 
 Reintegration classification  
 Educational and Vocational 
placement  
 
 Graduation and demobilisation  
Key enablers   
Disarmament camps Transformational training centres Partnering government 
agencies, NGOs and 
private organisations. 
 Rehabilitation camps Oil and gas institutions 
(OGIs) 
  Tracking and support 
system 
   
   
 
Source: Adapted from Ushie (2013) p.2  
 
 
As the table 7.1 above shows the period earmarked for disarmament was between 6 
August and 4 October 2009 and at the end of the period 20,192 militants accepted the 
offer of amnesty (table 7.2 shows details breakdown of the numbers).   
 
And by the end of this closure, 15,000 ex-militants surrendered 2,700 sophisticated 
weapons and 287,445 ammunitions to the Presidential Amnesty Committee (Obi & 





The figure 7.1 shows the arms and ammunition collected during the disarmament 
process of the Presidential Amnesty Programme.  
 
 
Figure 7. 1 Arms and other Accessories surrendered by Militants during the First Phase 
       of Disarmament Programme 
 
Source:       Daily Post 
The pressure mounted by those excluded in the first phase of the amnesty led to the 
second phase in which 6,166 were registered and a third phase in which 3,642 were 
registered bringing the number to 30,000 (Ekumaoko, 2013; Ibaba & Arugu, 2013; 
Tubodenyefa & Felix, 2013).   
 
The weapons recovered during these two phases were 18,971 locally made arms, 482 
automatic weapons; 20, 132 rounds of ammunition and 295 magazines from Bayelsa 
and Delta States,   Rivers, 82,406 ammunitions were recovered, Akwa Ibom, 959, 





The need to accommodate more militants in the programme between 2009 and 2012 
was borne out of agitation by those excluded initially from the programme. For 
instance, Latu group from Bakassi Peninsula and late John Togo had to be included.  
 
Secondly, the genuineness of the programme intention attracted those who originally 
adopted the Sidon look approach (afraid of the sincerity of the government) saw it as 
a ploy by the government to get them arrested when they came out of the Creeks and 
so when this did not occur, they demanded to be included in the programme (kelegbe 
& Umukoro, 2016). 
 
Table 7. 2  
Participants in the First Phase Presidential Amnesty Programme for Militants in the 
Niger Delta 
State Male Female Registered 
Akwa Ibom  155 8 163 
Bayelsa 6,900 61 6,961 
Cross-River 159 1 160 
Delta 3,361 - 3,361 
Edo 450 - 450 
Imo 297 3 300 
Ondo 1,198 2 1,200 
Rivers 6,958 39 6,997 
NDDC 571 19 600 
Total 20,049 133 20,192 
 







A close examination of the table 7.2 above shows that majority of the participants in 
the programme were from the core Niger Delta states of Bayelsa, Delta and Rivers and 
this further confirmed that these states were the epic centres of violence and majority 
of the armed groups were found in these states. Rivers led the pack with a total number 
of 6, 997 participants closely followed by Bayelsa with 6, 961 participants and Delta 
with 3, 361. The others states had low numbers because they were not predominantly 
dominated by the Ijaws who spearheaded the struggle and also they had few armed 
groups (Ushie, 2013). 
 
Interestingly, the female folks were not left out in the militancy and in the female 
category, Bayelsa led the pack and closely followed by Rivers State. The low number 
of women compared to the men could be attributed to cultural and physical factors.  
Most Nigerian communities frowned at women involvement in violence activities and 
any woman that venture into such enterprise is considered a deviant and ostracise by 
the community (Tubodenyefa & Felix, 2013). 
 
The physical nature of the activities. The militants undergone series of trainings and 
deprived themselves a lot of comfort in the Creeks which most women folk would not 
be ready to do and because of these factors and some others, the number of women 
that engaged in militancy were few compared to their male counterpart (Tubodenyefa 
& Felix, 2013).  
 
The second component of the PAP is the demobilisation and as table 7.1 above shows, 
quite a number of activities are involve and this includes among others, the report of 





guidance, educational and vocational placement.  The figure 7.2 below captures the 
process wherein, the ex-militants were being verified and documented.  This took place 
in Calabar, Cross Rivers State and militants oriented way from violence and combat 
to those of civilian lives (Ikelegbe, 2010; Ajibloa, 2015).  The militants received N1, 
500-naira daily as feeding allowance and N20, 000 naira per month for the three 
months’ period of demobilisation. (Ikelegbe, 2010).  
 
 
 Figure 7. 2 Niger Delta Ex-Militants being screened during the Demobilisation    
         Process  
 
 Source:     Information Nigeria 
 
The last component is the reintegration/reinsertion programme and as table 7.1 shows, 
it has a number of activities among which are knowledge and skill acquisition, 
financial empowerment, conflict resolution, education, placement programme.  
While at the camp, the ex-agitators received 20,000 monthly stipends and were later 
increased to N65, 000 naira.  The programme involved re-engaging the ex-militants 
into the social and economic aspects of society. Government agencies and stakeholders 





orgnisations and donor agencies were to partner in seeing to the accomplishment of 
the goals of this stage of the programme.  
 
Placement into the different skills acquisition/vocational programmes was based on 
interests and performance in placement evaluations for automobile technology, 
aviation, underwater welding, boat building, ocean diving, pipeline welding, crane 
operations, fish farming and entrepreneurship as well as formal education.   
Other available vocations were air traffic control, commercial pilot, grounds handling 
operations and aircraft engineering (cited in Osah & Amakihe, 2014). 
 
The reintegration stage is still ongoing as the ex-militants are undergoing training in 
and outside the country to acquire skills to be meaningful members of the society.  
Some have completed their studies and training and reintegrated into the society while 
others are still undergoing training and studies. For example, 89 ex-militants were 
employed in Nigeria, South Africa, United Arab Emirate and Ghana after completing 
their training in welding, fabrication and other maritime activities (Ushie, 2013).  It is 
important at this point to examine the strengths and weaknesses of this programme and 




7.4.2 The Strengths of Presidential Amnesty Programme (PAP) 
 
This sub-section analyses the advantages or gains of amnesty and some of these 
include educational opportunity, peace and rise in oil production and revenue of 






7.4.2.1 Educational Opportunity  
 
 It offers educational opportunities for those who in their dreams would not have 
thought they would have such opportunities. According to Ayorinde (cited in 
Udegbunam, 2013) many of the ex-militants have received (and some are still 
receiving) both formal and informal education in different parts of the globe.  
 
For example, many of these ex-agitators were sent to Israel, Malaysia, India, Belarus, 
South Africa, United Kingdom, Russia, United States of America, the Philippines, 
Trinidad and Tobago and Romania to acquire different skills.  Supporting the 
viewpoint that amnesty offers educational opportunities for the people of the Niger 
Delta. Majority of those interviewed believed amnesty programme has offered a 
platform for some youths of the region to be educated. An interviewee (002) Youth 
noted that: 
The AP to a great extent has offered educational opportunity for 
some of the youth from the region. This is because many who have 
not dreamt in their lives they would travel abroad to study, the AP 
offers such category of people the platform (Interview in Yenagoa, 
Bayelsa State 3/5/16). 
 
Also, commenting on the educational opportunity, the programme offers its 
participants, Asari Dokubo, leader of the Niger Delta People’s Volunteer Force in an 
interview granted the Nation Newspaper, maintained that: 
It has brought a lot of positive result. A lot of people have been 
trained; there has never been any adult scholarship programme in 
Nigeria that has trained as many people as the amnesty programme 
has done. A lot of people have been given a new lease of life; a lot 






However, the so-called training and skill acquisition and career advice fall short of 
expectations for higher status internationally recognised qualifications that will equip 
ex-agitators for employment opportunity in oil and gas industry (Nwajiaku-Dahou, 
2012).  
 
Similarly, Ogbogbo (2015) argues that the continuing efforts at training the ex-
militants in different callings within and outside Nigeria shore have not addressed the 
current joblessness in the Nigerian labour market. According to him, most of the 
trainee from the vocational training institutions have not secured jobs. The 
consequence is that there are army of unemployed youth and a good of them are ex-
agitators. 
 
7.4.2.2 Relative Peace 
 
The Presidential Amnesty Programme has brought peace to the region. The security 
situation in the region has stabilised and this created an avenue for the repaired of 
critical oil infrastructure. Kingsley Kuku highlighted the gains of PAP to include 
reducing the menace of kidnapping, entrenchment of peace in the creeks and lessening 
destruction of oil installations (Osah & Amakihe, 2014).  
 
In response to the question on the gains of PAP, majority of the participant held the 
view that with the introduction of the programme, peace had returned to the region.  
An interviewee 002 a Youth noted that: “The amnesty programme to a great extent has 





groups stopped their attacks on oil infrastructures” (Interview in Yenagoa, Bayelsa 
State, 03/5/16).  
 Similarly, Interviewee 003, Youth said that: 
One thing, we cannot take away from the amnesty programme is that 
its introduction brought a fragile peace to the region. Why I said 
fragile peace is because there are still skirmishes here and there. 
Prior to its introduction, people could not sleep with their eyes 
closed, but today, we can at least sleep with our eyes closed. Kudos 
to the initiators and we are also grateful to the late President Umar 
Musa Yar’adua for listening to the stakeholders and approved the 
programme (Interview in Yenagoa, Bayelsa State, 03/5/16). 
 
The two statements above highlighted the positive contribution of the PAP and the 
commitment showed by the then Yar’adua administration towards addressing the 
Niger Delta conflict.  This finding supports the positions of Osah and Amakhime 
(2014) that the peace provided by amnesty has created an opportunity for local and 
foreign contractors who previously relocated and abandoned their sites to return and 
fast-track the development of the region.  
 
However, Ikelegbe and Umukoro (2016) maintained that the peace has little effects on 
the condition and agitations of the people and submitted that the current peace and 
security in the region is not only delicate but also vulnerable to violent conflict 
recurrence. This position also resonates in Amaechi and Evah statements.  
 
Rotimi Amaechi the immediate past governor of Rivers and the current Minister of 
Transportation noted that:  
The amnesty has turned into a curse of sorts. Before the Amnesty 
was declared, Rivers state enjoyed relative peace as people carried 





some of the boys who were chased out to come back and cause havoc 
in the city (Isine, 2010, p.42). 
 
Similarly, Joseph Evah argued that the relative peace attributed to amnesty programme 
was a graveyard peace. In his words:   
What you have in the Niger Delta has been a peace of the graveyard. 
Although it is true that Amnesty Programme is in place, but how 
many people will programme benefit out of millions of our people 
whose daily lives and means of livelihood are being destroyed by oil 
exploration? (Evah, 2016). 
 
7.4.2.3 Increase in Oil production and Revenue 
 
The ending of attacks on oil infrastructural facilities had led to increase in oil 
production and revenues of the government. The amnesty programme has led to 
improvement in oil production from its previous 800,000 bpd during the periods of 
hostility to between 2.6 million bpd to 2.8 million bpd (Tubodenyefa & Felix, 2013).   
 
A common view among the majority of the participants in this study was that the 
programme has led to increase in both oil production and revenue.  An interviewee 
002 a Youth noted that: “the amnesty programme has brought about increased in oil 
production which resulted in more revenue for the state.”(Interview in Yenagoa, 
Bayelsa State, 03/5/16). 
 
Likewise, another interviewee 001, Traditional ruler disclosed that: 
We must pat our leaders from this zone on the back for the 
instrumental role they played in bringing into fruition this 
programme as well as ensuring its implementation. Having said 
that, the programme has increased oil production and revenue for 





the multi-national oil companies were able to deploy their resources 
both human and capital in order to ensure continuous flow of oil 
(Interview at Taylor Creek, Yenagoa, Bayelsa State, 1/05/16). 
 
Corroborating the statements above, Deziani Maduekwe, then Minister of Petroleum 
Resources noted that Nigeria’s oil production has increased because of the introduction 
of PAP. In her words: 
The nation’s actual crude oil (plus condensate) production rose to an 
average 2.39 million bpd, consistently maintained above the 
budgeted level of 2.30 million bpd… Similarly, gas sales rose by 
more than 70% to an average 4 million standard cubic feet per day 
in 2011 and for the first time, industry supplied more domestic gas 
than consumed by the power and industry sector. The Nigerian 
Liquefied Natural Gas Company (NLNG) had one of its most 
successful years with production peaking at 21.2 million metric tons 
in 2011 alone. Thanks, in no small part, to the amnesty programme 
which allowed unhindered access to oil and gas operations and 
activities (Opara, 2012). 
 
However, oil bunkering has increased. According to Nigerian National Oil 
Corporation (NNPC), the country is losing around 180,000 bpd of crude oil to oil 
bunkering organisation totalling US$7 billion per year (Amafuele & Opara, 2012).   
Also, the Vice-President, Professor Yemi Osinbajo put the figure at 400,000 bpd 
amounting to N4.8 billion daily (Adedeji, 2015).   
 
7.4.3 The Weaknesses of the Presidential Amnesty Programme 
 
The section discusses the weaknesses of the Presidential Amnesty Programme and this 
includes non-inclusiveness of the programme, nepotism, corruption and 
mismanagement, failure to address the root causes of the Niger Delta conflict and poor 






7.4.3.1 Non-inclusive nature of the Presidential Amnesty Programme and 
 Rewarding of Militancy  
 
The Presidential Amnesty Programme excluded ex-agitators, who fought for the so-
called liberation of the people of the Niger Delta that resulted in the late president of 
Nigeria, Umaru Yar’Adua proclaiming the amnesty. These groups or set of people 
believed they were stakeholders and may enjoy what other militants enjoyed by the 
virtue of having taken part in the struggle. The second and third phases of the 
disarmament took place to accommodate those militants excluded in the first phase 
and yet there are those who are still demanding to be included in the programme. 
 
Besides, the programme failed to include the vulnerable in the society like the aged, 
children and widows that lost their breadwinner or those who lost properties in the 
course of the insurgency (Akinwale, 2010; Nwajiaku-Dahou, 2010).  Moreover, the 
communities were the battle took place during the insurgency and those youths that 
did not take up arms against the state were not part of the programme. 
 
 Most of the interviewees in this study argued that the PAP was non-inclusive. They 
averred that it was meant for those who took up arms against the state while the law-











 As one interviewee 007 a Youth leader said: 
The amnesty programme only targeted those people that are 
carrying guns. Those that are kidnapping oil workers and asking for 
ransoms. They left out those other youths that did not join. People 
like us that said we would not join them. We want to struggle to go 
to school. The amnesty programme did not include us. There is the 
fear that a time will come when those that did not take up arms 
against the state will say if the language the government 
understands is taking up arms (violence) then lets me take up arms. 
The government encourages gangsterism, hooliganism by the way 
they are going about the amnesty because they are only giving 
money to those that took up arms while those that did not were 
neglected (Interview at Diobu, Port-Harcourt, Rivers State 1/6/16). 
 
Also, an interviewee 012, an Academic speaking in an angry tone maintained that: 
If the amnesty had worked why do we have the Niger Delta 
Avengers? In a region with say 15 million and less than a quarter is 
under amnesty. What do you expect to happen? It can’t work.  The 
amnesty programme is tailored toward what….to learn a trade or 
acquire skill. Well, it is okay for those who are learning the trade.  
What is the community benefiting from the programme? It is not all 
communities that are involved in kidnapping business. Sizeable 
numbers are not and yet the problems of oil still lingered in the 
various communities. Some people were just handpicked, and the 
government addressed their needs and excluded the communities. 
There are diverse groups with different cultures and traditions in the 
region, but the amnesty did not capture this. Rather, the programme 
has alienated the boys from their various communities. The “boys” 
no longer live or visit their communities, they live in big cities such 
as Port-Harcourt, Abuja, Lagos, (Interview at Mariri, in Taruni 











Supporting the above position, Ledum Mitee, in his insightful assessment of the 
amnesty programme argued that by appeasing the militants, a wrong signal is being 
sent that violence pay.  In his words: 
If you try to continually appease the militant segment of a 
community, what you create is a situation where people would 
believe that the only way they attract attention is to unleash violence. 
This has a profound snowballing effect because other people could 
begin to think this is the way to go. It also creates a situation, like I 
have always said that when you continue to take this appeasement 
measure, you create a situation where people now believe that they 
can get money without work… we have created that mind-set in 
some people that only those who can unleash some violence get 
attention (Mittee, 2016). 
 
Similarly, AVM Lucky Ochuko Ararile, in his appraisal of the amnesty programme 
argued that it centred on militants only and warned of the dire consequences if other 
youths are not integrated into the programme. In his words: 
One thing is to train them, and the other one is to get them employed 
and we are talking of about 30,000 persons. When I finished the 
disarmament, we actually had 20,000 plus but subsequently more 
were added and it is now about 30,000. We are only talking about 
people who carried arms or purportedly carried arms. We have a lot 
of youths, millions of them that are yet be attended to in the Niger 
Delta. And if they are not taken care of, they might think the only 
way government responds to issues is when they get violent. That 
message need to be avoided, the youth problem must be addressed 












Also, Asari Dokubo, in a press interview noted that: 
It is wrong for you to single out a group of people. These people 
when they started their agitation, according to them, they were not 
agitating for themselves, they were agitating on behalf of the people, 
so you cannot go on and give them a bribe (amnesty programme) in 
total exclusion of the people they claimed they were fighting for. 
And it is also wrong for them to accept the amnesty because they 
were delegates and they considered themselves as delegates, so they 
were on an errand for the people. So, morally it is wrong. So, the 
programme should be given to the oil-bearing communities and not 
the whole of Niger Delta. It should be given to communities who 
have suffered deprivation, degradation of their environment and 
social dislocation (Dokubo, 2013). 
 
These findings are consistent with the extant literature (Akinwale, 2010; Albert, 2015; 
Ibaba, & Arugu, 2013; Nwozor, 2010; Oluwaniyi, 2010).  According to Ibaba and 
Arugu (2013), the programme focused on the individuals (30,000 ex-agitators) needs 
who surrendered their arms and registered for the programme; ignoring the oil-bearing 
communities and non-armed individuals who shared the same belief with the ex-
agitators who are being pampered.   
 
Moreover, the non-comprehensive nature of the programme may lead to violence 
unless the needs of the majority or larger population are addressed (UKNDWG, 2012). 
Similarly, Davidheiser and Nyiayaana (2011) argued that it focuses on demobilised 
ex-agitators and overlooked the needs and feelings of other inhabitants of the region 
who also suffered from the region’s numerous problems. The wholesale avoiding of 
disillusioned non-combatants has not only left intact the injustices fuelling the 









The Presidential Amnesty Programme (PAP) favours a particular nationalities and 
militia groups in the Niger Delta. The selection of the participants for the programme 
is based on nepotism. For instance, those responsible for implementing the programme 
in collaboration with some warlords recruited their relations for the programme instead 
of those the programme is meant to serve. This use of one’s position to benefit one’s 
family, relation or friend is what Joseph (1987) referred to it as prebendalism.  
 
The handlers of the programme in collaboration with the ex-warlords have been 
accused of corruption and mismanagement of fund. For instance, the militants alleged 
embezzlement of funds by the handlers of the programme through non-maintenance 
of camps, poor feeding and living condition and non-payment of allowances (Ikelegbe, 
2010).  About 80-90% of the budget spent on consultants and leaving only 20 for 
rehabilitation of the ex-militants. The number of ex-agitators inflated by their 
respective leaders to cornered the resources in collaboration with the officials of the 
programme (Oluwaniyi, 2011; Aghedo, 2012).Most of the interviewees in the study 
believed that the procedure in the recruitment of the ex-militants was not transparent. 
The exercise was based on family ties, friends and close association.  
 
Commenting on this, an Interviewee 006 a retired Military Officer, had this to say: 
 You see in this country, when the government introduces or set-up 
something, the usual thing people do, those that manage the 
programme is to go to their villages, call their relations and friend 
and fixed them up. What happened with the amnesty programme is 
that the warlords were given slots to fill for their foot soldiers, but 





that’s why those excluded were demanding for their inclusion in the 
programme (Interview at Warri, Delta State, 31/05/16). 
 
By the same token, an Interviewee 010, Academic noted that: “the PAP was opened to 
the warlords and these warlords used their discretion to recruit people as ex-militants 
who eventually become the beneficiary of PAP.” (Interview at Tombia, Port-Harcourt, 
Rivers State, 2/6/16). 
 
The quoted statements above underscored the prevalence of “man knows man” (a 
network of families or close relations ties) that characterised the recruitment of the 
militants into the PAP programme.  
 
7.4.3.3 Failure to Address the Root Causes of the Niger Delta Conflict 
 
Another criticism of the PAP is that it failed to address the core causes of the conflict 
that gave birth to the insurgency. Critics were of the view that issues such as 
environmental degradation, unfairness in the distribution of proceeds from the sale of 
crude oil otherwise known as revenue allocation, poverty, unemployment are 
neglected by the amnesty programme.   
 
 
Commenting on this in a high tone, which depicted that the Interviewee (002) was 
angry, he stated that: 
The issues that gave rise to the militancy are environmental 
degradation; neglect by the central government to the plight of the 
people of the region; revenue allocation ‘…’ These issues gave rise 
to militancy in the region and they were not addressed by the 





militants on the back by rewarding their leaders with juicy contract 
of pipelines surveillance and the foot-soldiers with skill acquisition, 
training abroad, and monthly allowance which a fresh graduate in 
the country is not earning. The programme became another conduit 
pipe for our elite to milk the nation (Interview at Yenagoa, Bayelsa 
State, 3/5/16). 
 
Also, expressing his view on the issue that the root causes of the conflict has not been 
addressed by the amnesty programme, Ledum Mitee had this to say: 
I have always said militancy was not the problem of the Niger Delta; 
it was an extreme expression of frustration not dealing with the 
problems of the area. The problems of the area have been there, they 
have to do with the environment, corporate social responsibility, 
dislocated means of livelihood… None of those issues have been 
dealt with. All we got to hear is that some people got annoyed and 
carried guns and so let’s buy them off. The main issues still remain 
and you have now even attracted a situation where people now say 
the only way they can feel appreciated is to carry guns so as to be 
like the other people who have been settled (Mittee, 2016). 
 
The above views expressed by majority of those interviewed are consistence with  
extant literature Adeyemo & Olu-Adeyemi, 2010; Ekumaoko, 2013;  Davidheiser & 
Nyiayaana, 2011;  Ikelegbe, 2010;  Joab-Peterside, 2011; Odemene, 2011;  Omokhoa,   
2015; Ushie, 2013). They all agreed that the amnesty did not address the root causes 
of the conflict in the Niger Delta.   Ekumaoko (2013, p. 8) argues that “there is no 
ecological rehabilitation in the amnesty programme and poverty; lack of infrastructure 
and unemployment is on the rise”.  
 
In the same vein, Ushie (2013) argues that unemployment, poverty and inequality have 
remained endemic despite introduction of the programme.  According to Nigerian 
Bureau of Statistics (2012), 68% of the Niger Deltans are poor and unemployment in 





majority perception that the amnesty programme has not addressed the Niger Delta 
Question, Ajibola (2015) in a study, stated that 79% of respondents believed the 
programme had addressed the demands of the people of the region.   
 
7.4.3.4 Poor Implementation of the Presidential Amnesty Programme  
 
The amnesty programme implementation is faulty. It is not in accordance with the 
Technical Committee on the Niger Delta recommendation. According to Oluwaniyi 
(2011), there was no proper planning for the DDR programme. Rather, the central 
government whose representatives were the elite from the Niger Delta together with 
those from the region collaborated with ex-militant’s commanders who were only 
interested in their personal aggrandisement failed to carry along those militants on the 
ground.  
 
 Albert (2015) contends that amnesty was imposed by the federal government without 
negotiation or mediation that could have articulated the other key components of the 
peace process which the amnesty deal was supporting.  According to him Nigerian 
brand of amnesty did not conform to the best global practice of empowering victims, 
most especially the Niger Delta oil- bearing communities devastated by oil exploration 
and destroyed by military operation that took place in the region.  
 
In other part of the globe, the victims were to come out to define what the perpetrators 
did against them, the amnesty did not capture this.  Supporting this position, some 
participants expressed the view its implementation was faulty. It falls short of what the 
Technical Committee on Niger Delta (2008) recommended.  An interviewee 011, 





If you look at the Technical Committee on Niger Delta (TCND) 
report, there were certain recommendations concerning how the 
region should be developed. They talk about cleaning of the 
environment, development of system that could reduce 
unemployment; that could ensure that people from this region has 
accessed to world class education and also a strong 
recommendation around derivation. The amnesty programme was 
one recommendation of the many recommendations and even at that, 
its implementation was not how it was recommended. If you look at 
the TCND recommendations, it recommended that amnesty should 
be granted to the militia groups and should be followed by DDR 
process. But essentially what AP turns out to be was a way of 
sharing money from the federal government to a group of people. 
So, essentially creating an elitist class that were not just politicians 
as if we didn’t have enough problem with the politicians; within a 
different class of elite that also have access to the nation’s resources 
without necessarily looking at the main issues in the region 
(Interview at Tombia, Port- Harcourt, Rivers State (3/6/16) 
 
Supporting the view that the implementation of the programme was faulty. Eke (2014), 
noted the scantiness nature of the disarmament process, shabbiness of the 
demobilisation process and the ineffectualness of the reintegration process.  He argued 
further that the resurgence of violence was an indication of its poor implementation. 
 
Albert (2015) contends that the Niger Delta amnesty programme was a departure from 
the standard practice by not seeking to pursue long but short-term agenda.  According 
to him the federal government was only interested in settling the militant to have 
uninterrupted supply of oil in the Niger Delta.  
 Similarly, Okolie-Osemene and Udeke (2013) argue that the conception and 
execution of the Niger Delta DDR did not reflect the important components which 






There is no doubt that the amnesty programme has not addressed the core problems of 
the Niger Delta. The environmental degradation, unemployment, underdevelopment, 
poverty and so are still ravaging the region. As most of the people interviewed in this 
study and the secondary interviews have shown the relative peace in the region has 
been attributed to the president being the son of the soil and it would not do the region 
any good to make the country ungovernable for him.  In other words, ethnicity plays 
significant role in the relative peace enjoyed in the region until the resurgence in the 
militants activity in the region in 2016.  
 
Concurring with the above position, Annkio Briggs in an interview noted that “We 
step down on the agitation because Jonathan was the president” (Briggs, 2012). These 
views found support in Nnorom, and Odigbo (2015), they maintain that the relative 
peace enjoyed in the region was because of the sympathy and sentiment for President 
Goodluck Jonathan, who is a Deltan and not the amnesty program. They warned of 
grave consequences if the nation neglect to address the environmental degradation, 
and underdevelopment problems confronting the region.   
 
The findings on the elites contribution to the efforts at addressing the Niger Delta 
conflict through the role they played in the Presidential Amnesty Programme and the 
contributions of this programme to human capacity development of the region found 
support in the inevitability and desirability of the elites in a society in the elite theory. 
The theory points to the need for vesting power in the hands of few people who are 
cohesive and knowledgeable about the need of society and how to go about addressing 






The Niger Delta experience has shown that the elites were instrumental in the efforts 
to address the conflict by suggesting to the Federal Government of Nigeria under the 
leadership of late Umaru Musa Yar’adua to offer amnesty to the militants, which the 
government accepted and the elites of the Niger Delta extraction who recommended 
the programme made up the nucleus of those who implemented the programme. The 






The chapter examines the Presidential Amnesty Programme (P.A.P) recommended by 
elite of the Niger Delta extraction as a way of addressing or resolving the conflict that 
has engulfed the region. The chapter argues that the elite have played pivotal roles in 
the conception and implementation of the programme.  
 
The chapter has identified P.A.P weaknesses to include corruption, failure to tackle 
the core causes of the Niger Delta conflict and poor implementation while the strengths 
are among others relative peace in the region, educational opportunity for the ex-
militants and others, increased in oil production and revenue. It has been established 
that the relative peace in the region during Jonathan was due to his ethnicity and not 








The next chapter examines, among others, the summary of the chapter by the chapter 
of the study, the theoretical and methodological contributions and suggestion for 








CHAPTER EIGHT  




The chapter highlights among others, the objectives of the study; chapter by chapter 
summary of the study; summary of the findings; study contributions;  limitations of 
study; suggestion for further study and conclusion. The study essentially focuses on 
the role the elite of Niger Delta extraction played in the Niger Delta conflict. The 
objectives of this study as highlighted in chapter one of this thesis  are  to examine the 
elite’s contribution to  political -cum electoral violence in the Niger Delta; to analyse 
why the(elite) are demanding  the control of natural resources of the region and 
political reorganisation of Nigeria;  to examine the level of  transparency and 
accountability of the elites in the  management of the resources of the region and to 
examine the effectiveness or otherwise of the amnesty programme advocated for 
addressing  the conflict in the region.   
 
8.2 Overview, Summary and Contribution 
 
Chapter one provides a general over view of the entire study and contains the core 
questions and objectives of the study as highlighted above.  The study is situated within 
interpretivism world view and employs qualitative method and semi-structure 
interview as its means of data gathering. Data management is done manually and 





Chapter two examines the review of both conceptual and related studies on Niger Delta 
conflict and from the review of the extant literature five themes emerged and they are:  
governance failure, impacts of oil on the environment, poor corporate social 
responsibility, strategies for addressing the conflict and defective federal structure and 
fiscal allocation. The combined theories (elite, resource curse and frustration-
aggression) and theoretical model developed to analyse the conflict are critically 
analysed and their utilities to the analysis of the Niger Delta are painstakingly 
examined. 
 
Chapter three focuses on the evolution of Nigerian state and how the nature of its 
formation and character have impacted on the Niger Delta conflict. The Nigerian state 
formation is categorised into three phases pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial.  The 
chapter also examines the evolution and agitation of Niger Delta conflict and traced 
its evolution to colonial era and this resistance which started during colonial period 
has continued to this day.  The Adaka Boro’s secession bid of 1966 and the Ken Saro-
Wiwa and his Ogoni struggle for self-determination whose death marked a turning 
point in the Niger Delta struggle from non-violence to violence have been critically 
analysed.   The chapter submits that the current violence in the region which has come 
into existence in the early life of this present administration could be attributed to 
number of policies or decisions taken by the administration among which are: the fight 








In chapter Four, the role of the elite as regard violence in the Niger Delta is 
investigated.  The emergence and composition of elite in Nigeria and Niger Delta are 
dissected and analysed.  As the study has shown, the Nigerian elites are 
conglomeration of different segments of elite such as the military, economic, 
bureaucratic, traditional and political elites.  Specifically, the chapter discusses the role 
of elite in the political-cum electoral violence in the Niger Delta and argues that the 
battles for who control the oil wealth of the region makes the political contest in the 
region to be prone to violence. The elite have supported violence in the region through 
financing, procurement of weapon and its distribution to the armed groups, hate 
speeches, among others. The impacts of their roles can be seen in the proliferation of 
SALW and armed groups in the region who engage in supremacy battle to continue to 
enjoy the patronage of their clients, loss of lives and property and polarisation of the 
region. 
 
Chapter Five has centred on the analysis of resource control and political restructuring. 
It begins with the discussion of meaning of resource control and from the analysis, 
three types of resource control have been identified, absolute, and principal and 
increased revenue allocation. The rationale for resource control are among others, 
environmental degradation, lack of social amenities, inequity in the distribution of 
proceeds from the oil wealth, lack of participation in oil and gas sector.  
 
Consequently, the agitation has led to improvement in MNOC corporate social 
responsibility, more attention is now given to the region through the various 





Nevertheless, the demands have been a publicity stunt by the elite aimed at gaining 
support from the people of region and to cover up for their lack of initiatives and 
policies that could transform the region from her present state of underdevelopment to 
one of the most developed part of Nigeria.   
 
The issue of political restructuring of the polity has been examined and a recurrent 
decimal in the discussion is the defective nature of the current federal set-up which has 
necessitated the call for its reform.  The argument is that the current federal system is 
centralized and the need for non-centralised federal structure where the component 
units will be financially autonomous to discharge their constitutional responsibilities. 
 
Chapter Six, examines the role of the elite in relations to how they have managed the 
resources accrued to the nation and the region.  The chapter analyses the historical 
account of corruption in the country and the regime by regime account of the 
personalities involved. The study indicates that the mismanagement, money 
laundering and embezzlement of resources which are all forms of corruption 
characterised the state of affair in Niger Delta region. However, it is important to note 
that political corruption is not peculiar to Niger Delta alone, it is a nationwide affair.  
But what differentiates the elite of Niger Delta extraction from others is the degree and 
level to which they have taken graft to.  
 
The various personalities’ involved in the mismanagement of the resources in the 
region are meticulously examined. The elite, therefore, have mismanaged resources 
from statutory allocation, 13% derivation and allocation to the intervention agencies 





They have used these resources on projects that are of no benefit to the majority of the 
people. Projects that would improve the living standard of the people such as those on 
health and education are accorded less priority and evidence to this could  been seen 
in the budgetary allocation to these social sectors. The resultant is violence which has 
ravaged the region due to the failure of governance in the region.  
 
Chapter Seven discusses the Presidential Amnesty Programme (P.A.P) recommended 
by elite of the Niger Delta extraction as a way of tackling the conflict in the Niger 
Delta. From the analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of the PAP examined, it can 
be argued that the weaknesses far outweigh the strengths and coupled with the fact that 
lately, there has been a resurgence in militancy activities in the region, one could 
concludes that the programme is a failure.  It has been established that the relative 
peace witnessed in the region during the Jonathan administration is because he is a 
Niger Deltan and the resurgence in the militancy in the region under a Fulani from the 
northern part of the country point to the fact ethnicity cannot be ruled out in the 
conflict. 
 
8.2.1 Summary of Main Findings 
 











8.2.1.1 Political –Cum Electoral Violence 
 
The findings from the study showed that the elite comprising of political, economic 
and traditional elite supported violence through recruiting, sponsorship, inciting hate 
speeches and procurement of arms for the boys to prosecute their heinous activities. 
For instance, they sponsored and armed numerous armed groups such as Niger Delta 
Vigilantes Service, Niger Delta People Volunteer Force, and Niger Delta Avengers.  
 
8.2.1.2 Resource Control and Political Restructuring 
 
The findings indicated that people of the region were dissatisfied with the state of 
environment of the region, the oil revenue allocation formula and the use of their 
resources to develop other parts of the country. Thus, the elite demanded an upward 
review of the present revenue allocation formula and the reconfiguration of the present 
political arrangement as well as devolution of more powers to the region.  However, 
there was no unanimous agreement on who should control and manage the resources.  
The majority were against the Federal Government continuing control of the resources 
and wanted more powers devolved to the states.  Others preferred the oil-bearing 
communities to control and manage their resources.   
 
Moreover, contrary to the claim by the elite that the allocation of resources have been 
skewed in favour of other regions, this study found that resources distribution to the 
region has been on the rise compared to other regions in the federation but these 






8.2.1.3 Transparency and Accountability in the Management of Resources 
 
On the issue of transparency and accountability in the management of the oil wealth 
that accrued to the state. The findings revealed that there were divergence views. There 
was no consensus among those that took part in this study. Some believed that the elite 
of Niger Delta extraction could not be wholly blamed for the corruption and 
mismanagement of funds of the region. They argued that they had accomplice from 
other ethnic groups especially the major ones.  Those that subscribed to this view 
believed that when funds were allocated to federal government agencies and extra-
ministerial units responsible for development of the region, the contracts awarded by 
these agencies were given to people who were not from the region and the contracts 
were not executed.  
 
 For others, the elite of the region were not transparent and accountable in the 
management of the resources of the region. There were cases of money laundering, 
mismanagement and corruption established against some of the ruling elite in the 
region for which some of them had been convicted while for others, their cases are still 
pending in courts. The findings also showed that through their failure to effectively 
and efficiently manage the resources of the region, they contributed to violence. 
 
8.2.1.4 Elite and Presidential Amnesty Programme 
 
The elite of Niger Delta extraction also played significant role in an effort to address 
the conflict in the region. A classic example is the role they played in the conception 
and execution of the amnesty programme. Furthermore, they persuaded the boys to 
come out of the creeks and embraced the amnesty when the ‘boys’ were suspicious of 





implemented the programme. However, the same elite were reported to have siphoned 
some of the resources meant for the execution of this programme.  
 
 In examining the elite’ role in conflict  mitigation  through the lens of presidential 
amnesty programme, this study found out that the programme had not been able to 
address the fundamental or core issue that gave birth to the militancy. What the 
programme has succeeded in doing was to celebrate violence through the award of 
juicy contract to some of the ex-militant leaders and payment of monthly stipend to 
the foot-soldiers which is above the national minimum wage pay to fresh graduate in 
Nigeria.  
 
8.3 Contribution of Study  
 
It is expected to provide an update and better picture or understanding of the problem 
confronting the region. The conflict in the Niger Delta has always been examined from 
the lens of multi-national oil company and the federal government dominated by the 
majority ethnic groups lording it over the minority ethnic group and ignoring the role 
the elite of Niger Delta extraction played in encouraging and sustaining the conflict in 
the region.  
 
This study was able to show the pivotal role played by the elite in the conflict through 
financing, arming and logistic support they gave to the ‘boys’. Accordingly, this led to 
among others, insecurity, proliferation of arms and armed group and the 
underdevelopment of the region. As no investor will invest in a chaotic environment 





Thus, this study has enriched our understanding of the political economy of conflict in 
the region through a new perspective or explanation it offers to the ongoing conflict in 
the region thereby contributing to the body of literature on the conflict in the region.   
 
Interestingly, the study has brought to fore not only the involvement of the prominent 
elites from the region in illicit oil bunkering but also the use of the resources obtain 
from this  illicit trade to finance electioneering campaign in the region.  
 
8.3.1 Theoretical Contribution 
 
The combination of theories used have enriched our understanding of the conflict and 
these theories are resource curse, elite and frustration-aggression theories. The relevant 
of these theories to the findings of this study are discussed below. 
 
One of postulations of the elite theory is the inevitability of elite in society. The elite 
are the enlightened few in the society whose voices can be heard and who influence or 
make decisions on behalf of the mass of the people. This few minority who because of 
their skill, wealth, and office ruled over the majority, have spearheaded the campaign 
for an upward review of the revenue allocation formula, political restructuring of the 
polity and also steering the ship of the state in their respective states in the region.  
Nevertheless, the various segments of the elite in the Niger Delta were also involved 
in the perpetration of violence in the region through incitement of the people against 







Another relevance of this theory which the finding of this study supported is its 
assumption that all men like power.  This assumption attests to why it is difficult for 
the elites to relinquish power and also accounted for the phenomenon of political 
violence that has characterised the body politic of the region and the country. The elite 
of the Niger Delta used an unorthodox method to get or retain power and this method 
includes election rigging and the assassination of formidable political opponents. 
 
The resource curse which some of its postulations are poor economic performance, 
increased social conflict, among others. The findings of this work validated some of 
these assumptions. For instance, the oil-producing states of the Niger Delta despite the 
huge transfer from the Federation Account have not used the resources to develop the 
region. The region not only is the least developed of the six regions in the country, but 
also one of the most indebted region in the country. Specifically, the lack of 
transparency and accountability of the elites are corroborated by the resource curse 
theory which attributes the reliance of government on oil rents rather than taxation 
from the people for this state of affairs. The states in the region depend on statutory 
grant and 13% derivation allocation from the centre rather than taxation which the 
people could have used to make government transparent and accountable are poorly 
generated.  
 
Resource curse is evident in the poor service delivery or what in local parlance is called 
dividends of democracy.  The mismanagement of resources by the elite contributed to 
bad governance. In other words, resource curse is evident in the way elite of the region 
have resorted to corruption and plundering of the resources meant for the development 





as godfathers for those incumbent power holders and for those aspiring for elective 
office in the nearest future. The profligacy and waste in public expenditure exemplified 
by white elephant projects embarked upon by the states chief executives in the region 
for their own gain is an evidence of the contribution of this theory to the findings of 
this study.   
 
Another assumption of the resource curse theory is that oil is an impediment to 
democratic practice. This assumption found expression in the neo-patrimonial nature 
of the region’s politics in which the political gladiators could use their offices to 
dispense largesse to their cronies and their lack of transparency and accountability to 
those they governed because the resources used to administer the state was from oil 
rent and not taxes from the people and so, they have no reason to account for their 
stewardship.  
 
Also, contrary to the resource curse thesis which states that the abundance of natural 
resources translates into conflict. The study has been able to show that the presence of 
oil alone cannot automatically translates into conflict but the role of the elite who 
decides how the proceeds of this God given resources are disbursed and utilised has to 
be considered.   
 
This has been supported by Mahler (2010) who argued that oil added flame to the 
already existing socio-economic, cultural division and political-institutional factors to 
cause violence in the region. In essence, there are other factors that contributed to the 
violence in the region apart from oil while Dode (2012) findings agreed with key 





underdevelopment of the third world countries due to bad governance and poor 
management of resources. Therefore, it is how the managers managed these resource 
that makes it to be a curse rather than blessing. Thus, the findings enhanced our 
understanding of the theory.  
 
The frustration-aggression theory postulations which provide justification for 
aggressive behaviour also improved our understanding of this study. The theory 
postulates that aggression is a product of frustration and frustration is a product of 
aggression (Dollard, et al, cited in Berkowitz, 1989). The finding of this study 
corroborated the assumption that frustration can lead to aggressive behaviour. The 
failure of the elite to address inequity in the oil wealth distribution, mismanagement 
of resources, poverty, unemployment, environmental degradation, among others, made 
the people to be disenchanted. Consequently, they became frustrated and aggressive 
towards those they perceived to be responsible for their  
 
Lastly, the theoretical framework model (see figure 2.2, p.51) designed by the author 
served as a guiding post that enhanced an understanding of the study. It describes the 
relationship among the various layers of the concentric circles. The items in each ring 
depend on the item in the small ring.  For instance, oil is in the innermost part and 
closely follow by the elites and the control of this oil wealth account for a fierce battle 








Next is resource curse and its relationship to oil is that it leads to poor economic 
performance, hinder democracy and caused conflict among others. The resource curse 
concerns mismanagement of oil proceeds and whenever such issue is examined, it 
cannot be discussed in isolation of the elite.  The next in the ring is the frustration–
aggression and its relationship with oil is that the inhabitants or owners of oil except 
the proceeds derived from this resource to bring about qualitative change in their lives 
and due to mismanagement of these resources by the elite, they become frustrated and 
aggressive and went all out to deal with those they perceive to be responsible for their 
predicament using violence means. 
 
8.3.2 Methodological Contribution 
 
This study adopted qualitative research method, using different sources of data 
gathering method. The use of these various sources of data collection methods such as 
interview, observation, primary documents, secondary interviews and other secondary 
data compliment the weakness in each of the other data collection methods and thereby 
enhance the trustworthiness of the findings. 
 
8.3.3 Practical Contribution  
 
The findings from this study have implication for addressing the Niger Delta conflict. 
As one of the findings has shown that the elite played key role in the fuelling and 
sustaining the conflict through sponsorship and arming of the youth organisation and 
the mismanagement of funds of the region. Therefore, any resolution of the conflict 






In all, this study serves as a guide to  policy makers, academics, Federal Government 
and its extra-agencies such as NDDC, MNDA, DSS, NIA, DIA, states and local 
governments in the region, CSO, local and international NGOs who are interested in 
the development of the region and also  finding lasting solution to the  resolution of 
the Niger Delta debacle.  Put differently, the study should be of interest to 
aforementioned governmental and extra-ministerial agencies especially on issues 
relating to oil politics and violence in the Niger Delta. 
 
8. 4 Recommendations of Study  
 
As the findings of this study have shown oil wealth is central to violence in the Niger 
Delta and is responsible for the fierce battle among the elite for the soul of the region. 
In other words, the struggle for the control of oil wealth is the most underlying factor 
responsible for violence in the region.  Thus, every conflict in the region has oil 
undertone.  This section of the study recommends how the conflict in the region can 
be addressed and all the major stakeholders have a role to play in this regard. 
 
The regional elite who are close to the people must ensure that they utilise the resources 
of the region for the development of the region through embarking on meaningful 
projects that take care of the needs of individuals’ communities. Besides the regional 
elite at various levels of government must ensure that priority is given to education, 
health and other social amenities in order to develop human capacities of the people 






The regional elite should also mandate all tiers of government in the region and those 
wealthy individuals from the region to complement government efforts in establishing 
industries in the region to provide employment for the teeming youth of the region. 
 
Addressing the mismanagement of resources in the region and the country at large 
would require restructuring of the governance system and strengthening of the existing 
institutions in order for them to tackle the menace of corruption. For instance, the 
Economic and Financial Crime Commission and Independent Corrupt Practices 
Commission should be well funded and free of political interference by the executives 
to discharge their duties.   
 
Moreover, the legislature should be alive to its oversight function and assert its 
independence from the executive arm of government.  In most of the states in the 
region, the legislature has become a rubber stamp for the executive and this has 
worsened the governance in the region. The so-called representative organ of the 
people, which could have acted as a check on the excess of the executive has become 
a rubber stamp. 
 
 For the legislature to do its work, it must be independent and free of executive control 
and interference. They should not seek financial gratification or contracts from the 
executive branch of government which may hinder the discharge of their duties. The 
State Houses of Assembly owed it a duty as the most representative organ to adhere to 
the letter and spirit of the Constitution by ensuring that the executive branch of 
government is transparent and accountable in the management of the resources of the 





The membership of this House should comprise people of impeccable moral character 
and knowledge who can discharge their duties without fear and favour.  
 
There is a need for value reorientation among both the leaders and the people of the 
region. This becomes imperative because of value attached to violence in the region. 
The leadership and followership need to be sensitised on the need that they can achieve 
or accomplish their dreams in life through non-violent means.  Thus, the 
commodification of violence should be discouraged by all and sundry.  The campaign 
on this should be carried out in all print and electronic media as well as in social media 
in all the local languages of the region.  The campaign should also be extended to the 
country at large. People should be told in the plain language they understand that 
violence is harmful to the development of the region as it chases away investors.  
 
The people themselves too have a role to play if they want to put an end to violence 
and attract investment to the region. They must shun violence and advise other youths 
who may want to take to violence. More importantly, they should hold their leaders 
accountable for the resources put in their care. This they can do by voting credible and 
honest leaders who are selfless and have the interest of them at heart in all levels of 
government in the region and by extension those that will represent them at the centre. 
 
Meanwhile, election is one way of holding leaders accountable to people. They should 
not go to sleep even when these leaders have been elected. The people should always 
put them on their toes by demanding from them transparency and accountability for 





In other words, they should not be docile, they should be fully involved in government 
activities by writing petition on any government official who is found wanting in the 
discharge of his duty. Moreover, they should also discharge their duties to the state. 
That is prompt payment of taxes. This is one of the ways by which they can demand 
transparency and accountability from their leaders. 
 
Furthermore, they should also protest any government policies or programme that are 
anti-people. All these should be done within the ambit of law and in a peaceful manner. 
Lastly, they should reject at the poll any leader that failed to deliver on his campaign 
promises.  
 
The multi-national oil companies operating in the region are also culpable for the 
violence in the region. They should stay clear of the politics in the region and fulfil 
their obligations to the oil bearing communities through proper funding, effective and 
efficient corporate social responsibilities to their host communities. They should be 
transparent in their dealings with them and take appropriate actions necessary to douse 
tension in the region when the need arises.   
 
More so, the oil companies should conform to international practices by ensuring that 
the environment is well protected and when oil spill occurs prompt measure should be 








Besides, they should give priority to indigenes of the area when recruiting their 
Nigerian staff. This would make them a stakeholder in the oil companies operating in 
their areas.  It is not the usual pipeline surveillance contract given to the local 
communities but top management positions for those indigenous people that are 
qualified. 
 
The central government also has a role to play in the resolution of the conflict in the 
region. The government should ensure that the multi-national oil companies comply 
with international practices by putting an end to the reckless destruction of the 
environment and gas flaring.  Moreover, the Federal Government should ensure the 
participation of the people of the region in oil and gas sector of the economy by 
allocating oil blocks to the indigenous people of the area.  
 
 In addition, the current federal structure is centralised. Therefore, there is need for the 
central government to devolve some of its legislative and taxing power to the states. 
For instance, the central government should devolve such items as mines and minerals, 
Labour (wages), primary education and taxing powers like mining rents and royalty as 
well as value-added tax (VAT) to the states. 
 
These recommendations if implemented by all the major stakeholders in and out of the 
region will go a long way in addressing the Niger Delta imbroglio. The stakeholders 
owed it a duty to ensure that peace and tranquillity return to the region so that 







8. 5 Challenges and Limitations of the Study 
 
Although this study has some contributions as indicated in the foregoing, it has also a 
number of limitations. Some of the participants declined to participate at the last 
minute and this was augmented by print interviews of some of the dramatic personae 
or major stakeholders in the conflict.  And those that participated were not willing to 
go for another round of the interview session. They also complained of the duration of 
the interview and   this necessitated the change of the proposed phenomenological 
study design and its replacement with case study not as a design per se but as an object 
of study.  
 
Another limitation of this study was the issue of non-response bias.  In other words, 
the accuracy of the interview used as a means of data gathering in this study depended 
on the honesty of the participants. To get around this problem, the researcher used 
existing literature to verify data collected from the participants.  
 
Moreover, the study was restricted to conflict associated with oil and political violence 
in the region and perpetrated by armed groups supported by some elite in the region 
against the Nigerian State.  The study focused on four of the nine states in the region. 
Though other states in the region were mentioned during the research but the focus of 
the study was on the four states (Akwa Ibom, Bayelsa, Delta and Rivers State).   
 
Furthermore, the findings of the study may be limited in their generalisability, but the 
findings of this study may be used as a basis for developing an approach for measuring 
the moderating or mediating effects of regional elites in the relationship between oil 





8.6 Suggestions for Further Research 
 
The issue of oil and conflict in developing nations will continue to attract the attention 
of policy makers and scholars if the elite continued to mismanage the resources of the 
states and also promotes violence through patronage of armed groups.  Further studies 
can be extended to other geo-political zone of the country. For instance, north-east 
geopolitical zone of the country is presently experiencing armed insurrection waged 
by an Islamic fundamentalist group called the Boko Haram. The study should examine 
the role the elite of the region played vis-a vis the one played by the Niger Delta elite 
in order to establish or refine the strategic role elite play in furthering and sustaining 
conflict.  
 
Moreover, a comparative study of the roles of elite in oil and non-oil countries should 
also be conducted to prove or refine the assertion that elite struggle for the control of 
oil wealth accounted for violence in the Niger Delta. 
 
As indicated earlier, this study employs qualitative method to examine the role of elites 
in the Niger Delta conflict. Other studies can carry out quantitative analyses of the 
conflict. For example, investigating the moderating effect of elites on the relationship 




From the foregoing findings, there is no doubt that the elite of Niger Delta extraction 
played significant role in fuelling and sustaining the Niger Delta conflict through the 





However, they were not the only culprits in this venture, the multi-national oil 
companies and the central government were also instrumental to the conflict in the 
region. But it is very important to note that their roles in this conflict far outweigh 
others. They had the opportunity to put the development of the region in the front 
burner but they failed to utilise the opportunity. The immediate past president of 
Nigeria is from the Niger Delta Dr. Goodluck Jonathan spent five years as president 
and instead of focusing on the development of the region, his government through 
political settlement awarded contract to those few militant leaders that were not 
allowing oil to flow in the region thereby missing the golden opportunity to right the 
wrong of the previous administrations headed by the majority ethnic groups.  
 
Moreover, the different segments of the elites ranging from the traditional rulers, 
businessmen and the political elite as well as the ex-warlords who have made fortune 
through their militancy did not invest their money in their immediate state or 
communities or use their resources to solve their communities needs.  Rather, some of 
these elites including the so-called Generals invested their money in Lagos, Abuja and 
others outside the shore of Nigeria.  
 
Furthermore, the state chief executives in the region failed to establish industries that 
will create employment opportunity for the army of unemployed youth in the region. 
The region is well blessed with numerous other resources which they could have 
exploited in junction with the private sector or the states in the region coming together 
to pool their resources and establish a joint palm oil plantation, rubber industries, agro-





But they did not, instead they continued to agitate for more resources when they have 
failed to account for the little they received. In other states of the country that are not 
enjoying the derivation, they are forging ahead. For example, the joint rice venture 
between Lagos and Kebbi States known as Lake Rice has created employment 
opportunity and additional sources of revenues for the two states involved in this 
venture.  This is a clarion call for the elite in the Niger Delta to be innovative and 
committed to improving the lots of their people. They should learn from the 
collaboration of these two states. 
 
In the final analysis, the role of the elite of Niger Delta extraction in the Niger Delta 
conflict can be seen from both positive and negative angles.  From the positive side, 
they contributed immensely to efforts to improve the lots of their people through their 
demands for justice and equity from both the Nigerian state and the multi-national 
companies operating in the region. These demands especially that from the Nigerian 
state resulted in an upward revenue allocation formula and the return of derivation as 
basis for revenue sharing.  Besides, the elite’s effort also led to the emergence of Dr. 
Good luck Jonathan as the first Ijaw ethnic nationality to be the president of Nigeria. 
 
They have also contributed to efforts in addressing the conflict in the region through 
the amnesty programme. The elite from the region ensured that the boys were 
persuaded to come out of the creeks and embrace the amnesty and constituted the team 
that implemented the programme. Presently, the Niger Delta elite through Pan Niger 
Delta Elders Forum (PANDEF) once again are mediating in current conflict in the 






The negative contributions of the elite were: they supported violence in the region 
through sponsoring, arming, inciting and protecting the boys from law enforcement 
agencies and justice.  By and large, if all the major stakeholders in the conflict failed 
to play their roles particularly the elite from the region, failed to play their roles, peace 
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Dear Sir/ Madam, 
I am a doctoral student of the School of International Studies at Universiti Utara 
Malaysia. I am conducting research on the topic “Oil Politics and Violence in the Niger 
Delta of Nigeria: The Role of the Regional Elites”. The objectives of the study are: to 
examine the roles played by the elite in the political violence in the region; analyse the 
reasons for resource control and political restructuring of Nigeria by the elites of the 
Niger Delta; assess the effectiveness of the amnesty programme championed by the 
elite of the Niger Delta and to exam the level of transparency and accountability of the 
elite of Niger Delta in the management of the oil rent of the region. 
You have been chosen as one of the participants for this study. As such, I am writing 
to request that you spare some of your valuable time to give me an audience. If you 
accept participation in this study, the researcher will conduct a face-to-face interview 
with you at a time and place convenient for you. The interview will be audio recorded 
and it will last for an hour.  
Your participation in this research is voluntary and you should feel free to withdraw 
from the study at any stage and for whatever cause. You may also wish not to react to 
any questions that you are not comfy with. 
There are no major risks expected from your participation in this study. Your 
participation may provide you with a sense of self-pride knowing that you could assist 
in getting a permanent resolution to the conflict in the Niger Delta. Please, also note 
that there will be no compensation for taking part in this study. 
 
All data collected during the interview will be treated with extreme confidentiality. 
Your name or anything that identifies you will not be included in the information you 
provide and this information will simply be utilized for the study alone. 
 
The researcher can be reached in Nigeria through this phone number 08068327593. If 
you have any question about the study before or after the interviews, you can reach the 
researcher via email at babsadeosun90@gmail.com. You may also contact my 








Yours Sincerely,  
 






I ---------------------------------------------------hereby confirm that I have read and 
understood fully the contents of this document and the nature of the study and hereby 
consent to participate in the study. I understand that I am at liberty to withdraw from 
the study at any time, should I so desire. 
 
Signature ---------------------------------------- Date……………………………. 
 


























Appendix A : Interview Protocol 
 
Study: Oil Politics and Violence in Niger Delta of Nigeria: The Role of the 
Regional Elites 
 





Position of the interviewee: 
 
Questions: 
1. How do the regional elites contribute politically to the Niger Delta conflict? 
Specific question 
 In your opinion, how do the elites contribute to oil-related and political-cum 
 electoral violence that have ravaged the region? 
2. There have been agitation by the leaders from this region for resource control 
and political restructuring of the polity. Why this call and what is your take on 
this? 
         Specific questions: 
a. What is resource control? 
b. Why are the elites agitating for resource control and political restructuring? 
c. What is your assessment of the role of the elites in the demand for resource 
control and political restructuring? 
3. The major stakeholders in this region through the Technical Committee on 





Delta conflict. What is your assessment of the programme and the role of the 
elites in its formulation and execution? 
 
4. What is your take on the level of transparency and accountability of the Niger 
Delta elites in the management of the resource of the region?  
5. Is there anything else you would like to discuss on regional elites' role in the 
Niger Delta crisis that you did not have an opportunity to speak about?  
Thank you very much for participating in this interview and I like to assure you of the 
























Appendix C: Ogoni Bill of Rights 
 
                                       OGONI BILL OF RIGHTS 
PRESENTED TO THE GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE OF NIGERIA October, 
1990 
WITH 
AN APPEAL TO THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY 
By 
The Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP) December, 1991 
Published by Saros International Publishers, 24 Aggrey Road, PO Box 193, Port Harcourt, 
Nigeria for The Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP) June 1992  
 
WE, the people of Ogoni (Babbe, Gokana, Ken Khana, Nyo Khana and Tai) 
numbering about 500,000 being a separate and distinct ethnic nationality within the 
Federal Republic of Nigeria, wish to draw the attention of the Governments and people 
of Nigeria to the undermentioned facts:  
 
1. That the Ogoni people, before the advent of British colonialism, were not conquered 
or colonized by any other ethnic group in present-day Nigeria.  
2. That British colonization forced us into the administrative division of Opobo from 
1908 to 1947.  
3. That we protested against this forced union until the Ogoni Native Authority was 
created in 1947 and placed under the then Rivers Province.  
4. That in 1951 we were forcibly included in the Eastern Region of Nigeria where we 
suffered utter neglect.  
5. That we protested against this neglect by voting against the party in power in the 
Region in 1957, and against the forced union by testimony before the Willink 
Commission of Inquiry into Minority Fears in 1958.  
6. That this protest led to the inclusion of our nationality in Rivers State in 1967, which 
State consists of several ethnic nationalities with differing cultures, languages and 
aspirations.  
7. That oil was struck and produced in commercial quantities on our land in 1958 at 
K. Dere (Bomu oilfield).  
 
8. That oil has been mined on our land since 1958 to this day from the following 
oilfields: (i) Bomu (ii) Bodo West (iii) Tai (iv) Korokoro (v) Yorla (vi) Lubara Creek 
and (vii) Afam by Shell Petroleum Development Company (Nigeria) Limited.  
9. That in over 30 years of oil mining, the Ogoni nationality have provided the Nigerian 






10. That in return for the above contribution, the Ogoni people have received 
NOTHING.  
11. That today, the Ogoni people have:  
(i) No representation whatsoever in ALL institutions of the Federal Government of 
Nigeria;  
(ii) No pipe-borne water;  
(iii) No electricity;  
(iv) No job opportunities for the citizens in Federal, State, public sector or private 
sector companies;  
(v) No social or economic project of the Federal Government.  
 
12. That the Ogoni languages of Gokana and Khana are underdeveloped and are about 
to disappear, whereas other Nigerian languages are being forced on us.  
13. That the Ethnic policies of successive Federal and State Governments are gradually 
pushing the Ogoni people to slavery and possible extinction.  
14. That the Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria Limited does not 
employ Ogoni people at a meaningful or any level at all, in defiance of the Federal 
government s regulations.  
15. That the search for oil has caused severe land and food shortages in Ogoni one of 
the most densely populated areas of Africa (average: 1,500 per square mile; national 
average: 300 per square mile).  
16. That neglectful environmental pollution laws and substandard inspection 
techniques of the Federal authorities have led to the complete degradation of the Ogoni 
environment, turning our homeland into an ecological disaster.  
17. That the Ogoni people lack education, health and other social facilities.  
18. That it is intolerable that one of the richest areas of Nigeria should wallow in abject 
poverty and destitution.  
19. That successive Federal administrations have trampled on every minority right 
enshrined in the Nigerian Constitution to the detriment of the Ogoni and have by 
administrative structuring and other noxious acts transferred Ogoni wealth exclusively 
to other parts of the Republic.  
20. That the Ogoni people wish to manage their own affairs.  
 
NOW, therefore, while reaffirming our wish to remain a part of the Federal Republic 
of Nigeria, we make demand upon the Republic as follows:  
That the Ogoni people be granted POLITICAL AUTONOMY to participate in the 
affairs of the Republic as a distinct and separate unit by whatever name called, 





(i) Political control of Ogoni affairs by Ogoni people;  
(ii) The right to the control and use of a fair proportion of OGONI economic resources 
for Ogoni development;  
(iii) Adequate and direct representation as of right in all Nigerian national institutions;  
(iv) The use and development of Ogoni languages in all Nigerian territory;  
(v) The full development of Ogoni culture;  
(vi) The right to religious freedom; and  
(vii) The right to protect the OGONI environment and ecology from further 
degradation.  
We make the above demand in the knowledge that it does not deny any other ethnic 
group in the Nigerian Federation of their rights and that it can only conduce to peace, 
justice and fairplay and hence stability and progress in the Nigerian nation.  
 
 
We make the demand in the belief that, as Obafemi Awolowo has written: In a true 
federation, each ethnic group no matter how small, is entitled to the same treatment as 
any other ethnic group, no matter how large.  
We demand these rights as equal members of the Nigerian Federation who contribute 
and have contributed to the growth of the Federation and have a right to expect full 
returns from that Federation.  
 
Adopted by general acclaim of the Ogoni people on the 26th day of August, 1990 at 
Bori, Rivers State and signed by: (see under).  
 
ADDENDUM TO THE OGONI BILL OF RIGHTS  
 
We, the people of Ogoni, being a separate and distinct ethnic nationality within the 
Federal Republic of Nigeria, hereby state as follows:  
 
(a) That on October 2, 1990 we addressed an Ogoni Bill of Rights to the President of 
the Federal Republic of Nigeria, General Ibrahim Babangida and members of the 
Armed Forces Ruling Council;  
(b) That after a one-year wait, the President has been unable to grant us the audience 
which we sought to have with him in order to discuss the legitimate demands contained 
in the Ogoni Bill of Rights;  
(c) That our demands as outlined in the Ogoni Bill of Rights are legitimate, just and 
our inalienable right and in accord with civilized values worldwide;  
(d) That the Government of the Federal Republic has continued, since October 2, 1990, 
to decree measures and implement policies which further marginalize the Ogoni 
people, denying us political autonomy, our rights to our resources, to the development 
of our languages and culture, to adequate representation as of right in all Nigerian 






(e) That we cannot sit idly by while we are, as a people, dehumanized and slowly 
exterminated and driven to extinction even as our rich resources are siphoned off to 
the exclusive comfort and improvement of other Nigerian communities, and the 
shareholders of multi-national oil companies.  
 
NOW, therefore, while re-affirming our wish to remain a part of the Federal Republic 
of Nigeria, we hereby authorize the Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People 
(MOSOP) to make representation, for as long as these injustices continue, to the 
United Nations Commission on Human Rights, the Commonwealth Secretariat, the 
African Commission on Human and Peoples rights, the European Community and all 
international bodies which have a role to play in the preservation of our nationality, as 
follows:  
1. That the Government of the Federal Republic of Nigeria has, in utter disregard and 
contempt for human rights, since independence in 1960 till date, denied us our political 
rights to self-determination, economic rights to our resources, cultural rights to the 
development of our languages and culture, and social rights to education, health and 
adequate housing and to representation as of right in national institutions.  
2. That, in particular, the Federal Republic of Nigeria has refused to pay us oil royalties 
and mining rents amounting to an estimated 20 billion US dollars for petroleum mined 
from our soil for over thirty-three years.  
3. That the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria does not protect any of our 
rights whatsoever as an ethnic minority of 500,000 in a nation of about 100 million 
people and that the voting power and military might of the majority ethnic groups have 
been used remorselessly against us at every point in time.  
4. That multi-national oil companies, namely Shell (Dutch/British) and Chevron 
(American) have severally and jointly devastated our environment and ecology, having 
flared gas in our villages for 33 years and caused oil spillages, blow-outs etc., and have 
dehumanized our people, denying them employment and those benefits which 
industrial organizations in Europe and America routinely contribute to their areas of 
operation.  
5. That the Nigerian elite (bureaucratic, military, industrial and academic) have turned 
a blind eye and a deaf ear to these acts of dehumanization by the ethnic majority and 
have colluded with all the agents of destruction aimed at us.  
6. That we cannot seek restitution in the courts of law in Nigeria as the act of 
expropriation of our rights and resources has been institutionalized in the 1979 and 
1989 Constitutions of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, which Constitutions were acts 
of a Constituent Assembly imposed by a military regime and do not, in any way, 









7. That the Ogoni people abjure violence in their just struggle for their rights within 
the Federal Republic of Nigeria but will, through every lawful means, and for as long 
as is necessary, fight for social justice and equity for themselves and their progeny, 
and in particular demand political autonomy as a distinct and separate unit within the 
Nigerian nation with full right to (i) control Ogoni political affairs; (ii) use at least fifty 
per cent of Ogoni economic resources for Ogoni development; (iii) protect the Ogoni 
environment and ecology from further degradation; and (iv) ensure the full restitution 
of the harm done to the health of our people by the flaring of gas, oil spillages, oil 
blow-outs, etc. by the following oil companies: Shell, Chevron and their Nigerian 
accomplices.  
8. That without the intervention of the international community the Government of the 
Federal Republic of Nigeria and the ethnic majority will continue these noxious 
policies until the Ogoni people are obliterated from the face of the earth.  
 
Adopted by general acclaim of the Ogoni people on the 26th day of August 1991 at 
Bori, Rivers State of Nigeria.  





HRH Mark Tsaro-Igbara, Gbenemene Babbe; HRH F.M.K. Noryaa, Menebua, Ka-





HRH James P. Bagia, Gberesako XI, Gberemene Gokana; Chief E.N. Kobani, JP 




HRH M.H.S. Eguru, Gbenemene Ken-Khane; HRH C.B.S. Nwikina, Emah III, 
Menebua Bom; Mr. M.C. Daanwii; Chief T.N. Nwieke; Mr. Ken Saro-wiwa; Mr. 




HRH W.Z.P. Nzidee, Genemene Baa I of Nyo-Khana; Dr. G.B. Leton, OON, JP; Mr. 
Lekue Lah-Loolo; Mr. L.E. Mwara; Chief E.A. Apenu; Pastor M.P. Maeba. TAI: HRH 
B.A. Mballey, Gbenemene Tai; HRH G.N. Gininwa, Menebua Tua Tua; Chief J.S. 











THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY SHOULD:  
 
1. Prevail on the American Government to stop buying Nigerian oil. It is stolen 
property.  
2. Prevail on Shell and Chevron to stop flaring gas in Ogoni.  
3. Prevail on the Federal Government of Nigeria to honour the rights of the Ogoni 
people to self-determination and AUTONOMY.  
4. Prevail on the Federal Government of Nigeria to pay all royalties and mining rents 
collected on oil mined from Ogoni since 1958.  
5. Prevail on the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund to stop giving loans 
to the Federal Government of Nigeria; all loans which depend for their repayment on 
the exploitation of Ogoni oil resources.  
6. Send urgent medical and other aid to the Ogoni people.  
7. Prevail on the United Nations, the Organisation of African Unity and the 
Commonwealth of Nations to either get the Federal Government of Nigeria to obey 
the rules and mores of these organisations, face sanctions or be expelled from them.  
8. Prevail on European and American Governments to stop giving aid and credit to the 
Federal Government of Nigeria as aid and credit only go to encourage the further 
dehumanization of the Ogoni people.  
9. Prevail on European and American Governments to grant political refugee status to 
all Ogoni people seeking protection from the political persecution and genocide at the 
hands of the Federal Government of Nigeria.  
10. Prevail on Shell and Chevron to pay compensation to the Ogoni People for ruining 
















Appendix D: The kaiama Declaration 
 
THE KAIAMA DECLARATION 
                                                                
                                                                        by  
                                        
IJAW YOUTHS OF THE NIGER DELTA 
 
BEING COMMUNIQUE ISSUED AT THE END OF THE ALL IJAW YOUTHS 
CONFERENCE WHICH HELD IN THE TOWN OF KAIAMA THIS 11TH DAY OF 





We, Ijaw youths drawn from over five hundred communities from over 40 clans that make 
up the Ijaw nation and representing 25 representative organisations met, today, in Kaiama 
to deliberate on the best way to ensure the continuos survival of the indigenous peoples of 
the Ijaw ethnic nationality of the Niger Delta within the Nigerian state.  
 
After exhaustive deliberations, the Conference observed:  
 
a. That it was through British colonisation that the IJAW NATION was forcibly put under 
the Nigerian State  
 
b. That but for the economic interests of the imperialists, the Ijaw ethnic nationality would 
have evolved as a distinct and separate sovereign nation, enjoying undiluted political, 
economic, social, and cultural AUTONOMY.  
 
c. That the division of the Southern Protectorate into East and West in 1939 by the British 
marked the beginning of the balkanisation of a hitherto territorially contiguous and 
culturally homogeneous Ijaw people into political and administrative units, much to our 
disadvantage. This trend is continuing in the balkanisation of the Ijaws into six states-
Ondo, Edo, Delta, Bayelsa, Rivers and Akwa Ibom States, mostly as minorities who suffer 
socio-political, economic, cultural and psychological deprivations.  
 
d. That the quality of life of Ijaw people is deteriorating as a result of utter neglect, 
suppression and marginalisation visited on Ijaws by the alliance of the Nigerian state and 
transnational oil companies.  
 
e. That the political crisis in Nigeria is mainly about the struggle for the control of oil 
mineral resources which account for over 80% of GDP, 95 %of national budget and 90% 
of foreign exchange earnings. From which, 65%, 75% and 70% respectively are derived 
from within the Ijaw nation. Despite these huge contributions, our reward from the 










f. That the unabating damage done to our fragile natural environment and to the health of 
our people is due in the main to uncontrolled exploration and exploitation of crude oil and 
natural gas which has led to numerous oil spillages, uncontrolled gas flaring, the opening 
up of our forests to loggers, indiscriminate canalisation, flooding, land subsidence, coastal 
erosion, earth tremors etc. Oil and gas are exhaustible resources and the complete lack of 
concern for indiscriminate canalisation, flooding, land subsidence, coastal erosion, earth 
tremors etc. Oil and gas are exhaustible resources and the complete lack of concern for 
ecological rehabilitation, in the light of the Oloibiri experience, is a signal of impending 
doom for the peoples of Ijawland.  
 
g. That the degradation of the environment of Ijawland by transnational oil companies and 
the Nigerian State arise mainly because Ijaw people have been robbed of their natural 
rights to ownership and control of their land and resources through the instrumentality of 
undemocratic Nigerian State legislations such as the Land Use Decree of 1978, the 
Petroleum Decrees of 1969 and 1991, the Lands (Title Vesting etc.) Decree No. 52 of 1993 
(Osborne Land Decree), the National Inland Waterways Authority Decree No. 13 of 1997 
etc.  
 
h. That the principle of Derivation in Revenue Allocation has been consciously and 
systematically obliterated by successive regimes of the Nigerian state. We note the drastic 
reduction of the Derivation Principle from 100% (1953), 50% (1960), 45% (1970), 20% 
(1975) 2% (1982), 1.5% (1984) to 3% (1992 to date), and a rumoured 13% in Abacha's 
1995 undemocratic and unimplemented Constitution.  
 
i. That the violence in Ijawland and other parts of the Niger Delta area, sometimes 
manifesting in intra and inter-ethnic conflicts are sponsored by the State and transnational 
oil companies to keep the communities of the Niger Delta area divided, weak and 
distracted from the causes of their problems.  
 
j. That the recent revelations of the looting of national treasury by the Abacha junta is only 
a reflection of an existing and continuing trend of stealing by public office holders in the 
Nigerian state. We remember the over 12 billion dollars Gulf war windfall, which was 
looted by Babangida and his cohorts We note that over 70% of the billions of dollars being 
looted by military rulers and their civilian collaborators is derived from our ecologically 
devastated Ijawland.  
 
 
Based on the foregoing, we, the youths of Ijawland, hereby make the following 
resolutions to be known as the Kaiama Declaration:  
 
1. All land and natural resources (including mineral resources) within the Ijaw territory 
belong to Ijaw communities and are the basis of our survival.  
 
2. We cease to recognise all undemocratic decrees that rob our peoples/communities of 
the right to ownership and control of our lives and resources, which were enacted without 
our participation and consent. These include the Land Use Decree and The Petroleum 









3. We demand the immediate withdrawal from Ijawland of all military forces of 
occupation and repression by the Nigerian State. Any oil company that employs the 
services of the armed forces of the Nigerian State to "protect" its operations will be viewed 
as an enemy of the Ijaw people. Family members of military personnel stationed in 
Ijawland should appeal to their people to leave the Ijaw area alone.   
 
 
4 ... Ijaw youths in all the communities clans in the Niger Delta will take steps to 
implement these resolutions beginning from the 30th of December,1998, as a step towards 
reclaiming the control of our lives. We, therefore, demand that all oil companies stop all 
exploration and exploitation activities in the Ijaw area. We are tired of gas flaring; oil 
spillages, blowouts and being labelled saboteurs and terrorists. It is a case of preparing the 
noose for our hanging. We reject this labelling. Hence, we advice all oil companies staff 
and contractors to withdraw from Ijaw territories by the 30th December, 1998 pending the 




5. Ijaw youths and Peoples will promote the principle of peaceful coexistence between all 
Ijaw communities and with our immediate neighbours, despite the provocative and 
divisive actions of the Nigerian State, transnational oil companies and their contractors. 
We offer a hand of friendship and comradeship to our neighbors: the Itsekiri, Ilaje, 
Urhobo, Isoko, Edo, Ibibio, Ogoni, Ekpeye, Ikwerre etc. We affirm our commitment to 
joint struggle with the other ethnic nationalities in the Niger delta area for self-
determination.  
 
6. We express our solidarity with all peoples organisations and ethnic nationalities in 
Nigeria and elsewhere who are struggling for self-determination and justice. In particular 
we note the struggle of the Oodua peoples Congress (OPC), the Movement for the Survival 
of Ogoni People (Mosop), Egi Women's Movement etc.  
 
7. We extend our hand of solidarity to the Nigerian oil workers (NUPENG and 
PENGASSAN) and expect that they will see this struggle for freedom as a struggle for 
humanity  
 
8. We reject the present transition to civil rule programme of the Abubakar regime, as it is 
not preceded by restructuring of the Nigerian federation. The way forward is a Sovereign 
National Conference of equally represented ethnic nationalities to discuss the nature of a 
democratic federation of Nigerian ethic nationalities. Conference noted the violence and 
killings that characterized the last local government elections in most parts of the Niger 
Delta. Conference pointed out that these electoral conflicts are a manifestation of the 
undemocratic and unjust nature of the military transition programme. Conference affirmed 
therefore, that the military are incapable of enthroning true democracy in Nigeria.  
 
9 We call on all Ijaws to remain true to their Ijawness and to work for the total liberation 
of our people. You have no other true home but that which is in Ijawland.  
 
10 We agreed to remain within Nigeria but to demand and work for Self Government and 
resource control for the Ijaw people. Conference approved that the best way for Nigeria is 
a federation of ethnic nationalities. The federation should be run on the basis equality and 






Finally, Ijaw youths resolve to set up the Ijaw Youth Council (IYC) to coordinate the 
struggle of Ijaw peoples for self-determination and justice.  
 
Signed for the entire participants by:  












































Appendix E: Research Participants 
 
Interviewee 1 
Traditional Ruler, A paramount ruler from one of the towns in Yenagoa Local 
Government Area of the Bayelsa State. A key position holder in the Bayelsa 




Youth from Yenagoa, Bayelsa State, an environmental activist and a staunch member 
of the Ijaw Youth Congress, Secretary Niger Delta Wetland Centre, Yenagoa. The 
interviewee has participated in numerous effort to protect the environment through 
advocacy programme and effort to alleviate poverty in the region through 
empowerment programme which the centre coordinates. 
 
Interviewee 3 
A youth from Amasssoma in Bayelsa State. An ex-agitator turned environmentalist 
and has been active in campaign for the protection of environment and peace in the 
region.  
 
Interviewee 4  
A Community leader, Director in Bayelsa State Civil Service and Chairman of Civil 
Liberties Organisation. He has been involved in the security related issues in the state. 
He is a member of State Security Council and work with security agencies such as 
JTF, DSS and others to monitor and nip in the bud the activities of the militants in the 
state. He has written several articles on Niger Delta conflict. 
 
Interviewee 5 
A Senior Advocate of Nigeria, Politician and Opinion leader, Warri, Delta. He was a 
member of the House of Assembly in the old Bendel State (now Edo and Delta) in the 
Second Republic and also Special Assistant to the Governor in the short-lived 
administration of Late Brigadier-General Samuel Ogbomudia in the Second Republic. 
A loyal member of South- South Peoples Assembly and PANDEF 
 
Interviewee 6 
A Community Leader, retired Senior Military Personnel and current Commandant-
General Eagle Flight Chaplain and Elder, Warri Delta State He has served in different 
formations in the state and the country and since retirement, he has been involved in 
peace advocacy and training of youth. He was former Adviser on Security Matters to 
Chief Felix Ibru, the former Governor of Delta State. A staunch member of South-
South People Assembly and PANDEF. 
 
Interviewee 7  
A Youth Leader and politician from Sagbama. He was former Speaker of the Local 
Government legislative branch of government and a Doctoral candidate at University 
of Port-Harcourt. He was Supervisory Councillor for Works in Sagbama Local 
Government Area. An ex- officio member of the Ijaw Youth Council, the apex youth 








A Senior Official of the largest non-governmental organisation in the region, 
Partnership Initiative in the Niger Delta (PIND). He has trained over 300 people from 
over 50 different communities across the region on preventing, mitigating and 
reporting elections related violence before and after elections. He has authored several 
articles on Niger Delta conflict and convened and presided several stakeholders 
engagement forum with Police, Department of State Service, Independent National 
Electoral Commission, Traditional rulers and youth. 
 
Interviewee 9  
 
An High Chief from Olobiri in Bayelsa State  and  Ellu kingdom in Delta State and  
also a Network Coordinator for a Civil Society Organisation that involves in peace 
building in the region. Former Special Adviser on Local Government and Chieftaincy 
Affairs in Bayelsa State in the Timipre Sylva’s administration. 
 
Interviewee 10 
An Academician, Senior Research Fellow, French Institute for Researce in Africa 
(IFRA), University of Ibadan and Research Coordinator Partnership Initiatives in the 
Niger Delta (PIND). An Early Warning and Research Coordinator at Chevron's 
Foundation for Partnership Initiatives in the Niger Delta (PIND). He has written 
extensively on Niger Delta conflict and was  involved in the broker of peace between 
two ex- militants leaders, Asari Dokubo and Ateke Tom.  
 
Interviewee11 
An Academician, Senior Research Fellow and Peace building Coordinator Partnership 
Initiatives in the Niger Delta (PIND). He was at one time Special Assistant on Youth 
to the erstwhile governor of Rivers State, Dr Peter Odili and member of a Steering 
Committee on River State amnesty programme and has been involved in training as 
well as advocacy for peace throughout the length and breadth of the region. He has 
authored several articles, organises workshop and seminars on peace building 
throughout the length and breadth of the region. 
 
Interviewee 12 
An Academician, Nigerian Police Academy, Kano and Former Head of Security Unit 
at Shell Nigeria Limited. He has authored and co-authored several articles on Niger 
Delta conflict. As an employee of Shell, he was involved in the distribution of 
compensation to oil producing community’s security surveillance and protection of oil 
installations. He was an ex-agitator, who in the past has been involved in the Niger 














13. Chief Edwin Clark- Leader South-South People Assembly, South-South Peoples 
Congress, Pan Niger Delta Elder Forum, Leader of the South-South to the 2014 
National Conference, former Federal Commissioner for Information,  Commissioner 
for Education in the old Mid-West State, Commissioner for Finance in the defunct 
Bendel State ( now Edo and Delta states). 
14. Annkio Briggs, an environmentalist and human rights activist, founder and 
executive director of Agape Birthrights, a non-governmental organisation and 
spokesperson for both Ijaw Republican Assembly and United Niger Delta Energy 
Development Security Strategy. A delegate to the 2014 National Conference.  
15.  Ledum Mitee, an environmentalist, President of the Movement for the Survival of 
the Ogoni People (MOSOP), former Chairman of the Technical Committee on Niger 
Delta (TCND), Chairman of Nigerian Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative, 
NEITI and delegate to the 2014 National Conference. 
16. Lucky Ochuko Ararile, imperial majesty, the Ovie of Umiaghwa-Abraka Kingdom 
in Ethiope-East Local Government Area of Delta State. A retired AVM and pioneer 
Coordinator of the Presidential Amnesty Programme for ex-militants. 
17. Joseph Evah, an Ijaw activist, coordinator of Ijaw Monitoring Group and erstwhile 
publicity secretary of Ijaw apex ethnic group, Ijaw National Congress and member Pan 
Niger Delta Elder Forum (PANDEF).  
18. Asari Dokubo, an ex-militant, former president Ijaw Youth Council, an influential 
pressure group that seeks to influence government policies in favour of the region.; 
founder Niger Delta People’s Volunteer Force, one of the dreaded militia groups that 
operated in the region.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
